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1 Introduction 
Imagine a world in which language serves no purpose; utterances are exchanged 
but lack functionality. Such a society – if one could call it such – would lack 
speech acts  (Austin, 1976; Searle, 1969). Speech acts are verbal actions such as 
requests, teases and compliments. Participants in conversation have to be able to 
recognize these actions for communication to be successful. However, speech act 
recognition is far from straightforward, as utterances are frequently 
underspecified for the action level of meaning (Levinson, 2013; Searle, 1975). 
The challenge for listeners is further enhanced by the extraordinarily fast 
transitions between turns in conversation (De Ruiter, Mitterer, & Enfield, 2006; 
Heldner & Edlund, 2010; Stivers et al., 2009), allowing limited time to recognize 
the action and plan a relevant response (Levinson, 2013). How 
conversationalists manage to extract speech acts from the underspecified 
linguistic code and respond within these tight time constraints is a real puzzle. 
Can listeners recognize the action early on in the utterance, sidestepping the full 
propositional content, and thereby facilitate quick and efficient turn-taking? The 
aim of this thesis is to addresses this question by investigating the time-course of 
speech act recognition in spoken, naturalistic dialogues within a novel 
framework that bridges methods from cognitive neuroscience and research on 
conversational interaction. 
  In this introductory chapter I will first provide a short overview of 
theoretical approaches to speech acts and discuss the perspective adopted in this 
thesis. I will then outline the motivations for the research question. The reader is 
introduced to the principles of electroencephalography (EEG), the main 
methodology of the thesis. The chapter concludes with the research objectives 
and an overview of the thesis organization.  
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1.1 Theoretical background and approach 
Research on how we do things with words has roots in two theoretical 
traditions, originating in philosophy and sociology. The former tradition started 
with the philosophy of Wittgenstein, Austin and Searle in the fifties and sixties. 
Moving away from the idea that language is mainly a system for representation, 
Wittgenstein placed language use in the spotlight by proposing that language is 
first and foremost a toolbox for social activities: 
 
Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a 
glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. – The functions of words are as diverse as the function of 
these objects. . . . Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when 
we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their application is not 
presented to us so clearly. (Wittgenstein, 1953 para. 11) 
 
Seen from this perspective, speech acts are the tools that allow us to get things 
done through language.  
 Austin (1976) systematized the study of verbal action under the rubric of 
what was later termed speech act theory. He argued that talking about “uses of 
language” was too vague and instead made a distinction between three different 
types of acts that are performed through language use. The locutionary act refers 
to the production of a sentence with some propositional content (roughly 
“meaning” in the traditional sense). The illocutionary act is what is being done 
through the utterance; the performing of actions such as requests, offers, and the 
like. The current thesis is concerned with this level of analysis. The term speech 
act usually refers to illocutionary acts or the related concept of illocutionary force, 
i.e., the pragmatic function or force of the illocutionary act. The third and final 
type of act in Austin’s framework is the perlocutionary act, which involves 
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bringing about some additional effects in the listener (e.g., making someone 
frightened).    
 Speech act theory was further developed by Searle (1969, 1976) who 
classified illocutionary acts into five fundamental types; representatives, 
directives, commissives, expressives and declarations. Another influential aspect 
of speech act theory is the discussion of indirect speech acts (see, for instance, 
Gordon & Lakoff, 1971; Searle, 1975), in which “one illocutionary act is 
performed indirectly by way of performing another,” (Searle, 1975, p. 60). A 
classic example of an indirect speech act is the sentence “can you reach the salt,” 
which is simultaneously a question about someone’s ability to reach for an 
object and a request to pass it on (the utterance has two illocutionary forces; 
Searle, 1975).  
 Speech act theory has inspired research in diverse fields such as linguistic 
pragmatics (e.g., Kissine, 2013; Purver, Gregoromichelaki, Meyer-Viol, & Cann, 
2010), artificial intelligence (e.g., Traum, 1999), psychology (e.g., H. H. Clark, 
1979; Gibbs, 1981; Holtgraves, 2008b), and to a limited extent cognitive 
neuroscience (Basnakova, Weber, Petersson, Van Berkum, & Hagoort, 2014; 
Egorova, Pulvermüller, & Shtyrov, 2013; Egorova, Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, 
2013). I will return to experimental approaches to speech act comprehension in 
section 1.3 below.   
 Although speech act theory was influential, the most developed 
understanding of speech acts is found within the framework of conversation 
analysis (CA), where the term action is used (Schegloff, 1996, 2007). 
Conversation analysis was developed within sociology by Sacks, Schegloff and 
Jefferson (e.g., Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974), who drew on the writings of 
Goffman and Garfinkel (Garfinkel, 1967; Goffman, 1967; see also Heritage, 
2001). Conversation analysts record and study spontaneous conversation with 
the aim to “describe, analyze and understand talk as a basic and constitutive 
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feature of human social life” (Sidnell, 2010, p. 1). Proponents of conversation 
analysis argue that speech act theory places too much emphasis on the single 
utterance as the fundamental unit of analysis (Schegloff, 1988): 
 
What a rudimentary speech act theoretic analysis misses, and I suspect a sophisticated 
one will miss as well, is that parties to real conversations are always talking in some 
sequential context. I refer here not to social contexts like offices, classrooms or families, 
but sequential contexts formulated in terms of more or less proximately preceding talk 
and the real jobs of projecting further talk which utterances can do … Such prior and 
prospective contexts are inescapably implicated in the real life projects, however humble 
or exalted, which are being prosecuted through the talk. These real life projects, and the 
sequential infrastructure of talk-in-interaction, are involved in the production and analysis 
of talk by the parties in such intimate detail that we are only beginning to understand it. 
But it is clear that temporality and sequentiality are inescapable; utterances are in turns, 
and turns are parts of sequences; sequences and the projects done through them enter 
constitutively into utterances like the warp in a woven fabric. (Schegloff, 1988, p. 61) 
 
The study of sequence organization (Schegloff, 2007) – how actions are organized 
into larger sequences and what kind of contingencies operate between them – is 
a major contribution from CA in regards to speech acts. An important 
observation is that turns tend to come in pairs of actions and in such adjacency 
pairs (Schegloff, 2007) the first (pair) part sets up powerful constraints on what 
type of action can follow; questions are followed by answers, and invitations call 
for acceptances or rejections. The adjacency pair is one of the most basic action 
sequence types, attested in many languages (K. Kendrick et al., 2014). Adjacency 
pairs and other types of action sequences put constraints on speech acts, which 
can provide listeners with important information for the interpretation of talk. 
 CA findings have received little attention in the experimental sciences, 
particularly in cognitive neuroscience. In comparison to speech act theory, the 
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conversation analysis tradition provides a much more detailed account of what 
verbal actions in natural conversation really look like (action formation; see, for 
instance, Levinson, 2013), how they pattern into larger sequences (sequence 
organization; Schegloff, 2007), and, more generally, their role in social 
interaction. As a consequence, the CA approach and findings form the 
theoretical foundation of the following chapters, although conceptual 
distinctions from speech act theory will also be drawn upon.  
 As for terminology, the term speech act will be retained here due to its 
familiarity. It is much more frequently used than alternative terms, including the 
new hybrid speech actions (used, for instance, by Sbisà & Turner, 2013). The 
terms speech act, action and illocutionary act will be used interchangeably 
throughout the thesis, unless otherwise noted, but should not be taken to reflect 
theoretical contrasts.  
1.2 Why investigate the time-course of speech act recognition? 
Speech acts get their tool-like power by virtue of being recognized by other 
participants in conversation. Indeed, Sacks wrote that “a culture is an apparatus 
for generating recognizable actions” (Sacks, 1992, p. 226), highlighting not only 
that action (non-verbal or verbal) is a defining characteristic of culture but also 
that actions must be recognizable to have an effect. Speech act recognition – the 
topic of this thesis – is the process of identifying or recognizing the action of an 
utterance in a given context. Speech act recognition is critical in conversation 
because the response to an utterance is dependent on the speech act being 
performed. Problems with speech act recognition can halt progressivity of the 
conversation or lead to misunderstanding.  
 There are two factors that make speech act recognition difficult from an 
individual’s cognitive perspective; the lack of clear speech act marking on 
utterances and the tight time constraints in turn-taking (the back-and-forth 
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exchange of talk). These factors will be discussed below in sections 1.2.1 and 
1.2.2. Section 1.2.2 concludes with the introduction of an account of speech act 
recognition which will be tested in the experimental chapters of this thesis.   
1.2.1 Underspecification at the action level 
Speech act recognition would be an easy task if listeners could rely on turn 
design, i.e., the form of the utterance itself, to recognize the action. Searle noted 
that features such as word order, syntactic mood and intonation can provide 
clues about what type of speech act is being performed (Searle, 1969; Searle & 
Vanderveken, 1985); such speech act clues have been called illocutionary force 
indicating devices (Searle, 1969; Searle & Vanderveken, 1985). For example, 
interrogative word order, wh-question words (who, when) and rising intonation 
are associated with questions, while imperatives (put, go) are commonly used in 
orders or requests. However, listeners cannot always rely on such clues. 
Interrogatives and imperatives can perform many other actions than questioning 
and requests (see, for instance, Heritage, 2012). Similarly, rising intonation is 
not a good indicator of questionhood, as it is frequently absent from questions in 
English (Geluykens, 1988) and used in assertions serving a range of other 
actions. There is no evidence that prosody can, or normally does, fully 
disambiguate all the potential illocutionary forces associated with utterances. 
Moreover, illocutionary force indicating devices can be overriden by external 
factors such as epistemic status, i.e., which participants in conversation are 
considered to be most knowledgeable about a relevant domain of knowledge 
(Heritage, 2012). In fact, it has been noted that “it is possible to use nearly any 
sentence type with the effect of nearly any other, under appropriate 
circumstances” (Sadock & Zwicky, 1985, p. 191); there is no one-to-one 
correspondence between turn design and what speech act is being performed 
(Heritage, 2012; Levinson, 2013; Motsch, 1980; Schegloff, 2007). 
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 The lack of discrete speech act marking leaves most utterances in 
conversation underspecified for the action level of meaning, such that the 
utterance is compatible with multiple speech acts. For instance, the declarative 
utterance I have a car could be used to offer somebody help with moving, to 
indirectly reject an offer for a ride, or to answer a question about commuting. 
This problem of underspecification at the action level is pervasive in everyday 
conversation, making speech act recognition far from straightforward.  
1.2.2 Time constraints in turn-taking 
The challenge for participants in conversation is further enhanced by tight time 
constraints in turn-taking. The seminal paper by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 
(1974) noted that the turn-taking system is characterized by the minimization of 
overlapping talk and gaps between speakers’ turns. Turn transitions with no gap 
or no overlap are common, and “together with transitions characterized by slight 
gap or slight overlap, they make up the vast majority of transitions” (Sacks et 
al., 1974, p. 700; see also Levinson & Torreira, 2015). In recent years corpus 
research has provided important insights into the timing of turn transitions. 
Using a corpus of Dutch telephone conversations, De Ruiter, Mitterer and Enfield 
(2006) measured the time between the start of a turn and the end of the prior 
turn (response offset or floor transfer offset). The most frequent kind of turn 
transition interval, occuring in 45% of turn transitions, was a slight gap or slight 
overlap with a response offset between -250 and +250 ms (a negative value 
indicates an overlap with previous speaker while a positive value indicates a 
gap). In a study on Scottish English, Dutch and Swedish, the mode of the 
response offset distribution was centered around 200 ms in all corpora, 
indicating that a slight gap of 200 ms was most common, and 70–82% of all 
between-speaker gaps were shorter than 500 ms (Heldner & Edlund, 2010). A 
cross-linguistic study focusing on responses to questions revealed that in all 10 
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languages studied, the most frequent response offset was somewhere between 0 
and +200 ms, depending on the language, with an astonishing overall mode of 
0 ms (Stivers et al., 2009).  
 The emerging picture is that turn transitions between speakers in 
conversation are generally extremely quick, with gaps of roughly 200 ms being 
most frequent. From the perspective of a listener in conversation, a 200 ms gap 
does not leave much time for recognizing the action in the prior turn, planning a 
relevant response, and finally executing it. Indeed, as noted by Levinson (2013), 
research on the time course of speech production (e.g., Indefrey & Levelt, 2004; 
Levelt, 1989) indicates that planning and initiating a simple, one-word utterance 
takes considerably more time than most gaps in turn-taking provide. To 
highlight what this means in the context of conversation, these studies will be 
described in more detail below.  
 In a comprehensive meta-analysis of the relevant neuroimaging literature 
on word production, Indefrey and Levelt (2004) gave timing estimates for the 
core processes of word production, according to the theory of lexical access put 
forth by Levelt, Roelofs and Meyer (1999). The first core processing stage, 
conceptual preparation, involves accessing the lexical concept. In the second 
stage, lemma retrieval or lexical selection, the word’s syntactical properties are 
retrieved, such as word category, gender of nouns, and syntactic argument 
structure in the case of verbs. The third stage, form encoding, is itself a staged 
process that involves accessing the word’s phonological code, then clustering the 
segments into syllables, and finally creating motor action instructions to initiate 
articulation (phonetic encoding). The estimated time windows for these 
processes are as follows (see Table 1.1, based on Indefrey and Levelt (2004)):  
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Table 1.1: Estimated time-windows for the core processes of word 
production, as described by Indefrey and Levelt (2004, p. 108) 
The core processes of word production together take around 600 ms. In other 
words, this is how long it takes to plan and initiate a simple, one-word utterance 
in a controlled experimental environment.  
 The question arises how these numbers translate into natural 
conversation. Turns in conversation usually contain more than one word. Picture 
naming studies have demonstrated that longer sentences take longer to plan; 
when participants are asked to describe a picture using a full sentence such as 
the girl jumps, containing a determiner + noun + verb, mean naming latency is 
784 ms (Schnur, Costa, & Caramazza, 2006). When an adjective is also included, 
resulting in a four-word sentence, the latency is 857 ms (Schnur et al., 2006). 
Based on these findings, conversational utterances that contain more than one 
word should take even more than 600 ms to plan1. Moreover, in such picture 
                                         
1 It should be kept in mind, however, that language production is incremental; each processing component can start 
working on the still-incomplete output of the prior processing stage (Levelt, 1989). Thus “even though there can be no 
formulating without some conceptual planning, and there can be no articulating without a phonetic plan, message 
encoding, formulating and articulating can run in parallel” (Levelt, 1989, p. 24). Indeed, it is not the case that planning a 
five-word turn takes 5 x 600 milliseconds. It is nevertheless reasonable to assume that the basic process of “turning on” 
Operation Duration (ms) 
Conceptual preparation (from picture onset to selecting the target concept) 175 
Lemma retrieval 75 
Form encoding:   
- Phonological code retrieval 80 
- Syllabification 125 
- Phonetic encoding (until initiation of articulation) 145 
Total 600 
  10 
naming studies the object to be named is often primed or participants have been 
familiarized with the pictures beforehand – a situation that is quite remote from 
natural conversation. A study on seven languages, in which participants were 
not shown the pictures to be named in advance, found longer reaction times 
(naming latencies), ranging from 1041 ms in English to 1254 in Bulgarian, for a 
single word (E. Bates et al., 2003).  
 The timing facts discussed in this section – that initiating a turn takes at 
least between 600 to 1200 ms, while most gaps in conversation are only 200 ms 
– suggest that listeners begin planning their responses before the prior speaker 
has finished speaking, and by extension that they can ascribe an action to the 
unfolding utterance well before the turn ends (Levinson, 2013). On this early 
speech act recognition account, recognition of the action is not made at the final 
stage in the comprehension process, occurring at the last word of incoming 
utterances, but takes place early on when the turn has only been partially 
processed. Early speech act recognition could be the key to efficient turn-taking, 
allowing listeners to plan their reply early and respond within the 200 ms time 
frame characteristic for turn-taking. The key question addressed in this thesis is 
whether this early recognition of action can be made, given that utterances are 
often underspecified for action and do not contain clear speech act clues to aid 
recognition. 
1.3 Prior research on speech act comprehension 
Several strands of experimental research have addressed speech act 
comprehension broadly construed, i.e., aspects of comprehension that do not 
necessarily involve the recognition of the action per se. In this section I will give 
                                                                                                                         
the speech production system in conversation takes at least 600 ms and probably longer when it comes to more complex 
turns in conversation. 
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a brief overview of the relevant literature, with a particular focus on eye-
tracking and neuroimaging methods due to their edge in unraveling the time-
course and neural substrates of cognitive processing.  
 One domain of research that has indirectly addressed speech act 
comprehension is the study of reference resolution and common ground using 
eye-tracking methodology. Experiments in this domain have demonstrated early 
sensitivity to speech act types in referential communication tasks, even in young 
children; listeners quickly interpret requests as asking about referents in 
common ground (known to both participants) (Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004; 
Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell, 2003; Heller, Grodner, & Tanenhaus, 2008), 
whereas when listening to questions they shift their attention to entities in 
privileged ground (only known to the addresses) (Brown-Schmidt, Gunlogson, & 
Tanenhaus, 2008; Nurmsoo & Bloom, 2008). However, these eye-tracking 
paradigms are more informative about the on-line processing consequences of 
speech act recognition than how recognition of the action is made in the first 
place. The critical utterances are often all of the same or restricted type (e.g., 
only requests, or requests vs. questions) and contain clear speech act marking.2 
As a consequence, they do not address the key focus of the present thesis, 
namely how underspecified utterances (without illocutionary force indicators) 
are rapidly understood as performing certain actions.  
 Another strand of research has used functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) to investigate the comprehension of indirect speech acts. An 
fMRI study on indirect replies in spoken dialogues (e.g., Did you like my 
presentation? - It's hard to give a good presentation) found that in comparison to 
direct replies, the indirect speech acts activated not only typical language 
                                         
2 In one experiment, for instance, all targets were requests with imperatives; Pick up X and put it in area Y (Hanna, Tanenhaus, & 
  12 
regions, such as the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, but also areas implicated in 
mentalizing and affective empathy, including the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 
(dmPFC), right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and insula, as well as the right 
medial temporal gyrus (Basnakova et al., 2014). This was taken to indicate that 
listeners take the speaker’s perspective both at cognitive and affective levels 
when they listen to speech acts (Basnakova et al., 2013). Similarly, a study on 
indirect requests (e.g., it is very hot here presented with a picture of a window) 
reported activations in theory of mind regions known to be involved in false 
belief tasks, including the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the precuneus, and 
the bilateral TPJ (van Ackeren, Casasanto, Bekkering, Hagoort, & Rüschemeyer, 
2012). The indirect requests also activated cortical motor areas associated with 
action planning and motor control (van Ackeren et al., 2012). These fMRI 
studies provide important insights into the neural substrates of indirect speech 
act comprehension, but due to the poor temporal resolution of fMRI cannot tell 
us much about the time-course of speech act recognition. 
 A number of studies have made use of the excellent temporal resolution 
of electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG) to 
investigate the comprehension of speech acts. These methods are advantageous 
for tracking the time-course of cognitive processes, as discussed in section 1.4 
below. Most of these studies throw only indirect light on speech act recognition, 
for instance by investigating the processing of irony (Regel, Gunter, & Friederici, 
2011; Spotorno, Cheylus, Van Der Henst, & Noveck, 2013) or pitch accents in 
question-answer dialogues (e.g., Dimitrova, Stowe, Redeker, & Hoeks, 2012; 
Magne et al., 2005; Wang, Bastiaansen, Yang, & Hagoort, 2011). More relevant 
for this thesis, an EEG study on visually presented (written) indirect requests 
(e.g., My soup is too cold to eat in a restaurant context) found differences between 
indirect requests and literal statements from the second word onwards, but no 
EEG differences at the final word (Coulson & Lovett, 2010). The results suggest 
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that speech act recognition in the visual modality takes place relatively early in 
the sentence. Another EEG study investigated speech act recognition in written 
words (e.g., plant) that performed either a requesting or a naming speech act 
depending on a prior video-taped context sentence (What are these called?/What 
can I get you? – PLANT) (Egorova, Shtyrov, et al., 2013). The brain responses for 
the two speech acts diverged as early as 120 ms after the onset of the critical 
words (PLANT). A follow-up MEG study (Egorova, Pulvermüller, et al., 2013) 
reported that the requests engaged comprehension systems in the right 
hemisphere within 100 ms after word onset, followed by theory of mind 
activations in the medial prefrontal and temporo-parietal areas from 200 to 300 
ms. Naming speech acts, on the other hand, activated brain areas involved in 
lexico-semantic retrieval from 100 to 150 ms. These EEG and MEG findings 
provide some supportive evidence for an early speech act recognition account, at 
least in the visual modality. However, these studies are far removed from 
conversation, using written input instead of naturalistic, spoken dialogues. What 
is missing is an investigation of speech act recognition in the auditory modality 
that takes into account not only the temporal demands that characterize spoken 
conversation but also the sequential organization of action in turn-taking.  
1.4 Methodology: Electroencephalography and language research 
EEG is a neuroimaging method that is particularly well suited for investigating 
the time-course of cognitive processes, due to its fine temporal resolution. Since 
this is the main methodology used in this thesis I will describe it in some detail 
in the following section.  
 The German neurologist Hans Berger discovered in 1929 that the 
electrical activity of the human brain could be measured by placing an electrode 
on the scalp and plotting the voltage changes over time (Berger, 1929). This 
recording of electrical activity along the scalp is referred to as 
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electroencephalography or simply EEG, and the output is the electroencephalogram. 
Electrical activity encodes information about brain states and processes, and by 
inference about mental states and processes involved in various cognitive tasks 
(Kutas & Dale, 1997). The recording of this activity through EEG has therefore 
proven very useful in both clinical and scientific contexts, particularly when 
information about the time-course of processing is needed.  
 Electrical activity is the result of electrochemical signaling between 
neurons. Postsynaptic potentials are voltages that arise when neurotransmitters 
from the presynaptic (sending) neuron bind to receptors on the postsynaptic 
(receiving) cell. This leads to net negativity in the region of the dendrite and a 
net positivity at the cell body, creating a small dipole (Luck, 2005a). The electric 
potential produced by a single dipole is too weak to be detected at the scalp. The 
voltage can only be measured with EEG when a large ensemble of neurons with 
a similar spatial orientation fires synchronously; if the dipoles from the 
individual neurons are not spatially aligned, they will cancel each other (Kutas & 
Dale, 1997; Luck, 2005a). The summation of postsynaptic potentials is most 
likely to occur in pyramidal cells, due to their alignment perpendicular to the 
surface of the cortex (Luck, 2005a). The EEG therefore reflects the summed 
postsynaptic potentials of thousands or millions of pyramidal neurons that fire 
synchronously and have a similar spatial orientation.  
 There are two main approaches to analyzing EEG data; event-related 
potentials and time-frequency analysis. These two approaches will be described 
below. The advantages and disadvantages of EEG relative to other neuroimaging 
methods will also be discussed. Section 1.4 ends with some practical challenges 
of investigating speech act recognition with EEG and how they can be addressed.  
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1.4.1 Event-related potentials 
In experimental research, a large part of the raw EEG signal is not related to the 
manipulation of interest, but rather reflects background EEG activity (i.e., 
“noise” from an experimental point of view). Evoked responses – the electric 
potentials associated with the processing of a stimulus or an event – are much 
smaller in amplitude than the background EEG. One way to extract the evoked 
response from the background activity is to average the EEG across many trials 
that are time-locked to the stimulus, i.e., averaging the electric potentials that 
occur immediately before or after the event. Since the background EEG is 
assumed to be randomly distributed across trials, the averaging procedure 
reduces the noise to nearly zero (Bastiaansen, Mazaheri, & Jensen, 2008; Kutas 
& Dale, 1997). At the same time, the event-related response of interest, which 
should be invariant from trial to trial, is enhanced. The remaining, averaged 
signal is the event-related potential (ERP). More specifically, ERPs reflect brain 
responses that are both time-locked and phase-locked with respect to stimulus 
onset. The phase of an EEG wave is, roughly speaking, its slope or direction at a 
given point in time (Bastiaansen et al., 2008). The phase of an evoked response 
associated with a stimulus does not vary across trials (it is phase-locked), and as 
a consequence the evoked response of interest remains in the ERP average, while 
the phase of the background activity is random (non phase-locked) and is 
therefore averaged out (Bastiaansen et al., 2008; Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 
1999). The ERP approach has been the dominant methodology to investigate the 
relationship between EEG and cognition (Bastiaansen et al., 2008). This 
approach is the foundation of this thesis and will therefore be discussed in some 
detail. 
 The ERPs elicited by a stimulus consist of negative and positive voltage 
fluctuations. By convention, negative voltages are normally plotted upwards. 
The fluctuations are frequently labeled according to polarity (i.e., 
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negativity/positivity) and latency (measured from stimulus onset). As an 
example, the N400 component is a negative-going deflection in the EEG that 
peaks 400 ms post-stimulus onset. An ERP component refers to fluctuations in the 
EEG waveform that have certain functional or physiological characteristics. An 
important distinction has been made between endogenous and exogenous ERP 
components. Exogenous components occur early in the waveform and are 
obligatory, sensory-driven responses that are largely insensitive to cognitive 
factors (C. M. Brown & Hagoort, 2000; Luck, 2005a). In contrast, endogenous 
ERP components are not influenced by the physical characteristics of the 
stimulus, but vary as a function of the internal, cognitive operations engendered 
by it (Kutas, van Petten, & Kluender, 2006). The endogenous components, which 
usually occur with a latency beyond 100 ms after stimulus onset, are therefore 
more informative for psycholinguistic research (Kutas et al., 2006). 
 How can ERPs be used to investigate language comprehension? An 
influential study by Kutas and Hillyard (1980) marked the birth of the 
electrophysiology of language. Kutas and Hillyard investigated the ERP 
responses to semantically congrous versus incongruous sentences in a reading 
task. Words that were incongruous with the prior context (He spread his warm 
bread with SOCKS) elicited a larger negativity than congruous words (He spread 
his warm bread with BUTTER) between 250 and 400 ms after word onset. This 
ERP component has since been referred to as the N400. The N400 is thought to 
reflect the ease/difficulty of retrieving conceptual knowledge associated with a 
word or meaningful stimulus from semantic memory (e.g., Kutas & Federmeier, 
2000; Kutas et al., 2006), or the subsequent semantic integration of that 
knowledge into context (e.g., D. J Chwilla, Brown, & Hagoort, 1995; Van 
Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown, 1999). The N400 has been found to be modulated 
by factors such as word frequency (Van Petten & Kutas, 1990) and semantic 
priming (Kutas & Federmeier, 2000). However, in recent years big strides have 
  17 
been made in research on how discourse and social context influence the N400 
and other ERP components. As an example, an N400 effect is elicited when a 
target word does not fit into prior story context (Van Berkum, Zwitserlood, 
Hagoort, & Brown, 2003), violates world knowledge (Hagoort, Hald, 
Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004), or makes establishing causal coherence across 
sentences difficult (G. R Kuperberg, Paczynski, & Ditman, 2011). The N400 is 
also influenced by the personal values of experimental participants (Van 
Berkum, Holleman, Nieuwland, Otten, & Murre, 2009), and mismatches between 
a message and stereotypical expectations based on the voice of the person 
uttering it (Van Berkum, Van Den Brink, Tesink, Kos, & Hagoort, 2008), 
demonstrating that social context has an immediate impact on sentence 
interpretation.  
 Another language-related ERP component is the P600, also referred to as 
the late positive component. A positive-going deflection that peaks after 600 ms, 
the P600 was initially associated with syntactic reanalysis or repair following 
syntactic ambiguity or violations (Hagoort, Brown, & Osterhout, 1999). 
However, it was later found to be elicited in other situations involving semantic 
processing, such as in thematic violations (see Kolk & Chwilla, 2007 for a 
review) and has been argued to reflect domain-general reanalysis processes (Van 
de Meerendonk, Kolk, Vissers, & Chwilla, 2010). Most relevant for research on 
conversation, ironic utterances (e.g., That’s really BLAND preceded by a 
description of a man tasting a very spicy dish) elicit a P600 and not an N400, 
both in the visual and auditory modality (Regel et al., 2011), suggesting that the 
P600 may reflect pragmatic interpretation processes.  
 Well-known ERP components such as the N400 and P600 provide 
important benchmarks for the interpretation of ERP data. However, inferences 
can be drawn from ERP data at several levels, even when familiar ERP 
components are not observed. At the most basic level, statistical differences 
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between two conditions tells us that cognitive processing in the conditions 
differs in some way (Rugg & Coles, 1995). In the case of linguistic stimuli, for 
instance, such differences indicate that the comprehension system is sensitive to 
the experimental manipulation in question (sensitivity inferences; Van Berkum, 
2004). A second type of inference concerns timing. If two waveforms diverge 
statistically at a certain point in time, one can infer that cognitive processing 
differs for the conditions at least at that moment (Rugg & Coles, 1995; Van 
Berkum, 2004). A third type of inference can be drawn based on the scalp 
distribution. If two experimental manipulations affect the ERPs in different ways 
in terms of the scalp distribution of effects, the inference can be made that two 
non-equivalent processes are involved (Rugg & Coles, 1995). Other aspects of 
the EEG waveform provide additional cues regarding whether there are 
qualitative or quantitative differences between conditions. Differences in 
polarity, morphology (wave shape) and/or scalp distribution are usually 
required to infer the presence of qualitatively different cognitive processes 
(Kutas, 1993). If, on the other hand, two ERP effects are similar in terms of these 
features, differences in the size of the effect or latency are interpreted as 
reflecting quantitative variations of the same cognitive process (Kutas, 1993). 
These dimensions highlight the wealth of information that can be obtained from 
event-related potentials. 
1.4.2 Time-frequency analysis 
ERPs only reflect a certain part of the event-related EEG signal. Raw EEG 
recordings are dominated by rhythmic oscillations of various frequencies. These 
oscillations are ongoing phenomena that occur even in the absence of an 
experimental task (Bastiaansen et al., 2008). The original report by Hans Berger 
in 1929 described two such oscillatory rhythms, alpha and beta (Berger, 1929), 
at a frequency around 8 – 13 Hz and 13 – 30 Hz respectively. Other rhythms 
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include delta (1 – 4 Hz), theta (4 – 8 Hz) and gamma (30 – 70 Hz). Some of the 
oscillatory activity reflects “noise”, i.e., background EEG activity that is 
uncorrelated with the experimental condition and is averaged out in the event-
related potentials analysis. However, in addition to giving rise to evoked 
responses (ERPs), an experimental event can also modulate ongoing oscillatory 
activity, resulting in oscillations that may be of interest to the researcher. Such 
event-related changes in oscillatory activity are not phase-locked to stimulus 
onset, since the experimental event occurs at random phases of the ongoing 
oscillation (Bastiaansen et al., 2008). As a consequence, this type of event-
related activity cancels out in the averaging procedure, in contrast to the phase-
locked responses captured in the ERPs. 
 A different type of analysis is required to capture non-phase locked 
oscillatory activity. One method commonly used is time-frequency analysis of 
power which represents frequency-specific changes in EEG power (squared 
amplitude) over time at the single trial level. EEG power reflects the number of 
neurons that fire synchronously (Klimesch, 1999). The summation of post-
synaptic potentials of a large number of neurons results in increased amplitude, 
and hence power, of the scalp-recorded EEG oscillations (Bastiaansen et al., 
2008).  
 Time-frequency analysis of EEG data is complementary to ERP results in 
several respects. First, since the two methods capture different types of brain 
responses, combining them can result in a more complete picture of the time-
course of cognitive processes in the post-stimulus interval. As an example, a 
recent study on oscillatory activity during comprehension of irony found 
evidence for integration operations (reflected by an increase in gamma band 
power) in an earlier time window than reported by ERP studies, challenging the 
view that irony processing takes place only at a later stage (Spotorno et al., 
2013). Second, while ERPs in principle reflect the brain’s phase-locked response 
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after the stimulus, time-frequency analyses can be applied to the pre-stimulus 
interval, revealing power changes that may be of interest. This is an advantage, 
for instance, in paradigms investigating anticipatory attention – when attention 
is oriented towards an upcoming stimulus to facilitate its processing 
(Bastiaansen, Böcker, Brunia, de Munck, & Spekreijse, 2001; e.g., Bastiaansen & 
Brunia, 2001; Jones et al., 2010; van Ede, Szebényi, & Maris, 2014). The use of 
both ERP and time-frequency analyses can therefore “provide a unified temporal 
account (pre-stimulus and post) of how information is processed by the brain” 
(Bastiaansen et al., 2008, p. 38). Third, oscillatory activity provides additional 
insights into the cognitive processes of the phenomena under investigation. For 
instance, time-frequency analyses can dissociate superficially indistinguishable 
ERP components (see, for instance, Roehm, Schlesewsky, Bornkessel, Frisch, & 
Haider, 2004), providing further specification of the neuronal mechanisms 
involved. More generally, event-related oscillatory activity is informative about 
the functional network dynamics in the brain, since synchronization of 
oscillations is thought to play a key role in linking areas that are part of the 
same functional network (Bastiaansen et al., 2008).  
 In this thesis both event-related potentials and event-related oscillations 
are exploited to elucidate the time-course and nature of speech act recognition.  
1.4.3 Practical aspects of investigating speech act recognition with EEG  
EEG is a very useful technique for investigating language comprehension 
because it allows researchers to track brain responses to utterances as they 
unfold in real time, providing unique insights into the time-course of processing. 
There are nevertheless several constraints on the methodology that need to be 
considered. First, in addition to brain activity, EEG also records electrical 
activity arising from other sources, including the muscles of the body. For 
instance, movement of the head, clenching of the jaw, shoulder tension, eye 
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movements and blinking can contaminate the EEG recording. Such artifacts are 
typically very large compared to the signals of interest and decrease the signal-
to-noise ratio (Luck, 2005a). Although artifacts can be removed from the dataset 
by excluding contaminated trials according to certain criteria (artifact rejection) 
or correcting for their presence (artifact correction), it is necessary to instruct 
participants to move as little as possible. As a consequence, the researcher 
cannot simply place the EEG cap on participants’ head and record their brain 
activity while they have a conversation; speaking and blinking would introduce 
too many artifacts into the signal.  
 Second, many trials per condition are needed to obtain a clear ERP signal. 
The signal-to-noise ratio increases as more trials are added to the ERP average; 
as a rule of thumb, at least 30 trials should be included for each condition, and 
for smaller components hundreds of trials are recommended (Luck, 2005b; Van 
Berkum, 2012). This puts constraints on the creation of stimuli, which are 
particularly relevant in the case of language research. Using lengthy narratives 
or dialogues is not feasible, keeping in mind the time required for the making of 
the stimuli as well as the length of the experimental session.  
 Third, the ERP method is sensitive to numerous factors, which may 
confound the manipulation of interest. These factors include, for instance, 
variation in word length, frequency of words, word class, semantic content and 
discourse context (Hagoort, 2008; Hauk & Pulvermüller, 2004; Kutas & 
Federmeier, 2000; Van Berkum, 2004; Van Petten & Kutas, 1990). Given the 
degree of variability in these factors in natural conversation, and the fact that 
many (similar) trials are needed for each condition, the use of recordings from 
natural conversation as stimuli for ERP research is very challenging, if not 
impossible.  
 How can we then investigate speech act recognition in a way that comes 
as close to language comprehension in conversation as possible? One solution is 
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to use an overhearing paradigm in which participants listen to short, pre-designed 
spoken conversations (Van Berkum, 2012). This approach offers a good 
compromise between experimental control and ecological validity. An 
overhearing paradigm allows the researcher to use controlled materials, 
reducing noise from confounding factors. At the same time, the conversational 
exchanges can be modeled on natural conversation – based on findings from 
conversation analysis and other domains of research – to ensure a better 
approximation to everyday interaction. This is the approach adopted in this 
thesis.  
1.5 Objectives of the thesis 
The general aim of this thesis is to investigate the time-course of spoken speech 
act recognition – the core cognitive ability that gives language its basic 
functionality. More specifically, the main goal is to test the early speech act 
recognition account introduced in section 1.2.2, i.e., the hypothesis that speech 
acts are recognized early on in utterances, facilitating quick and efficient turn-
taking. A second goal is to investigate the influence of the sequential 
organization of action on the time-course of speech act recognition.  
 The experimental paradigm developed to address these issues involves 
short, spoken dialogues containing target utterances that deliver three distinct 
speech acts depending on the prior turn. The target utterances are identical 
across conditions – and hence underspecified at the action level – they but differ 
in the type of speech act performed and how it fits into the larger action 
sequence. As a consequence, ERP differences between them can be attributed to 
their speech act function and how listeners arrive at that function.  
 The novelty of this thesis lies in two aspects. First, in contrast to the 
majority of EEG research on language (for overviews, see for instance Kolk & 
Chwilla, 2007; Kutas & Federmeier, 2000; Van Berkum, 2004), this study 
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investigates speech act comprehension in spoken, naturalistic dialogues without 
any syntactic, semantic or pragmatic anomalies. Second, this thesis uses an 
interdisciplinary approach based on methods from cognitive neuroscience and 
findings from conversation analysis and other studies on talk in interaction. By 
modeling the experimental paradigm on everyday turn-taking, this investigation 
comes closer to capturing speech act recognition in its natural habitat – 
conversation.  
1.6 Outline of the thesis 
The next four chapters present the experimental research conducted for this 
thesis. Since the chapters are based on published articles or manuscripts in 
submission/preparation, some overlap between the chapters and this 
introduction is inevitable. However, when possible the reader is referred to prior 
chapters to minimize repetition.  
 Chapter 2 sets the stage by reporting behavioural findings from self-paced 
reading and comprehension tasks which form the foundation for the following 
EEG experiments. The aim of the behavioural experiment was twofold: to 
investigate how reliably participants can categorize the speech act of sentences 
that are underspecified at the action level, and to obtain a rough estimate of the 
time-course of speech act comprehension as reflected in self-paced reading 
times. The target stimuli were written versions of the spoken dialogues used in 
the remainder of the thesis. The results from an action categorization task 
demonstrate that participants can categorize the speech act in action-
underspecified sentences with very high accuracy (95.8%), based only on the 
prior speech act. The reading time results indicate that speech act recognition in 
the visual modality begins early in the utterance, at the first word or the verb. 
The results demonstrate the feasibility of using the experimental paradigm in 
further research on speech act recognition.  
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Chapter 3 then proceeds to the core of the thesis, investigating the time-
course of spoken speech act recognition using ERPs. How quickly can listeners 
recognize action-underspecified speech acts in the auditory modality? How does 
the sequential context influence this process? The ERP experiment presented in 
this chapter uses the spoken versions of the dialogues in Chapter 2 (briefly 
described in 1.5) and the same comprehension task (action categorization) to 
facilitate comparability with the behavioural results. Chapter 3 identifies three 
speech-act-related ERP effects. The results for an early utterance time-window, 
corresponding to the first word and the verb, indicate that spoken speech act 
recognition begins early in the turn when the utterance has only been partially 
processed. The results for a late utterance time-window, corresponding to the 
final word, demonstrate that the time-course of speech act recognition is 
influenced by the type of speech act and how it fits into the larger action 
sequence; recognition of the action can be made before the final word when the 
prior turn is highly constraining in terms of what action can follow, while 
additional processing, based on the complete utterance, is required in more 
complex actions.  
Chapter 4 tests the robustness of the speech-act-related ERP effects that in 
Chapter 3 were observed using an action categorization task. In particular, it 
investigates whether the the ERP effects generalize to a more natural situation in 
which overt categorization is not required. The experiment in Chapter 4 includes 
a different task (true/false judgment) and additional filler dialogues, reducing 
strategic processing of the target speech acts. Chapter 4 replicates two of the 
three ERP effects reported in Chapter 3, demonstrating the robustness of these 
effects. However, it also reveals an influence of task and experimental design on 
the ERP results and thereby further refines the time-course of speech act 
recognition described in Chapter 3.  
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 Chapter 5 investigates whether the pattern of results reported in Chapter 
4 is supported by converging evidence from time-frequency analyses of the EEG 
data in the same experiment. As discussed in section 1.4.2, ERPs only reflect a 
certain part of the event-related EEG signal, namely phase-locked responses 
which remain after averaging in the time domain (Bastiaansen et al., 2008; 
Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 1999). By analyzing non-phase locked oscillatory 
activity, Chapter 5 aims to give a more complete picture of the time-course of 
speech act recognition. The more specific aim was to shed light on the role of 
anticipatory processes in speech act recognition. Overall, the results substantiate 
the time-course of speech act recognition as reported in Chapter 4 and provide 
evidence that early speech act recognition in highly-constraining contexts 
involves anticipatory attention before the speech act begins. 
 Finally, Chapter 6 presents a summary of the main empirical findings, 
discusses their theoretical implications and directions for future research. The 
thesis concludes with remaining questions that relate to speech act 
comprehension in a broader context. 
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2 Speech act recognition: Behavioural findings 
This chapter is an extended and modified version of: 
Gisladottir, R. S., Chwilla, D. J., Schriefers, H., & Levinson, S. C. (2012). Speech 
act recognition in conversation: Experimental evidence. In N. Miyake & R. P. 
Cooper (Eds.), Proceedings of the 34th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science 
Society (pp. 1596–1601). Austin, Texas. 
 
Abstract 
Recognizing the speech acts in our interlocutors’ utterances is a crucial 
prerequisite for conversation. However, speech act recognition can be a 
challenging task given that the form and content of utterances is frequently 
underspecified for this level of meaning. In the present study we investigate 
participants’ competence in categorizing speech acts in such action-
underspecified sentences and explore the time-course of speech act 
comprehension using a self-paced reading paradigm. The results demonstrate 
that participants are able to categorize the speech acts with very high accuracy, 
based on only limited context and without any prosodic information. 
Furthermore, the results show that the exact same sentence is processed 
differently depending on the speech act it performs, with reading times starting 
to differ already at the first word. The present results indicate that participants 
are very good at “getting” the speech acts, opening up a new arena for 
experimental research on action recognition in conversation. 
2.1 Introduction 
Knowing a language doesn’t just require syntax or semantics, but the ability to 
extract speech acts from our interlocutors’ utterances. This is crucial in 
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conversation, since all actions – be they non-verbal or verbal – have implications 
for how we should respond (Schegloff, 2007): a greeting calls for another 
greeting, an offer is followed by an acceptance or declination. Scholars in 
Conversation Analysis were the first to reveal the systematicity of courses of 
action in turn-taking (e.g. Sacks et al., 1974; Schegloff, 2007). Moving away 
from the single act as the fundamental unit of analysis – the perspective of 
speech act theory (Austin, 1976; Searle, 1969) – conversation analysts pay 
attention to the sequential context, i.e., prior and upcoming turns in conversation. 
As discussed in section 1.1, one of the main observations from this literature is 
that turns tend to come in pairs of actions and in such adjacency pairs (Schegloff, 
2007) the first (pair) part sets up powerful constraints on what type of action 
can follow. Moreover, not all actions have equal status. Reflecting an orientation 
towards preference structure (Schegloff, 2007), dispreferred actions such as 
rejections to invitations tend to be delivered with inter-turn gaps, turn-initial 
delay, hedges or other discourse markers (uhm, well), while preferred actions 
(e.g., acceptances) do not (Schegloff, 2007). Importantly, preference is calibrated 
to the specific action context; for instance, while rejections are usually 
dispreferred actions, they can in certain contexts be preferred over acceptances 
and are in such cases delivered without hedges or delays. This suggests that 
participants in conversation not only monitor their speech for actions but also 
orient to how they fit into the larger action sequence. 
How do we map speech acts onto our interlocutors’ utterances, bridging 
the gap between the literal meaning (sentence meaning; Grice, 1975) and 
action? In some cases this is a simple matter. In the utterance please close the 
door, for instance, the imperative mood of the verb and the adverb please 
function as “special markers” or “illocutionary force indicating devices” (H. H. 
Clark, 1979; Levinson, 1983; Schegloff, 2007) that clearly indicate this is a 
request. In most utterances, however, the absence of such dedicated vocabulary 
  29 
leaves the propositional content underspecified for the speech act level of 
meaning. As an example, the assertion I have a credit card can deliver different 
speech acts, depending on context. When responding to a question from our 
interlocutor (e.g., How are you going to pay for the ticket?), I have a credit card 
functions as an information-giving answer. If it follows an offer of payment (e.g., 
I can lend you money for the ticket), it is used to indirectly decline it. In this case 
it could be characterized as an indirect speech act, in which “one illocutionary 
act is performed indirectly by way of performing another” (Searle, 1975, p. 60). 
In yet another interchange, if our interlocutor has expressed the need or desire 
for some means of payment (e.g., I don’t have any money to pay for the ticket), the 
same statement of ownership can function as a prelude to an offer, called a pre-
offer in conversation analysis (Schegloff, 1988, 2007). In all three cases, the form 
and semantic content is underspecified for the action such that the full import of 
the utterance I have a credit card can only be determined relative to the context, 
in this case the prior speech act in the conversation. 
There is some psychological evidence that people do extract speech act 
information online. Holtgraves (2008a) addressed whether the comprehension of 
a sentence like Don’t forget to go to your dentist (an “implicit speech act”) entails 
automatic activation of the speech act performed (reminding). Participants were 
presented with the critical sentence or a control, and then performed either a 
lexical decision task (is this string of letters a word?) or a recognition probe task 
(did this probe literally appear in the remark?). If, for instance, comprehension 
of the critical sentence does involve activation of the speech act (e.g., remind), 
then participants should respond faster in the lexical decision task when the 
target represents the speech act than when it does not. This is indeed what was 
found. Such priming studies indicate that people do extract speech act 
information from both written and spoken utterances (Holtgraves, 2008a). A 
further study (Holtgraves, 2008b) suggests that people recognize and retain in 
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long-term memory the actions that people perform with their utterances. In line 
with speech act theory and conversation analysis, Holtgraves argues that “in 
conversation there is an action dimension, a dimension that does not exist for 
isolated sentences or texts. Speakers are usually constructing utterances with the 
intention to perform certain actions, and with the intention of having the 
recipient recognize those actions” (Holtgraves, 2008a, p. 640). 
Clearly, action recognition crosscuts research on topics such as 
communicative intention and implicature in pragmatics (Grice, 1975; Levinson, 
1983; D. Sperber & Wilson, 2004), the study of indirect speech acts (e.g., H. H. 
Clark, 1979; H.H. Clark, 1996; Coulson & Lovett, 2010; Gibbs, 1979) and 
discourse processing (e.g., Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994) in 
psycholinguistics, as well as research on non-verbal action understanding and 
theory of mind in the cognitive sciences (e.g., Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2009; 
de Lange, Spronk, Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008). There is limited 
experimental research, however, on speech act recognition in spoken dialogue. 
The experimental approach used by Holtgraves (2008a, 2008b) involves 
artificial tasks (lexical decision and recognition probe) and does not unravel the 
time-course of action recognition. The puzzle remains: how is it that we can 
extract speech acts from utterances so efficiently, as evidenced by 
extraordinarily fast turn transitions (Levinson, 2013; Sacks et al., 1974; Stivers 
et al., 2009)? Before investigating speech act recognition in spoken dialogues it 
is important to empirically assess whether, and if so how well, participants can 
extract the speech act from utterances that are underspecified at the action level.  
2.2 The experiment 
The aim of the present experiment was to investigate participants’ competence 
in identifying speech acts in action-underspecified sentences and explore the 
time-course of speech act comprehension. To do this we presented target 
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sentences using the self-paced reading paradigm and asked participants to 
categorize the speech acts and rate how sure they were in the categorization. 
Self-paced reading has been used to investigate the processing of phenomena 
such as scalar implicatures in pragmatics (Breheny, Katsos, & Williams, 2006) 
and other types of inferences in text comprehension (Graesser, Swamer, & 
Baggett, 1996), with longer reading times (in comparison to a control) 
interpreted as indicating the generation of an inference. The self-paced reading 
paradigm allows us to obtain information on the word-by-word processing of 
action-underspecified utterances, thereby exploring the time-course of speech act 
inferencing.  
The stimuli in our study consist of a context sentence which is presented 
auditorily, followed by a target sentence designed to be interpreted as an 
Answer, Pre-Offer or Declination depending on the context (see Table 2.1). These 
actions are commonly found in conversation and their form and function has 
been described in the conversation analytic literature. 
The Answers in our study complete an adjacency pair by responding to a 
wh-question in the first turn. This condition serves as a benchmark for 
inferencing in the reading time analysis since the gap between literal (sentence) 
meaning and the action intended is the smallest. Moreover, since the other 
actions in the study can superficially be viewed as answers, because they 
respond to the prior turn, this condition provides a check on whether 
participants go beyond a simple characterization of the sentences as responses 
and identify the correct speech act.  
The second action, a Declination, completes an adjacency pair by 
responding to a proposal (an offer or invitation) in the first turn. The 
Declinations in this study are relatively indirect responses, requiring a backward 
inference that bridges the response and the prior speech act. Conversation 
analysts have noted that, at least in English, indirect responses “need not be 
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polite, nor unclear or obfuscatory. For certain activities, in specific sequential 
locations, responding indirectly may be the most efficient form of 
communication,” (Walker, Drew, & Local, 2011, p. 17).  
Table 2.1: Stimuli in Dutch and English translations. 
The third action is the Pre-Offer, which belongs to a type of pre-sequence 
(Schegloff, 1988). Pre-sequences are preliminary to, or project, the main course 
of action – in this case an offer (Schegloff, 1988, 2007), as demonstrated in the 
following example: 
 
 
 Set 1 Set 2 
Condition Context Target Utterance Context 
Target 
Utterance 
Answer 
Hoe ga je voor het 
ticket betalen? 
Ik heb een 
creditcard. 
Waar koop je je 
shampoo? 
Ik ga naar de 
Kruidvat. 
How are you 
going to pay for 
the ticket? 
I have a credit-
card. 
Where do you 
buy your 
shampoo? 
I go/am going to 
the Kruidvat 
[drugstore]. 
Declination 
Ik kan je wat geld 
lenen voor het 
ticket. 
Ik heb een 
creditcard. 
Ik kan wel 
shampoo voor je 
meenemen? 
Ik ga naar de 
Kruidvat. 
I can lend you 
money for the 
ticket. 
I have a credit-
card. 
I can bring some 
shampoo for 
you? 
I go/am going to 
the Kruidvat 
[drugstore]. 
Pre-offer 
Ik heb geen geld 
om het ticket te 
betalen. 
Ik heb een 
creditcard. 
Mijn shampoo is 
op. 
Ik ga naar de 
Kruidvat. 
I don’t have any 
money to pay for 
the ticket. 
I have a credit-
card. 
My shampoo is 
finished. 
I go/am going to 
the Kruidvat 
[drugstore]. 
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Bookstore, 2.1: 107 (modified from Schegloff, 2007, p. 35) 
1 A:    I’m gonna buy a thermometer though because I  
2 B:              but  
3 A:    think she’s got a temperature 
4 C: Pre-Offer we have a thermometer 
5 A: Go-ahead you do? 
6 C: Offer  want to use it? 
7 A: Acceptance yeah 
 
Only if the response to the pre-offer is positive (line 5) is the offer put forward 
(line 6). This strategy allows conversationalists to check whether an offer would 
be welcome or not, preventing them from embarrassment that would arise if an 
offer were to be rejected. 
Crucially, the Pre-Offers differ from the Answers and Declinations in that 
they do not complete an adjacency pair but rather open up or “project” a 
continuation of the sequence. Understanding Pre-offers involves knowing that a 
direct offer is underway; in this sense they involve a forward directed inference 
(projection). By including Pre-Offers in our study we can explore whether the 
distinction between projection (Pre-Offers) and a backward directed inference 
(Declinations) is borne out in reading times. 
Given that the same sentence can be used as an Answer, Declination or 
Pre-offer depending on the sequential context, in this study we investigate: 1) 
Can participants reliably categorize action-underspecified speech acts? 2) Does 
the time-course of speech act comprehension differ for these actions as reflected 
in self-paced reading times? Due to lack of research in this area, in particular on 
Pre-Offers, we do not make specific predictions regarding reading times. 
However, we speculate that the reading time pattern of Pre-Offers and 
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Declinations will differ relative to Answers, based on the structural properties 
described above.  
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Participants 
39 native speakers of Dutch were recruited from the student population in 
Nijmegen, Netherlands. Participants were paid 8 euros for participating. 
2.3.2 Materials and Design  
We created 378 two-sentence long, naturalistic dialogues in Dutch reflecting 
informal daily conversations between friends or relatives. The discourse topics 
include buying groceries, going out, and working/studying. Each dialogue 
consists of a target sentence and a preceding context sentence, which biases the 
interpretation of the target as an Answer, Declination or Pre-Offer (see examples 
in ). The target sentence was presented visually, one word at a time in self-paced 
reading, while the context utterance was auditory. In total there were 126 target 
sentences, presented in three contexts (conditions).  
 To maintain a balance of variety and control in the stimulus materials, 
half of the target sentences started with “I have” (Dutch ik heb), e.g. “I have a 
credit card” (Set 1). The other half was more varied and included simple 
utterances like “I am going to the market” and “My brother is a mechanic” (Set 
2). We varied the length of the sentences to make the stimuli as natural as 
possible, but constructed the target sentences such that the final word is critical 
for understanding the propositional content of the utterance (irrespective of 
speech act level meaning). In line with the reported characteristics of indirect 
replies (Walker et al., 2011), the target sentences do not involve ellipsis or 
pronominalization. To maintain consistency in the way the Declinations and Pre-
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offers are connected to their contexts, we ensured that there was at least one 
clear implicated premise and an implicated conclusion for each sentence pair: 
when presented with an utterance that is indirect, the hearer needs to access an 
implicated premise and combine it with the proposition expressed to derive the 
implicated conclusion (Blakemore, 1992). In the dialogue (A) I can lend you 
money for the ticket. – (B) I have a credit card, the implicated premise is that a 
credit card can pay for things, including tickets. The implicated conclusion is 
that speaker B does not need A’s help with paying for the ticket. 
In order to get a measure of the semantic relatedness between the context 
and the target sentence in each condition, Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) values 
(Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998) were computed for the English translation of 
each sentence pair using document-to-document mode with “General reading up 
to 1st year of college” as the semantic space. The average LSA values for each 
condition were: Answers 0.13, Declinations 0.33, and Pre-Offers 0.42 (the higher 
the value, the more semantic similarity). 
The stimuli were translated from English into Dutch and checked by two 
native speakers of Dutch. The sentences were recorded by four native speakers, 
two male and two female. The recordings of the target sentences were not used 
in this experiment, since they are presented visually in self-paced reading. The 
stimuli were pseudo-randomized and balanced across three lists, such that 
participants saw each target sentence only once, in one context. After each trial 
(sentence pair), participants were given a comprehension and rating task. They 
were first asked to indicate what the second speaker was doing with his response 
and were given the options of Answering, Offering and Declining (in Dutch: 
antwoorden, aanbieden, weigeren). Since pre-offer is not a colloquial term, the 
broader term of offering was chosen. Participants were then asked to rate how 
sure they were in their categorization decision on a rating scale from 1 (very 
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uncertain) to 7 (very certain). The purpose of the rating task was to assess the 
feasibility of using the items in future studies.   
2.3.3 Procedure 
Participants were given instructions that included one example of each action. 
They were instructed to imagine that they were listening to a conversation 
between friends or colleagues, and to read the sentences as quickly as possible, 
but not too quickly as they would have to “judge the underlying meaning” of the 
sentences. They were then seated in a chair in front of a monitor in a soundproof 
experimental booth. On each trial the context utterance was played while a 
small picture of a loudspeaker was presented in the middle of the screen. After 
the offset of the spoken sentence a blank screen was presented for 500 ms, 
followed by the presentation of the target sentence in a moving window self-
paced reading format (Just, Carpenter, & Woolley, 1982). A series of lines 
appeared on the screen representing each word in the target sentence. When 
participants clicked on the mouse the first word appeared and upon subsequent 
button presses a new word was shown, while the previous word was again 
replaced by a line. When participants clicked the mouse after the last word had 
been shown, they were presented with the action categorization question, 
immediately followed by the certainty rating. There were 126 experimental 
trials, preceded by a brief practice session. 
2.4 Results  
2.4.1 Accuracy  
Overall accuracy (number of correct responses in the action categorization task 
divided by the total number of responses) was very high, 95.8 percent. Accuracy 
percentages (summarized in Table 2.2) were very similar across conditions. The 
  37 
accuracy data were analyzed with mixed-effects logistic regression in the 
statistics software R (R Core Team, 2013) using the lme4 package (D. Bates, 
Maechler, & Bolker, 2012). Mixed-effects logistic regression is better suited for 
the analysis of categorical outcome variables (such as question-answer accuracy) 
than ANOVA and allows the inclusion of participants and items as random 
factors in a single analysis (for a discussion, see Jaeger, 2008). The fixed effects 
were Action and Set (for a description of the two stimulus sets, see 2.3.2). Set 
was included to check whether there is an interaction between the Action and 
the linguistic form of the sentence (Set). We used the most maximal random 
effects structure justified by the experimental design and for which convergence 
was reached (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). This included random 
intercepts by participant and item, as well as by-participant random slopes for 
Action and Set and by-item random slopes for Action. For model comparison, see 
Appendix (section 8.1). The full model with Action, Set and the Action×Set 
interaction indicated that there were no differences in accuracy between the 
three actions (ps > 0.14). However, an Action×Set interaction was present. Pre-
offers in Set 1 were categorized more accurately than those in Set 2 (Estimate: 
1.15, SE: 0.28, z = 4.06, p < .001), while an opposite pattern was observed for 
Declinations and Answers; Answers in Set 1 were categorized slightly less 
accurately than in Set 2 (Estimate: -1.15, SE: 0.29, z = -3.97, p < .001), and 
Declinations in Set 1 were also categorized less accurately than in Set 2 
(Estimate: -1.13, SE: 0.29, z = -3.89, p < .001). The Action×Set interaction 
suggests there are subtle differences in how salient the action of the target 
sentences is, depending on their linguistic form. 
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Table 2.2: Accuracy and mean certainty ratings. Standard deviations (in 
brackets) are based on data aggregated over participants for comparability 
between accuracy and certainty tasks. 
2.4.2 Certainty ratings 
Participants rated how certain they were in answering the action categorization 
question on a scale from 1 (very uncertain) to 7 (very certain). The overall mean 
certainty rating was 6.48 (SD 1.03). Mean certainty ratings for each condition 
and set are summarized in Table 2.2. A repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean 
ratings revealed a main effect of Action (F(2, 76) = 11.20, p < .001), a main 
effect of Set (F(1, 38) = 9.66, p < .01) and an Action×Set interaction (F(2, 76) 
= 10.63, p < .001). Pairwise comparisons between the actions indicated that 
certainty in categorizing the speech acts was lower for Pre-Offers than both 
Answers (Action; F(1, 38) = 13.69, p < .01) and Declinations (Action; F(1, 38) 
= 14.98, p < .001), while the difference between Declinations and Answers was 
not significant (F(1, 38) = 4.07, p = .051). A main effect of Set was present in 
the comparison between Pre-offers and Answers (F(1, 38) =9.89, p < .01) and 
Pre-offers and Declinations (F(1, 38) = 17.26, p < .001), reflecting that 
certainty ratings were higher in Set 1. However, Action×Set interactions were 
 Answer Declination Pre-offer 
Overall Accuracy 96.0% (4.0%) 96.0% (6.1%) 95.6% (5.4%) 
Set 1 Accuracy 95.2% (3.8%) 94.7% (7.8%) 98.0% (2.6%) 
Set 2 Accuracy 96.7% (5.6%) 97.2% (5.1%) 93.2% (9.6%) 
Overall Certainty 6.60 (0.36)  6.50 (0.39) 6.35 (0.51) 
Set 1 Certainty 6.58 (0.37) 6.52 (0.42) 6.50 (0.45) 
Set 2 Certainty 6.61 (0.43) 6.48 (0.41) 6.21 (0.62) 
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also present in both comparisons (Pre-offers and Answers: F(1, 38) = 16.66, p < 
.001, Pre-offers and Declinations: F(1, 38) = 14.00, p < .01). These interactions 
reflected that the main effect of Set was mainly driven by differences in certainty 
across Sets in Pre-offers; Pre-offers in Set 1 (M=6.50, SD=0.45) were rated 
higher than in Set 2 (M=6.21, SD = 0.62) (p < .001).  
2.4.3 Reading times  
The time between button presses was recorded as the reading time for each 
word. Extreme values below 100 ms were excluded, as well as values above 
1200 ms for non-final words and above 7000 ms for final words. In total 7 
outliers (0,1%) were removed. Since online speech comprehension and the 
subsequent off-line categorization task tap different types of information, error 
trials were not excluded from the reading time analysis. 
 Mean reading times for the first word, the verb and the final word of the 
target sentences were used for the analysis, in addition to the mean reading time 
per word (sentence reading time divided by number of words) and the mean 
reading time of the entire sentence (see Table 2.3). Reading times were analyzed 
with repeated-measures ANOVA with Action and Set as factors. Since a main 
effect of Set is not of theoretical relevance, only main effects of Action and 
Action×Set interactions are reported in follow-up comparisons between the 
action conditions. 
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Table 2.3: Mean reading times in ms. 
First word  
Reading times started to differ already at the first word, reflected by a main 
effect of Action (F(2,76) = 5.25,  p < .01). There was no main effect of Set or 
an Action×Set interaction (Fs < 0.68, ps >.51). First word reading times were 
slightly longer in Pre-Offers compared to Answers (Action; F(1,38) = 7.07,  p < 
.05), and in Pre-offers compared to Declinations (Action; F(1,38) = 5.84,  p < 
.05). The comparison between Answers and Declinations was not significant 
(F(1,38) = 0.12,  p  =  .73). 
 
Verb 
There was a main effect of Action (F(2, 76) = 3.41, p <  .05) and a main effect 
of Set (F(1, 38) = 10.45, p <  .01), but no Action×Set interaction (F(2,76) = 
0.43,  p = .65)4. Pairwise comparisons revealed that verb RTs were longer in 
Declinations than in Answers (Action; F(1,38) = 6.31, p <  .05). The 
                                         
3 RT of the entire sentence divided by number of words. 
4 The main effect of Set reflected that reading times were longer in Set 2 than in Set 1 at the verb, both in the overall 
analysis and in follow-up comparisons between the actions, where a main effect of Set was also present. 
 Answer Declination Pre-Offer 
First Word Mean RT 251 252 259 SD 56 57 65 
Verb Mean RT 260 267 265 SD 60 69 70 
Final Word Mean RT 564 622 593 SD 384 447 412 
Word3  Mean RT 339 354 352 SD 135 146 147 
Sentence Mean RT 1459 1528 1501 SD 584 652 603 
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comparison between Pre-Offers and Answers was not significant (F(1,38) = 
2.97, p =  .09), nor between Pre-Offers and Declinations (F(1,38) = 0.67, p =  
.42). No Action×Set interactions were present in the pairwise comparisons (Fs 
< 0.8, ps >.37). 
 
Final word 
A main effect of Action was present in the overall analysis (F(2,76) = 4.27, p <  
.05), but there was no main effect of Set (F(1,38) = 0.39,  p = .54) nor 
Action×Set interaction (F(2,76) = 2.69,  p = .09). Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that final RTs were longer in Declinations than in Answers (Action; 
F(1,38) = 6.16, p <  .05), and RTs in Pre-offers tended to be longer than in 
Answers (Action; F(1,38) = 3.75, p = .06). There were no differences between 
Pre-Offers and Declinations (F(1,38) = 2.06, p =  .16).  
 
Word 
An ANOVA on mean RTs per word revealed a main effect of Action (F(2, 76) = 
5.73, p <  .01), but no main effect of Set (F(1,38) = 1.50,  p = .23) nor 
Action×Set interaction (F(2,76) = 2.60,  p = .09). Mean RTs were shorter in 
Answers than in Pre-offers (Action; F(1,38) = 6.88, p <  .05), and shorter in 
Answers than in Declinations (Action; F(1,38) = 8.30, p <  .01). The difference 
between Pre-Offers and Declinations was not significant (F(1,38) = 0.25, p = 
.62). 
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Sentence 
Although the reading times for the entire sentence differed descriptively 
between action conditions, these differences were not significant (F(2, 76) = 
2.73, p = .09). While there was a main effect of Set (F(1,38) = 24.12, p <  .01), 
no Action×Set interaction was present (F(2,76) = 2.15,  p = .13)5. 
2.5 Discussion 
The present experiment demonstrates that participants categorize the speech acts 
of sentences whose form and semantic content is underspecified for action with 
very high accuracy (95.8%). They are able to do so based on limited context (the 
prior speech act) and without any prosodic information in the target sentence. 
Importantly, overall accuracy was the same for all three actions (Answer, 
Declination, Pre-Offer). If participants had processed the target sentences 
superficially, ignoring the speech act content, they could have categorized 
Declinations and Pre-Offers as Answers. This is the case since the Dutch term for 
answering (antwoorden) also means to respond and all three speech acts can 
superficially be seen as responses. This should have resulted in lower accuracy 
for Pre-Offers and Declinations vis-à-vis Answers. The high accuracy rate across 
actions shows that participants go beyond a simple characterization of the target 
sentences as responses and “get” the correct action. Participants were also very 
confident in categorizing all actions and rated the certainty of their 
categorizations on average 6.48 (out of 7). These results provide further support 
that participants are confident in orienting to the action content of sentences.  
The reading time results demonstrate that the exact same sentence is 
processed differently depending on the speech act it performs. Declinations and 
                                         
5 The main effect of Set reflected that reading times were longer in Set 2 than in Set 1, both in the overall analysis and in 
follow-up comparisons between the actions, where a main effect of Set was also present.  
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Pre-Offers have different trajectories relative to Answers, which have shortest 
RTs on all measures. In the case of Pre-offers, reading times were longer than 
both Answers and Declinations at the first word. RTs also tended to be longer in 
Pre-offers relative to Answers at the final word. It should be pointed out that 
descriptively the difference between the means at the first word is small and 
standard deviation large. Event-related brain potentials might be a more 
sensitive measure to reveal processing differences at early positions in the 
sentence. In the case of Declinations, RTs were longer than in Answers at the 
verb and the final word, while there was no difference between Declinations and 
Answers at the first word. 
Based on differences in sequence organization, we speculated that 
Declinations and Pre-Offers would exhibit different reading time patterns 
relative to Answers. This is indeed what we found; reliable differences were 
found at the first word for Pre-offers relative to Answers, but at the verb and the 
final word for Declinations. Recognizing the speech act in the Declinations 
requires a backward inference, connecting the incoming sentence to the prior 
proposal. Moreover, since Declinations close an action sequence (the adjacency 
pair), they do not heavily constrain the relevant next action. Declinations 
therefore do not invite strong predictions about the upcoming speech act. In 
contrast, Pre-offers initiate a new action sequence, containing a subsequent 
direct offer if the conversation were to continue. Thus although understanding 
Pre-offers inevitably requires integration with the prior turn, it also involves a 
forward directed inference about the continuation of the sequence. The 
distinction between an inference based on a backward bridge to the prior turn in 
an adjacency pair and an inference based on forward projection of a sequence is 
akin to the difference between causal antecedent and causal consequence 
inferences in text processing (Magliano, Baggett, Johnson, & Graesser, 1993). 
The reading time differences between Pre-Offers and Declinations provide some 
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indication that the distinction between forward projection and a backward 
directed inference plays a role in the online processing of speech acts. However, 
it is not clear why the projective nature of Pre-Offers would call for more 
processing at the first word, whereas the backward inference in Declinations 
requires processing at the verb and the final word. More research is needed to 
investigate whether this finding holds for spoken language processing as well. 
The early effects of action at the first word and the verb suggest that 
comprehension at the speech act level starts before the full propositional content 
has been presented. Familiarity with action sequences is one factor that could 
enable early speech act comprehension, making the fast transitions between 
turns (Levinson, 2013; Sacks et al., 1974; Stivers et al., 2009) possible. 
Neuroimaging studies suggest that people use their knowledge of the wider 
discourse context to predict specific upcoming words and that prediction is not 
the result of relatively low-level, word-based priming mechanisms, “but involves 
a more sophisticated message-level mechanism that can take into account the 
actual nuances of the preceding discourse,” (Otten & Van Berkum, 2008, p. 485). 
This could be the case for sequential context as well. Whether and how implicit 
knowledge of the organization of actions guides the interpretation of utterances 
is a topic for further investigation. 
An alternative explanation for the reading time results is that the 
experimental manipulation does not address speech act recognition per se, but 
some other confounding variable such as semantic priming from the context. 
Latent Semantic Analysis can be used to determine semantic relatedness of two 
texts and LSA similarity relations have been found to correspond well with the 
pattern of results in priming studies (Dorothee J. Chwilla & Kolk, 2002; 
Landauer et al., 1998). If semantic priming from the context is the main factor 
driving the reading times one would expect the condition with the lowest LSA 
value (least amount of priming) to have the longest mean reading times. A 
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pattern opposite to what a priming account predicts was found: Answers had the 
lowest average LSA value but the shortest reading times on all measures. This 
suggests that the differences in reading times across conditions in our study were 
not due to lexico-semantic relationships between the content words of the 
context and the target sentences.  
An additional finding from this study is that the linguistic form of the 
sentence (i.e., Set 1 vs. Set 2) seems to have a subtle impact on how accurately 
participants can categorize the speech acts and how confident they are in the 
categorization. This is not very surprising, since some formats may be more 
common than others in certain actions. However, the accuracy and certainty 
ratings were high across the board, with the lowest values 93.2% and 6.21 
respectively (both for Pre-offers in Set 2). Moreover, the interaction between the 
action condition and linguistic form (Action by Set) was minimal in reading 
times. These results indicate that differences between the two stimulus sets are 
not substantial, which is important for future use of the experimental materials. 
Also relevant for further research is that comprehension of the speech acts seems 
to be more complex in Declinations and Pre-offers than in Answers, as reflected 
in longer reading times. This validates the use of the Answers as a control 
condition. 
The self-paced reading paradigm used in this study has several limitations 
compared to other methods such as event-related brain potentials. First, while 
self-paced reading data only provide a rough measure of how long the 
processing of a particular word (e.g., the first word) takes, ERPs can indicate 
with much higher temporal precision, at the level of milliseconds, how soon 
differences between conditions emerge after a word is presented. Secondly, ERPs 
in contrast with self-paced reading can provide information about whether there 
are quantitative or qualitative processing differences involved (Kutas, 1993; 
Rugg, Schloerscheidt, & Mark, 1998). Most importantly, self-paced reading (and 
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self-paced listening) cannot inform us about the realtime processing of 
continuous, spoken language, the prime modality of everyday conversation.  
2.6 Conclusions 
In this study on speech act comprehension we investigated the processing of 
sentences that perform different speech acts depending on prior context. In each 
case an assertion is used as a vehicle for some other action, and it is “part of 
competent membership in the society/culture and being a competent interactant 
to analyze assertions of this sort for what (else) they may be doing at this 
moment, at this juncture of the interaction, in this specific sequential context” 
(Schegloff, 2007, p. 35). Our study tapped into this competence by addressing 
two primary questions: how reliably participants can categorize action-
underspecified speech acts, and whether the time-course of speech act 
comprehension differs for the actions as reflected in self-paced reading times. 
Participants in our study categorized the speech acts with very high accuracy, 
based only on limited context (the prior turn). This is striking given that the 
target speech acts did not contain any illocutionary force indicating devices nor 
prosodic information to aid recognition. Furthermore, the exact same sentence 
was processed differently depending on the speech act it performed, with 
reading times starting to differ already at the first word. These findings open up 
a new arena for experimental research on speech act recognition in 
conversation.  
As a crucial component of social behavior, communication involves 
actions. Being a competent member of society must require a cognitive 
architecture that is oriented to speech acts. Having demonstrated that 
participants orient to the action content of sentences and can categorize speech 
acts with high accuracy, the next experimental step is to shed light on this 
ability in spoken dialogues – the foundation of doing things with words. 
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3 Conversation electrified: ERP correlates of speech act 
recognition  
This chapter is a modified version of:  
Gisladottir, R. S., Chwilla, D. J., & Levinson, S. C. (2015). Conversation 
electrified: ERP correlates of speech act recognition in underspecified utterances. 
PLOS ONE, 10(3), e0120068. 
 
Abstract 
The ability to recognize speech acts (verbal actions) in conversation is critical 
for everyday interaction. However, utterances are often underspecified for the 
speech act they perform, requiring listeners to rely on the context to recognize 
the action. The goal of this study was to investigate the time-course of auditory 
speech act recognition in action-underspecified utterances and explore how 
sequential context (the prior action) impacts this process. We hypothesized that 
speech acts are recognized early in the utterance to allow for quick transitions 
between turns in conversation. Event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded 
while participants listened to spoken dialogues and performed an action 
categorization task. The dialogues contained target utterances that each of which 
could deliver three distinct speech acts depending on the prior turn. The targets 
were identical across conditions, but differed in the type of speech act performed 
and how it fit into the larger action sequence. The ERP results show an early 
effect of action type, reflected by frontal positivities as early as 200 ms after 
target utterance onset. This indicates that speech act recognition begins early in 
the turn when the utterance has only been partially processed. Providing further 
support for early speech act recognition, actions in highly-constraining contexts 
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did not elicit an ERP effect to the utterance-final word. We take this to show that 
listeners can recognize the action before the final word through predictions at 
the speech act level. However, additional processing based on the complete 
utterance is required in more complex actions, as reflected by a posterior 
negativity at the final word when the speech act is in a less-constraining context 
and a new action sequence is initiated. These findings demonstrate that sentence 
comprehension in conversational contexts crucially involves recognition of 
verbal action which begins as soon as it can. 
3.1 Introduction 
Just like other aspects of social behaviour, conversation involves verbal actions 
such as requests, greetings and complaints (Schegloff, 2007). The exchange of 
such speech acts in everyday conversation is the core ecology for language – this 
is where children acquire language and the great bulk of language usage occurs. 
The prime task in conversation is to recognize what speech act is being 
performed and prepare a fitted reply.  
 Speech act recognition, the topic of this study, is the process of 
recognizing the action of an utterance in a given context. As discussed in the 
introduction to the thesis, speech act recognition may be quite direct in some 
cases, particularly in ritualized expressions where there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between the form of the utterance and its speech act function 
(like Gesundheit! in response to a sneeze). Illocutionary force indicators (see 
1.2.1) can likewise provide clues about the relevant speech act. However, 
listeners cannot always rely on such morphosyntactic clues. For example, a 
declarative utterance like I have a car could be used to offer somebody help with 
moving, to indirectly reject an offer for a ride, or to answer a question about 
commuting. The utterance is thus compatible with multiple speech acts and 
listeners have to rely on the context to recognize which action is being 
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performed. This problem of underspecification at the action level is pervasive in 
everyday conversation.  
 The challenge for participants in regards to speech act recognition in 
conversation is further enhanced by the very tight time constraints in turn-
taking, as discussed in 1.2.2. The most frequent gaps between turns in 
conversation are only around 200 ms (De Ruiter et al., 2006; Heldner & Edlund, 
2010; Stivers et al., 2009). A gap of 200 ms does not leave much time for both 
recognizing the action in the prior turn and planning a response to it. Findings 
from word production experiments indicate that it takes people at least 600 ms 
just to plan a one-word utterance (Indefrey & Levelt, 2004) and even longer for 
sentences with multiple words (Schnur et al., 2006). These timing facts imply 
that listeners start planning their responses before the prior speaker has finished 
speaking, and since the appropriateness of the response crucially depends on 
recognizing the speech act, they suggest that speech act recognition must be an 
early process (Levinson, 2013). On this early speech act recognition account, 
recognition of the action is not made at the final stage in the comprehension 
process, occurring at the last word of incoming utterances, but takes place early 
on when the turn has only been partially processed. The primary aim of the 
present study was to test the early speech act recognition account, investigating 
the time-course of verbal action understanding. 
 Given that the turn construction doesn’t always give us indications about 
what speech act is coming up, how could early recognition of the action be 
made? One source of information that can constrain the speech act possibility 
space is the sequential context, i.e., preceding turns in the conversation. Speech 
acts do not exist in a vacuum; they are coherently organized into larger action 
sequences (sequence organization; see Schegloff, 2007). One of the basic action 
sequences is the adjacency pair (Schegloff, 2007; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973), 
where the first utterance puts powerful constraints on the following turn. The 
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first part in an adjacency pair “projects a prospective relevance, and not only a 
retrospective understanding. It makes relevant a limited set of possible second 
pair parts, and thereby sets some of the terms by which a next turn will be 
understood” (Schegloff, 2007, p. 16). Prior talk in conversation is thus not 
merely the background to speech act comprehension, but rather contains a rich 
structure of action sequences that could proactively funnel possible 
interpretations of upcoming talk. If this notion is correct, participants in 
conversation can profit from implicit knowledge of action sequences during 
speech act comprehension. 
 The goal of the present experiment was twofold: a) to investigate the 
time-course of speech act recognition in utterances that are underspecified for 
the action, and b) examine the effects of sequential context on speech act 
recognition. The larger theoretical relevance of this investigation is that it 
addresses the fundamental problem of how listeners map speech act functions 
onto underspecified utterances – a core cognitive ability that gives language its 
basic functionality. 
3.1.1 Prior research 
Several domains of research have addressed speech act comprehension broadly 
construed. For a short review of the literature, the reader is referred to section 
1.3 in the introduction to the thesis. Most relevant for the present investigation, 
a growing body of research has made use of the excellent temporal resolution of 
EEG and MEG to investigate pragmatic language comprehension in real time. 
Studies on non-conversational discourse have shown that spoken or written 
words are related to the wider discourse context extremely rapidly, from 150 ms 
after word onset (see, for instance, Van Berkum et al., 1999; Van Berkum, 
Zwitserlood, et al., 2003). However, research on pragmatic inferencing – which 
may play a role in speech act recognition – indicates that language processing at 
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the level of pragmatics is not always so fast. For instance, understanding irony 
involves late inferential processes, reflected by modulations of the P600 
component (Regel et al., 2011; Spotorno et al., 2013), and scalar inferences are 
associated with N400 effects only in some cases (Nieuwland, Ditman, & 
Kuperberg, 2010; see also Noveck & Posada, 2003). The above studies highlight 
that pragmatic language comprehension involves both early and late processes. 
Importantly, they do not address comprehension at the speech act level, i.e., the 
processing of utterances in conversational contexts, so their relevance for the 
time-course of speech act recognition is unclear.  
 Turning to research that comes closer to dialogue, a recent EEG study 
investigated speech act processing in written words that performed either a 
requesting or a naming speech act depending on a prior video-taped context 
sentence (e.g., What are these called?/What can I get you? – PLANT) (Egorova, 
Shtyrov, et al., 2013). The brain responses for the two speech acts diverged as 
early as 120 ms after the onset of the critical words. A follow-up MEG study 
(Egorova, Pulvermüller, et al., 2013) reported that the requests engaged 
comprehension systems in the right hemisphere within 100 ms after word onset, 
followed by theory of mind activations in the medial prefrontal and temporo-
parietal areas from 200 to 300 ms. Naming speech acts, on the other hand, 
activated brain areas involved in lexico-semantic retrieval from 100 to 150 ms. 
In a study on visually presented (i.e., written) indirect requests (e.g., My soup is 
too cold to eat in a restaurant context), differences between indirect requests and 
literal statements were found from the second word onwards, but no ERP 
differences were present at the final word (Coulson & Lovett, 2010). These EEG 
and MEG findings provide some supportive evidence for the early speech act 
recognition account, at least in the visual modality. However, these studies are 
far removed from conversation and overlook the importance of spoken language 
input. When a sentence is visually presented, one word at a time, the linguistic 
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signal is artificially spread out over a much longer time period than in spoken 
language (or natural reading for that matter). This is problematic for 
investigating the time-course of speech act recognition, as effects of sentence-
level factors such as speech act function may not be confined to a single word. 
Although a few studies have indirectly addressed speech act comprehension by 
investigating processing of prosody in question-answer dialogues (e.g., 
Dimitrova et al., 2012; Magne et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2011), to our knowledge 
there are no studies directly investigating the time-course of speech act 
processing using auditory stimuli. A critical next step therefore is to shed light 
on speech act recognition in spoken language, the prime modality of natural 
conversation.  
3.1.2 The present study 
Against this background, several important questions need to be addressed. 
What is the time-course of speech act recognition in the auditory modality? In 
light of the extraordinarily fast transitions between turns in conversation, how 
quickly can listeners recognize the speech act in action-underspecified 
utterances? How does the type of action and how it fits into the action sequence 
influence this process? We used ERPs to investigate these issues, using spoken 
dialogues approximating informal everyday conversation. 
 The experimental paradigm was briefly introduced in sections 1.5 and 2.2 
of this thesis, but will be described in more detail below. The paradigm was 
designed based on the following criteria. First, in order to examine how listeners 
recognize speech acts in utterances that are underspecified for the action, the 
critical utterances do not contain morphosyntactic speech act clues such as 
question words or imperative verbs. Secondly, to get a better understanding of 
the role of sequential context, we used speech acts that differ in how they fit into 
the larger action sequence (for details, see below). Third, since passively 
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overhearing a dialogue is quite different from taking an active part in one (see, 
for instance, Schober & Clark, 1989), we use an action categorization task to 
mimic the response demands and attention level necessary for everyday 
interaction. While the absence of a behavioural task is appropriate for ERP 
studies on passive reading or listening to non-conversational discourse, the 
crucial task in conversation is comprehending-for-responding. As we have 
argued above, a critical part of that task is identifying the speech act category of 
the incoming turn (see also Levinson, 2013).  
 For convenience, examples of stimuli are presented again in Table 3.1 
below. The dialogues contain target utterances (e.g., I have a credit-card) that 
deliver three functionally distinct speech acts (Answer, Pre-offer, Declination) 
depending on the prior turn. The Answer condition involves a question-answer 
sequence (How are you going to pay for the ticket? - I HAVE A CREDIT-CARD). The 
Answers serve as the control condition as they should be easiest to comprehend. 
This assumption is supported by the results of the self-paced reading study in 
Chapter 2, in which reading times were shortest for Answers on all measures 
(see also Gisladottir, Chwilla, Schriefers, & Levinson, 2012). The Declination 
condition consists of an offer, followed by a rejection (I can lend you money for 
the ticket. – I HAVE A CREDIT-CARD). The Pre-offer condition contains a first 
turn expressing need or desire for something, followed by a prelude to an offer, 
called a pre-offer (Schegloff, 1988, 2007) in conversation analysis (I don’t have 
any money to pay for the ticket. – I HAVE A CREDIT-CARD). To balance control 
and variety in the format of the critical utterances, we divided the dialogues in 
two stimulus sets (see and Methods in 3.2); Set 1 contains utterances starting 
with I have… but Set 2 includes other verbs (see Table 3.1 and Methods section 
below). In none of the conditions can listeners rely on clues in the utterance to 
recognize the speech act. Instead, it is the sequential context, that is the prior 
turn, which determines the action. Since the target sentences are identical across 
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conditions, ERP differences between them can be attributed to their speech act 
function and how listeners arrive at that function. This design allows an 
investigation of speech act recognition in spoken dialogues that do not contain 
semantic or pragmatic anomalies. 
Table 3.1: Examples of stimuli in Dutch and English translations 
 An important aspect of the design is that while the critical actions – 
Declinations and Pre-offers – are both relatively indirect, they differ in how they 
fit into the larger action sequence. Declinations are second parts of adjacency 
pairs, which entails that the context turn (first part of the pair) should be highly 
 Set 1 Set 2 
Condition Context Target Utterance Context 
Target 
Utterance 
Answer 
(Control) 
Hoe ga je voor 
het ticket 
betalen? 
Ik heb een 
creditcard. 
Waar koop je je 
shampoo? 
Ik ga naar de 
Kruidvat. 
How are you 
going to pay for 
the ticket? 
I have a credit-
card. 
Where do you 
buy your 
shampoo? 
I go/am going to 
the Kruidvat 
[drugstore]. 
Declination 
(Context highly-
constraining + 
target utterance 
ends the 
sequence) 
Ik kan je wat 
geld lenen voor 
het ticket. 
Ik heb een 
creditcard. 
Ik kan wel 
shampoo voor je 
meenemen? 
Ik ga naar de 
Kruidvat. 
I can lend you 
money for the 
ticket. 
I have a credit-
card. 
I can bring 
some shampoo 
for you? 
I go/am going to 
the Kruidvat 
[drugstore]. 
Pre-offer 
(Context less 
constraining + 
target utterance 
starts a new 
sequence) 
Ik heb geen geld 
om het ticket te 
betalen. 
Ik heb een 
creditcard. 
Mijn shampoo is 
op. 
Ik ga naar de 
Kruidvat. 
I don’t have any 
money to pay 
for the ticket. 
I have a credit-
card. 
My shampoo is 
finished. 
I go/am going to 
the Kruidvat 
[drugstore]. 
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constraining in terms of what type of action can follow. An offer, for instance, 
sets up a normative expectation for an acceptance or declination. Out of the vast 
possibility space for speech acts in conversation, the prior turn has narrowed the 
likely actions down to two. This is not the case for Pre-offers. Although typically 
responding to a telling of some trouble, pre-offers do not close an adjacency pair 
but rather initiate a new sequence, a so-called pre-sequence (Schegloff, 1988, 
2007). Pre-sequences are preliminary to the main course of action, in this case a 
more direct offer if the conversation were to continue. This is illustrated below 
(for a similar example from a real conversation, see Schegloff, 2007): 
 
1 A:    I don’t have any money to pay for the ticket.  
2 B: Pre-Offer  I have a credit card.   
3 A:  Go-ahead You do?   
4 B:  Offer  Want to use it? 
7 A:  Acceptance Yeah. 
 
Understanding Pre-offers may therefore involve forward inferences about 
upcoming talk, akin to causal consequence inferences in text processing 
(Magliano et al., 1993). An additional difference between Pre-offers and 
Declinations is that the context turn is less constraining in Pre-offers. The first 
turn in the Pre-offer dialogues can be followed by a large number of actions; 
there is no normative expectation for a Pre-offer. The utterance I don’t have any 
money could, for instance, be followed by responses such as condolences (Oh 
dear, That sucks), a telling of one’s own experience (Me neither), or a suggestion 
(Why don’t you ask somebody for a loan?); a direct offer or a pre-offer are just two 
possibilities. Thus by comparing Pre-offers and Declinations we can go beyond 
the traditional distinction between direct and indirect speech acts and 
investigate how speech act recognition is modulated by the type of action being 
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performed and how it fits into the sequential context (high- vs. low-constraining 
context, end of an action sequence vs. a start of a new one). 
 In Chapter 2 I reported a behavioural study using the same dialogues, in 
which the target replies were presented visually in self-paced reading (see also 
Gisladottir et al., 2012). After each dialogue, participants were asked to 
categorize the action in the target sentences (I have a credit card) as doing 
answering, offering or declining. The categorization accuracy was very high 
(95.8%), indicating that listeners are very good at identifying the speech act in 
such action-underspecified sentences. Reading times were longer in Pre-offers 
than Answers at the first word, while Declinations took longer at the verb and 
the final word, relative to Answers. However, the differences in reading times 
were very small and standard deviation large, preventing conclusive 
interpretations. The ERP method has advantages over self-paced reading in that 
it is compatible with spoken language input and can indicate with much higher 
precision the time-course of differences between experimental conditions. 
Moreover, ERPs allow to determine whether there are quantitative or qualitative 
processing differences between the actions (see, for instance, Kutas, 1993). 
Given that Declinations and Pre-offers have different properties, it is possible 
that they recruit in part qualitatively different comprehension processes. If so, 
this should be reflected by differences in polarity, morphology (wave shape) 
and/or scalp distribution of the ERP effects to Declinations vs. Pre-offers. 
 If the early speech act recognition account is correct and auditory speech 
act recognition takes place early in the turn when the utterance has only been 
partially processed, then the three speech acts should differ early on in the target 
utterance (I have a credit-card), for instance at the first word (I) or the verb 
(have). Moreover, there should be no ERP differences at the utterance-final 
word, i.e., credit-card (note that this is one word in Dutch, the language of the 
stimuli); if the action has already been recognized at that point, the processing 
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of the final word should only add to the propositional meaning of the utterance, 
which for each target is the same for all three conditions and hence no 
differences should occur at the final word. Our predictions for the experiment 
were therefore as follows. We expected that both Declinations and Pre-offers, the 
critical conditions, would elicit ERP effects relative to the control condition 
(Answers) in an early time-window corresponding to the first word and the verb, 
and not at the final word. The critical questions are how early the effects appear 
and whether there are quantitative or qualitative ERP differences between Pre-
offers and Declinations, reflecting that the type of action and sequential context 
influences speech act recognition. Given that Pre-offers have a more complex 
action sequence structure (the context is less-constraining and the target 
utterance initiates a new sequence), we hypothesized that they might elicit 
additional ERP effects relative to Declinations. We did not have specific 
predictions regarding the ERP components, given that the two visual ERP 
experiments on speech act recognition discussed above (Coulson & Lovett, 2010; 
Egorova, Shtyrov, et al., 2013) do not yield a clear picture in terms of which 
ERP components are involved. However, we speculated that frontal ERP effects 
would be involved, as both studies (Coulson & Lovett, 2010; Egorova, Shtyrov, 
et al., 2013) report frontal effects. 
3.2 Methods  
3.2.1 Participants 
Forty-four right-handed speakers of Dutch with no hearing or speech problems 
and normal or corrected-to-normal vision were recruited from the subject 
database of the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics in Nijmegen (28 
female, 16 male, mean age 20, age range 18-27). The study was approved by the 
Ethische Commissie Gedragswetenschappelijk Onderzoek at Radboud University 
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Nijmegen. Participants gave written informed consent according to the 
Declaration of Helsinki prior to the study and were paid 8 Euro per hour for 
their participation. EEG data from two participants were removed from analysis 
due to excessive artifacts.  
3.2.2 Construction of materials 
The stimuli are auditory versions of the dialogues described in Chapter 2 (see 
section 2.3.2 and Gisladottir et al., 2012). Eight dialogues (out of 378) were 
changed for the present experiment due to low accuracy and certainty ratings in 
Chapter 2. The number of words in the target utterances ranges from three to 
seven words (median: four words), and average utterance duration is 1175 ms. 
The sentences were recorded in a soundproof room at 44.1 kHz sampling rate 
and 16-bit resolution. Four native speakers of Dutch (two male, two female) 
were instructed to act out the written dialogues as naturally and informally as 
possible in four different pairings (male1-male2; female1-female2; male1-
female1; male2, female2). The partners of each pair took turns in acting context 
utterances and critical utterances. The context utterances were extracted from 
those recordings, while the critical utterances were recorded separately from a 
list (without context) to prevent the prosody of the critical utterance from 
biasing one condition over another. The overall sound intensity of the recordings 
was normalized to prevent loudness differences between the items. The stimuli 
were pseudo-randomized and balanced across three lists, such that participants 
heard each critical utterance only once. Each list contained 126 dialogues with 
an equal number of trials across conditions and stimulus sets. Care was taken 
that the voices of the native speakers appeared as equally as possible in each 
action within each list.  
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3.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were given written instructions that included one example of each 
action. They were instructed to pay attention to the underlying meaning of the 
responses in the dialogues (the target utterances) and answer a comprehension 
probe: after each dialogue, participants indicated with a mouse click what the 
second speaker was doing with his response. For this task the options were 
Answering, Offering and Declining (Dutch antwoorden, aanbieden, weigeren). 
Since pre-offer is not a colloquial term, the broader concept of offering was 
chosen. Participants were seated in a comfortable chair in a soundproof room 
facing a computer monitor. There were 126 experimental trials presented 
auditorily through loudspeakers, preceded by 18 practice items. On each trial a 
fixation cross appeared in the middle of the screen which lasted throughout the 
entire dialogue. Participants were instructed to avoid eye movements and other 
movements during the presentation of the fixation cross. The context utterance 
was played 500 ms after the appearance of the fixation cross, followed by a 250 
ms pause before the target recording was played. In order to prevent an abrupt 
start and ending of the sentences, the recordings included a 50 ms buffer before 
sentence onset and after offset, such that the pause between context and target 
was in total 350 ms. This pause is similar to average gap durations reported in 
corpus studies of Dutch, which range from 8 to 380 ms depending on the study 
(Bosch, Oostdijk, & Boves, 2005; Heldner & Edlund, 2010; Stivers et al., 2009). 
The fixation cross disappeared 1200 ms after the offset of the target utterance 
recording. A blank screen was then presented for 1500 ms, until the 
comprehension probe was presented. This delayed task reduced contamination 
of the ERPs of interest by movement related EEG activity. Upon answering the 
comprehension probe (see above) a blank screen appeared for 2000 ms and then 
the next trial began. The trials were presented in 6 blocks, allowing participants 
to make eye movements and rest between them. After the EEG recording, 
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participants filled out the Empathy Quotient questionnaire (EQ; see 8.2 in 
Appendix) (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). 
3.2.4 Electrophysiological recordings 
The EEG was recorded with 36 active electrodes mounted in a cap (actiCap), 
referenced to the left mastoid. After the recording, the data were re-referenced 
off-line to the average of the left and right mastoids. Vertical eye movements 
were monitored with an electrode placed below the left eye and an electrode in 
the cap right above the left eye (Fp1). Horizontal eye movements were 
monitored through two electrodes in the cap placed approximately at the left 
and right outer canthi (F9 and F10). Bipolar EOGV and EOGH was computed. 
Electrode impedances were kept below 20 KΩ. EEG and EOG data were 
amplified with a bandpass filter of .02 to 250 Hz with a 10 second time constant 
and digitized at a sampling frequency of 500 Hz. Recording and analyses were 
performed with Brain Vision Analyzer. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Behavioural analysis and results  
Behavioural responses from all participants included in the EEG analysis were 
analyzed (42 out of 44 participants). Mean accuracy in the action categorization 
task was very high, 96.6% (SD 5.4%) (see Table 3.2). Participants correctly 
categorized 98.5% of Answers, 94.8% of Pre-offers and 96.5% of Declinations. 
The accuracy data were analysed with mixed-effects logistic regression using the 
lme4 package (D. Bates et al., 2012) in the statistics software R (R Core Team, 
2013). Mixed-effects logistic regression is better suited for the analysis of 
categorical outcome variables (such as question-answer accuracy) than ANOVA 
and allows the inclusion of participants and items as random factors in a single 
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analysis (Jaeger, 2008). The fixed effects were Action and Set; while the Set 
factor (see 2.3.2) was not meant to test any hypothesis of theoretical relevance, 
it was included in the analysis to check for interactions between action and the 
linguistic form of the sentence. We used the most maximal random effects 
structure justified by the experimental design and for which convergence was 
reached (Barr et al., 2013). This included random intercepts by participant and 
item, as well as by-participant random slopes for Action and Set and by-item 
random slopes for Action. For model comparison, see Appendix (section 8.2). 
The full model with Action, Set and the Action×Set interaction indicated that 
Declinations were categorized less accurately than Answers (Estimate: -1.57, SE: 
0.40, z = -3.94, p < .001) and Pre-offers were categorized less accurately than 
Answers (Estimate: -1.48, SE: 0.43, z = -3.47, p < .001). However, the 
comparison between Declinations and Pre-offers was not significant (Estimate: -
0.26, SE: 0.27, z =  -0.94, p = .34). An Action×Set interaction reflected that 
Pre-offers in Set 1 were categorized more accurately than in Set 2 (Estimate: 
0.84, SE: 0.38, z = 2.22, p < .05).  
Table 3.2: Behavioural results. Mean accuracy (and standard deviation) in 
the action categorization task for all items (overall) and for each stimulus 
set. 
 
3.3.2 ERP analysis  
The EEG data were averaged relative to the first word onset and the sentence-
final word onset of the target utterance. For each time-locking point the EEG 
 Answer Declination Pre-offer 
Overall 
accuracy 
98.5% (2%) 96.5% (3.8%) 94.8% (8%) 
Set 1 
accuracy 
98.0% (3.7%) 96.2% (4.5%) 97.2% (5.2%) 
Set 2 
accuracy 
99.1% (2.2%) 96.9% (4.9%) 92.4% (11.9%) 
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data were segmented into epochs of 1200 ms with a 150 ms pre-stimulus 
baseline. Artifacts were removed by excluding epochs with excessive EEG (>100 
µV) or EOG (>75 µV) amplitude. In the final dataset of 42 participants, 17% of 
trials were rejected due to artifacts. The percentages of rejected trials did not 
differ across the three experimental conditions at the two time-locking points (Fs 
< 1.5, ps > .23). Only artifact-free trials were included in the averages.  
 For a separation of ERP effects elicited early in the target sentences and 
effects elicited at the final word, we defined two broad time-windows: an early 
utterance time-window from 100 to 600 ms after first word onset and a late 
utterance time-window from 100 to 1000 ms after final word onset. These time-
windows were chosen for the following reasons. The early utterance time-
window covers the duration of the first word and the verb, and therefore 
captures early speech act recognition effects (the target sentences involve 
connected speech with subjects and verbs of relatively short duration; see Figure 
1). The final word of the target utterances occurs on average 490 ms after 
utterance onset; however, since the first 100 ms after word onset reflect 
exogenous, stimulus-bound ERP components which are largely insensitive to 
cognitive factors (C. M. Brown & Hagoort, 2000; Coulson, 2004), the first 100 
ms of the final word should be very similar across experimental conditions. As a 
consequence, the endpoint of the early utterance time-window was set at 600 ms 
(roughly 490 ms + 100 ms), and the starting point of both early and late 
utterance time-windows was set at 100 ms after first and final word onset. 
Importantly, these two time-windows are not overlapping, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Mean onset of the first word, verb and final word in target 
utterances and a rough timeline for the early and late utterance time-
windows. An example sentence (in red) illustrates the onset of the first 
word, verb and final word, but does not reflect actual word durations. 
 To further narrow down relevant time-windows, we first performed 
omnibus repeated measures ANOVAs on mean amplitudes in 100 ms consecutive 
windows6 in the early and late utterance time-windows described above, using 
all electrodes (see Table 3.3 and Table 3.4). Based on these initial omnibus 
ANOVAs, follow-up analyses were performed in 100 ms consecutive windows at 
                                         
6 For a similar approach, where consecutive time-windows of 100 ms were used to get a more fine-grained picture of the time-course 
of language-relevant ERP effects, see for example Grainger, Lopez, Eddy, Dufau, & Holcomb (2012) and Kwon, Kluender, Kutas, & 
Polinsky (2013). 
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the first word from 100 to 600 ms, and at the final word from 100 to 200 ms 
and 600 to 1000 ms. The lateral ANOVA included the topographical factors 
AntPost (for Anterior vs. Posterior sites), Hemisphere and Site (i.e., electrode), 
yielding four regions of four electrodes each (for an illustration of the regions, 
see Figure 3.2). The medial ANOVA included the topographical factors AntPost 
and Site, yielding two regions of five sites each. Note that the medial ANOVA 
included 8 lateral electrodes and only 2 midline electrodes, and is therefore 
referred to as medial. Since no Action×Set interactions were obtained in the 
initial omnibus ANOVA (see Table 3.3 and Table 3.4), Set was removed as a 
factor in these regional analyses. When applicable, the Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction was applied to correct for violations of the assumption of sphericity; 
original degrees of freedom are reported. Main effects of Action and relevant 
interactions in the regional omnibus analysis were followed up with pairwise 
comparisons (ANOVA), contrasting every action with each one of the others.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Initial omnibus analyses for the early utterance time-window. 
Lat = lateral sites, Mid = midline sites, Hem = hemisphere, *p < .05, 
**p<.01. 
 
 
Analysis  Source DF 100-200 
200-
300 
300-
400 
400-
500 
500-
600 
Lat Action×Hem×Site 24, 984 2.77** 3.34** 2.33** 2.48** 2.83** 
Mid Action×Site 6, 246       3.45* 4.63** 
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Table 3.4: Initial omnibus analyses for the late utterance time-window, for 
those epochs that showed significant effects. Lat = lateral sites, Hem = 
hemisphere, *p < .05.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Regions used for analyses of EEG data 
 
 
 
 
Analysis  Source DF 100-200 
600-
700 
700-
800 
800-
900 
900-
1000 
Lat 
Action×Site 24, 984  2.43* 2.68* 2.51* 2.74* 
Action×Hem 2, 82 3.43*     
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1.1.1 ERP results  
3.3.2.1 Early utterance time-window (first word onset of the target 
utterance) 
Figure 3.3 shows the grand averaged ERPs time-locked to the first word. All 
conditions elicited the early ERP components characteristic of auditory stimuli, 
the N1 and P2. The regional omnibus analysis at lateral electrodes (see Table 
3.5) yielded Action×AntPost×Hemisphere interactions from 100 to 600 ms (all 
Fs ≥ 3.69, ps < .05) and Action×Hemisphere×Site interactions from 100 to 
400 ms (all Fs ≥ 2.55, ps < .05). The medial omnibus ANOVA revealed an 
Action×AntPost interaction from 500 to 600 ms (F(2, 82) = 4.11, p < .05). 
Pairwise comparisons between the actions were performed on the basis of these 
interactions. 
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Figure 3.3: Early utterance time-window. A) Grand-averaged ERPs time-
locked to the onset of the first word. Representative electrodes showing 
the relevant effects are highlighted in dashed boxes. B) Scalp distribution 
of the ERP effects. All waveforms were low-pass filtered (10 Hz) for 
illustration purposes only. Negativity is plotted upwards. 
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 Analysis Source DF 100-200 
200-
300 
300-
400 
400-
500 
500-
600 
Re
gio
na
l 
Om
nib
us
 
Lat 
Action×AntPost
×Hem 2, 82 4.14* 7.08** 3.69* 4.08* 5.64** 
Action×Hem×
Site 
6, 
246 3.42* 2.81* 2.55*   
Med Action×AntPost 2, 82     4.11* 
Pa
irw
ise
 C
om
pa
ris
on
s 
D 
vs
. A
 
Lat 
Action×Hem 
×Site 
3, 
123 3.88* 3.63* 3.94*   
Action×AntPost
×Hem 1, 41    6.77* 7.08* 
Action×AntPost
×Site 
3, 
123    2.89*  
Lat Ant 
Action 1, 41     6.70* 
Action×Hem 1, 41    5.40* 4.59* 
Action×Hem×
Site 
3, 
123    3.28* 3.06* 
Right Ant Action 1, 41    8.29**  
Med Action×AntPost 1, 41     6.86* 
Med Ant Action 1, 41     6.90* 
P 
vs
. A
 
Lat 
Action×Hem 1, 41    6.47* 7.99** 
Action×AntPost
×Hem 1, 41 9.63** 
15.18*
* 7.10* 5.46* 
10.37*
* 
Action×AntPost
×Hem×Site 
3, 
123 2.96*   3.40* 2.88* 
Action×Hem×
Site 
3, 
123 7.68** 4.02* 3.21*   
Lat Ant 
Action×Hem 1, 41 4.77* 10.40**  8.56** 
11.57*
* 
Action×Hem×
Site 
3, 
123 6.93** 4.84** 4.08* 3.55*  
Right Ant Action 1, 41  7.94** 6.08* 10.61** 6.66* 
P 
vs
. D
 
Lat Action×AntPost×Hem 1, 41  5.18*    
Med Action×AntPost 1, 41     6.07* 
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Table 3.5: Regional omnibus analyses and pairwise comparisons for the 
early utterance time-window. D = Declination, A = Answer, P = Pre-offer, 
Lat = lateral regions, Med = medial regions, Ant = anterior regions, Hem 
= hemisphere, AntPost = Anteriority, *p < .05, **p<.01 
Declination versus Answer  
The lateral analysis (see Table 3.5) revealed that mean amplitude was more 
positive-going in Declinations than in Answers at the anterior region in the right 
hemisphere from 400 to 500 ms (Action; F(1,41) = 8.29, p < .01), and at 
bilateral anterior sites from 500 to 600 ms (Action; F(1,41) = 6.70, p < .05). 
Mean amplitude was also more positive-going in Declinations than in Answers at 
the anterior medial region from 500 to 600 ms (Action; F(1,41) = 6.90, p < 
.05).  
 
Pre-offer versus Answer  
The lateral analysis revealed that mean amplitude in Pre-offers was more 
positive-going than in Answers at the anterior region in the right hemisphere 
from 200 to 600 ms (Action; Fs ≥ 6.08, ps < .05). The medial ANOVA did not 
yield any reliable differences across conditions (Fs ≤ 2.34, ps > .06). 
 
Pre-offer versus Declination  
The lateral ANOVA revealed an Action×AntPost×Hemisphere interaction from 
200 to 300 ms (F(1,41) = 5.18, p < .05), but no reliable differences were 
obtained in follow-up analyses (Fs ≤ 2.35, ps > .08). In the medial analysis, 
mean amplitude tended to be more positive-going in Declinations than in Pre-
offers at the anterior medial region from 500 to 600 ms (Action; F(1,41) = 3.75, 
p = .06). 
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Summary of ERP effects in the early utterance time-window  
As predicted, there were early ERP differences between the actions in the early 
utterance time-window (corresponding to the first word and the verb). In 
particular, Declinations and Pre-offers both showed a frontal positivity, relative 
to Answers. In Pre-offers the positivity was restricted to the right hemisphere 
from 200 to 600 ms. In Declinations the positivity was present at anterior sites 
in the right hemisphere from 400 to 500 ms and extended to anterior bilateral 
and medial regions from 500 to 600 ms. The frontal positivity in Declinations 
was marginally significant relative to Pre-offers at the anterior medial region 
from 500 to 600 ms (p = .06). Differences in scalp distribution of the frontal 
positivity in Declinations and Pre-offers are illustrated in the topographical maps 
in Figure 3.4.  
3.3.2.2 Late utterance time-window (final word onset of the target 
utterance) 
Figure 3.4 presents the waveforms aligned to the final word onset. The regional 
omnibus analysis for medial sites (see Table 3.6) yielded an Action×Site 
interaction from 100 to 200 ms and 600 to 700 ms (Fs ≥ 2.56, ps < .05) and an 
Action×AntPost interaction from 900 to 1000 ms (F(2,82) = 3.57, p < .05). In 
the lateral analysis an Action×AntPost interaction was obtained from 600 to 
1000 ms (Fs ≥ 3.43, ps < .05) in addition to an Action×Site interaction from 
700 to 800 ms (F(6,246) = 2.65, p < .05). Hence follow-up comparisons 
between the actions were performed at medial sites from 100 to 200 ms, 600 to 
700 ms and 900 to 1000 ms and at lateral sites from 600 to 1000 ms. 
 
Declination versus Answer 
The medial ANOVA (see Table 3.6) yielded an Action×AntPost interaction from 
100 to 200 ms (F(1,41) = 6.32, p < .05), but follow up analyses did not reveal 
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significant differences between the actions (ps > .12). In the lateral ANOVA 
there were no significant differences (Fs ≤ 2.34, ps > .10). 
 
Pre-offer versus Answer  
The lateral analysis revealed that mean amplitude was more negative-going in 
Pre-offers than in Answers at bilateral posterior regions from 900 to 1000 ms 
(Action; F(1, 41) = 5.11, p < .05). In the analysis for medial sites, mean 
amplitude was also more negative-going in Pre-offers than in Answers in the 
medial posterior region from 900 to 1000 ms (Action; F(1, 41) = 4.97, p < .05). 
 
Pre-offers versus Declinations  
Mean amplitude was more negative-going in Pre-offers than in Declinations at 
bilateral posterior regions from 600 to 1000 ms (Action; Fs ≥ 4.24, p < .05). 
Mean amplitude was also more negative-going in Pre-offers than in Declinations 
at medial posterior sites from 900 to 1000 ms (Action; F(1, 41) = 6.31, p < 
.05).  
 
Summary of ERP effects in the late utterance time-window  
As expected, there were no differences between Declinations and Answers in the 
late utterance time-window. Pre-offers, however, elicited a late, posterior 
negativity relative to both Answers and Declinations. Relative to Declinations, 
the negativity was present at posterior bilateral regions (600 to 1000 ms) and 
the posterior medial region (900 to 1000 ms). Relative to Answers, the 
negativity was present at posterior bilateral and medial regions from 900 to 
1000 ms. The scalp distribution of these effects is illustrated in the topographical 
maps in Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4: Late utterance time-window. A) Grand-averaged ERPs time-
locked to the onset of the final word. Representative electrodes showing 
the relevant effects are highlighted in dashed boxes. B) Scalp distribution 
of the ERP effects. 
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Table 3.6: Regional omnibus analyses and pairwise comparisons for the 
late utterance time-window, for those epochs that showed significant 
effects. D = Declination, A = Answer, P = Pre-offer, Lat = lateral regions, 
Med = medial regions, Post = posterior regions, AntPost = Anteriority. *p 
< .05, **p<.01. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
The aim of this article was to address a fundamental problem in conversation, 
namely how utterances that are underspecified at the action level can quickly be 
understood as performing certain speech acts. This study goes beyond prior 
research by investigating the time-course of speech act recognition in such 
  Analysis Source DF 100-200 
600-
700 
700-
800 
800-
900 
900-
1000 
Re
gi
on
al 
Om
ni
bu
s Lat 
Action×AntPost 2, 82  3.78* 3.43* 4.17* 4.21* 
Action×Site 6, 246   2.65*   
Med Action×Site 
8, 
328 3.47** 2.56*    
Action×AntPost 2, 82     3.57* 
Pa
irw
ise
 C
om
pa
ris
on
s D 
vs
. A
 
Med Action×AntPost 1, 41 6.32*     
P 
vs
. A
 Lat Action×AntPost 1, 41   4.41* 6.79* 8.75** 
Lat Post Action 1, 41     5.11* 
Med Action×AntPost 1, 41     5.56* 
Med Post Action  1, 41     4.97* 
P 
vs
. D
 Lat Action×AntPost 1, 41  7.64** 6.45* 9.04** 8.52** 
Lat Post Action 1, 41  9.26** 4.24* 4.40* 5.93* 
Med Action×AntPost 1, 41     4.28* 
Med Post Action 1, 41     6.31* 
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action-underspecified utterances in spoken dialogues and exploring the effect of 
sequential context on this process. The target utterances were identical across 
conditions but differed in the type of speech act performed and how it fits into 
the larger action sequence (high- vs. low-constraining context, end of an action 
sequence vs. a start of a new one). The behavioural results indicate that even for 
action-underspecified utterances participants are very good at identifying the 
underlying speech act; the mean accuracy in the comprehension task was 96.6%. 
The ERP results show that speech act recognition begins early in the turn when 
the utterance has only been partially processed, at least when participants are 
asked to categorize the action of the utterance. This was reflected by frontal 
positivities from 200 ms after utterance onset in Pre-offers and from 400 ms in 
Declinations, relative to the control condition (Answers). At the utterance-final 
word no ERP effects occurred in Declinations, while Pre-offers elicited a late 
posterior negativity relative to the other actions. The differences between Pre-
offers and Declinations, both of which are relatively indirect speech acts, 
demonstrate that speech act comprehension is not just modulated by 
indirectness as traditionally construed, but also by the type of action being 
performed and the relationships between actions in conversation. Below we 
describe the results in more detail and discuss their implications.  
3.4.1 The time-course of speech act recognition 
Conversation is characterized by tight time constraints, allowing listeners limited 
time between turns (on average only 200 ms) to recognize the speech act and 
plan an appropriate response (Levinson, 2013). We hypothesized that speech 
acts are recognized early on in utterances, enabling quick turn transitions. More 
specifically, we predicted that the critical conditions – Declinations and Pre-
offers – would elicit ERP effects relative to the control (Answers) in an early 
utterance time-window corresponding to the first word and the verb (e.g., I 
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have), and not at the utterance-final word (credit-card). In line with the first 
aspect of this prediction, both Declinations and Pre-offers elicited ERP effects in 
the early utterance time-window. In particular, Pre-offers elicited a frontal 
positivity relative to Answers in the right hemisphere from 200 to 600 ms after 
utterance onset. A positivity was also observed in Declinations, relative to 
Answers, at frontal sites in the right hemisphere from 400 to 500 ms after 
utterance onset, extending to anterior bilateral and medial regions from 500 to 
600 ms.   
 The earlier onset in Pre-offers is consistent with the results from the self-
paced reading study in Chapter 2 (see also Gisladottir et al., 2012), in which 
reading times for the first word were longest in Pre-offers. Future studies are 
needed to assess the functional significance of this early difference between 
Declinations and Pre-offers. Studies in the visual modality have reported speech 
act related ERP effects around 100 ms (Egorova, Pulvermüller, et al., 2013; 
Egorova, Shtyrov, et al., 2013). The slightly later onset in the present experiment 
may be due to noisier language input (spoken vs. visual in previous studies 
(Egorova, Pulvermüller, et al., 2013; Egorova, Shtyrov, et al., 2013)) and greater 
variability in the target utterances (multi-word sentences vs. one word). It is also 
possible that the effects observed in the early utterance time-window are early 
responses to the verb, and not the first word. The dialogues involve connected 
speech with subjects and verbs of relatively short duration; the duration of the 
first word in the critical utterances was only 141 ms on average (in 89% of cases 
it was the short pronoun “I” ik; see Figure 3.1). Importantly, however, the early 
frontal positivities were absent when time-locked to the final word, indicating 
that the beginning of the utterance, that is the first word and/or the verb, is 
critical for this aspect of speech act recognition. These early effects of action 
type show that, at least when an action categorization task is used, listeners do 
not wait for the full propositional meaning of the sentence, but proceed 
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immediately with speech act recognition based on the partial information 
available. This is striking given that the critical utterances do not contain any 
clues regarding what speech act is being performed.  
 When is speech act recognition achieved, i.e., when has the speech act 
been successfully recognized? While the ERP method cannot pinpoint the exact 
moment in time when recognition occurs, the results for the final word are 
informative about whether additional processing at the end of the utterance is 
required. In contrast to our prediction that no ERP effects would occur at the 
utterance-final word (credit-card), a late posterior negativity was observed in 
Pre-offers from 600 to 1000 ms after final word onset relative to Declinations 
and from 900 to 1000 ms relative to Answers. This late effect suggests that 
under certain circumstances listeners do make use of the entire utterance to 
understand the action. While the final-word effect in Pre-offers is unexpected on 
an early speech act recognition account, it fits well with our prediction that Pre-
offers would elicit additional ERP effects relative to Declinations due to having a 
more complex action sequence structure. In particular, Pre-offers are less 
predictable, as the context turn is less constraining (the two turns do not form an 
adjacency pair). Second, Pre-offers are more predictive, “projecting” further talk 
in a new action sequence (Schegloff, 1988); understanding a Pre-offer involves 
knowing that a direct offer would follow if encouraged by the recipient. Pre-
offers may thus require additional processing based on the complete utterance 
because of one or both of these characteristics (for a further discussion of the 
ERP effects, see below). 
 The prediction that no ERP effects would be observed at the utterance-
final word (credit-card) was confirmed for Declinations. As discussed in the 
introduction, the sequential context is highly constraining in Declinations due to 
adjacency pair structure; given a proposal (I can lend you money), there is a 
normative expectation for either an acceptance or a declination. The first word 
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of the response (I…) helps to narrow down the identity of the unfolding speech 
act by eliminating obvious acceptances of the form Oh great, Phew! Thank you 
etc. The verb (I have…) makes clear that a proto-typical acceptance is not 
underway, strengthening the likelihood that a declination is involved. By the 
time the final word is reached, the semantic processing only adds to the 
propositional meaning, which is the same in all conditions, and hence no ERP 
differences occur at the final word. We take this to show that in highly 
constraining contexts – in the present study following the first turn in an 
adjacency pair – listeners can sidestep the full propositional content of 
utterances and recognize the speech act before hearing the final word. On the 
assumption that the action categorization task captures the response demands in 
everyday conversation, the present results support the early speech act 
recognition account. 
 The ERP pattern for Declinations is consistent with the idea that the brain 
is proactive, constantly generating expectations about upcoming input (Bar, 
2009; Kutas, DeLong, & Smith, 2011; Martin J. Pickering & Garrod, 2013; 
Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). It has been argued that “we do not interpret 
our world merely by analysing incoming information, but rather we try to 
understand it using a proactive link of incoming features to existing, familiar 
information (e.g., objects, people, situations)” (Bar, 2009, p. 1235). Past 
experience with speech act sequences during a lifetime of conversation (stored 
as scripts in memory (Schank & Abelson, 1977)), coupled with minimal 
information about the utterance, may enable listeners to predict the action in 
advance of its completion. The implication of the present results is that 
prediction in language comprehension may not be confined to the level of 
individual lexical items or their syntactic, semantic or conceptual features 
(Altmann & Kamide, 1999; Federmeier, 2007; Kutas et al., 2011; Thornhill & 
Van Petten, 2012), but takes place at the level of speech acts as well. Early 
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action recognition through such predictions could be the key to efficient turn-
taking, allowing listeners to plan their reply early and respond within the typical 
200 ms window between turns in conversation. 
 Overall, the current findings on the time-course of speech act recognition 
contribute to a growing body of ERP research (discussed in section 3.1.1) 
showing that both early and late processes are involved in pragmatic language 
comprehension. The early effects of action are in line with the view that 
“different information types (lexical, syntactic, phonological, pragmatic) are 
processed in parallel and influence the interpretation process incrementally, that 
is as soon as the relevant pieces of information are available,” (Hagoort, 2008, p. 
1055). The results extend reports of early pragmatic effects (from 150-200 ms 
after word onset in discourse studies) (Van Berkum et al., 1999; Van Berkum, 
Zwitserlood, et al., 2003) to dialogue contexts. Fast and incremental processing 
of speech acts challenges classic theories of pragmatics (Grice, 1975; Searle, 
1975) which assume that language understanding proceeds by first extracting 
the propositional or semantic content of the complete utterance and then 
comparing that to the context, in order to generate additional pragmatic 
inferences. However, the results for the utterance-final word – in particular, the 
late negativity in Pre-offers – highlight that pragmatic language comprehension 
sometimes involves late inferential processes, as research on irony (e.g., Regel et 
al., 2011; Spotorno et al., 2013) has also shown.  
 To summarize, we can draw two main conclusions regarding the time-
course of speech act recognition. First, even in utterances that are underspecified 
for the action, speech act recognition begins early in the turn – before the final, 
critical word has been heard. Second, the time-course of speech act recognition 
is influenced by how the utterance connects to the larger action sequence. In 
highly-constraining contexts, when the sequence is coming to a close, additional 
processing at the utterance-final word is not required. This finding is in line with 
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the early speech act recognition account discussed in the introduction. However, 
in less-constraining contexts, when a new sequence is initiated, recognition of 
the speech act involves analysis of the complete utterance, as reflected by a late 
posterior negativity at the final word.  
3.4.2 What do the ERP effects reflect? 
There are several parallels between our ERP findings and prior research on 
speech acts and pragmatic language comprehension more generally which we 
will briefly discuss. The earliest effect of action was observed at frontal sites in 
the right hemisphere during the early utterance time-window (e.g., I have…), 
from 200 ms after first word onset in Pre-offers and from 400 ms in Declinations. 
The timing and anterior scalp distribution of this early positivity differentiates it 
from other positivities reported in the language domain  (see, for instance, 
Hagoort et al., 1999; Kolk & Chwilla, 2007; Van Petten & Luka, 2012). However, 
the right hemisphere preponderance of this early frontal positivity is consistent 
with several studies implicating the right hemisphere in pragmatic language 
comprehension. A visual half-field lexical-decision study found that the right 
hemisphere plays a critical role in speech act processing in isolated statements 
such as Don’t forget to go to the dentist (Holtgraves, 2012). Similarly, damage to 
the right hemisphere causes difficulty with understanding indirect speech acts 
(Foldi, 1987). EEG and fMRI studies in healthy participants have likewise 
highlighted the role of the right hemisphere in pragmatic language 
comprehension (Coulson & Wu, 2005) and discourse coherence (Menenti, 
Petersson, Scheeringa, & Hagoort, 2009). The right hemisphere advantage in 
pragmatics has been associated with factors such as coarse semantic coding 
(Beeman, Bowden, & Gernsbacher, 2000), processing of relatively unpredictable 
semantic relationships (Federmeier, Wlotko, & Meyer, 2008), or forming an 
integrated representation of ongoing discourse (Menenti et al., 2009). In the 
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MEG study on speech act comprehension previously discussed (Egorova, 
Pulvermüller, et al., 2013), several activations were found in the right 
hemisphere. In particular, an effect was observed between 200 and 300 ms in 
the right inferior frontal gyrus, suggesting that this area plays a role in “binding 
information about action and context” (Egorova, Pulvermüller, et al., 2013). At 
face value, the right hemisphere distribution of the frontal positivity observed in 
the present study supports the idea that this early effect reflects linguistic and/or 
discourse-level processes in the right hemisphere that are needed to understand 
the speech act of the utterance in the given context.  
 The frontal positivity in Declinations extended to the anterior medial and 
left hemisphere sites during the early utterance time-window, from 500 to 600 
ms after first word onset relative to Answers. This effect is especially prominent 
at the midline and in the left hemisphere (see waveforms in Figure 3.4) and will 
therefore be referred to as frontal left/midline positivity. While the frontal 
left/midline positivity in Declinations was not significant relative to Pre-offers (p 
= .06), the waveforms in Figure 3.4 suggest that it is absent in Pre-offers. This 
frontal effect bears some resemblance to a frontal positivity reported in a visual 
ERP study on indirect requests, which was interpreted as reflecting ease of 
processing in the indirect condition (Coulson & Lovett, 2010). However, that 
interpretation does not fit the present results, as it counter-intuitively implies 
that Declinations are the easiest out of the three speech acts to process (whereas 
we expect Answers to be so). What is it about Declinations that triggers this 
positivity? In contrast to Pre-offers, the context turn in the Declination dialogues 
builds up strict expectations about the upcoming action (an acceptance or 
declining of an offer). In contrast to Answers, the Declination target utterances 
are relatively indirect (providing just a reason for not needing the offer) and 
therefore more taxing. We propose that this combination of predictability and 
indirectness triggers the frontal left/midline positivity: listeners quickly “tune 
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in” to the early signals of the action (expecting either declination or acceptance) 
and yet have to engage in additional processing because of the indirect response. 
The nature of this additional processing is unclear. Frontal positivities with a left 
hemisphere and midline distribution have been linked to discourse structure 
reanalysis (Dwivedi et al., 2010; Dwivedi, Phillips, Laguë-Beauvais, & Baum, 
2006) and update of working memory (MacGregor, Corley, & Donaldson, 2010). 
The similarity of these positivities to the effect reported here is not obvious, as 
they are elicited in very different conditions (when a single word is unexpected 
or pragmatically anomalous). However, an account in terms of discourse 
structure revision or working memory is compatible with the notion that the 
beginning of the utterance in Declinations is demanding due to a combination of 
indirectness and predictability. In particular, the non-canonical beginning of the 
Declinations (e.g., I have…) could trigger revision of the incoming turn in order 
to make sense of the sentence as a Declination.  
 An alternative account is that the frontal left/midline positivity reflects 
socio-emotional factors. As reported in the Introduction, fMRI and MEG studies 
on indirect speech act comprehension report activations in frontal regions 
involved in mentalizing, including the medial frontal cortex (Basnakova et al., 
2014; Egorova, Pulvermüller, et al., 2013; van Ackeren et al., 2012). Frontal 
slow waves similar to the frontal left/midline positivity in Declinations have 
been reported in studies on theory of mind using narratives or story cartoons 
(Meinhardt, Kühn-Popp, Sommer, & Sodian, 2012; Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000). 
Moreover, in supplementary analyses of the present data (presented in the 
Appendix, see 8.2), a correlation was obtained between the frontal left/midline 
positivity in Declinations and the Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004), which measures both theory of mind (cognitive empathy) 
and affective empathy. Although speculative, the frontal left/midline positivity 
in Declinations may reflect theory of mind processing. Note that frontal theory 
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of mind regions are also activated when participants think about the future (Bar, 
2009; C. D. Frith & Frith, 2006), suggesting a link to prediction: these areas 
“may be concerned with anticipating what a person is going to think and feel 
and thereby predict what they are going to do” (C. D. Frith & Frith, 2006, p. 
532). The combination of predictability and indirectness in Declinations could 
trigger theory of mind processing at the beginning of the target utterance, 
resulting in the frontal left/midline positivity. However, further research is 
clearly required to investigate the two possible accounts for this ERP effect 
discussed above.  
 In addition to the frontal left/midline and right hemisphere positivities 
observed in the early utterance time-window, a late posterior negativity 
occurred at the final word (credit-card) in Pre-offers. This effect was present in 
Pre-offers from 600 to 1000 ms after final word onset relative to Declinations, 
and from 900 to 1000 ms relative to Answers. We interpret this ERP effect as a 
negativity to Pre-offers rather than as a positivity (P600) associated with 
Answers and Declinations, since it is not plausible that Answers, the control 
condition, should require more reanalysis, revision, or pragmatic inferencing – 
processes traditionally associated with late positivities.  
 One possibility is that the posterior negativity to the final word in Pre-
offers reflects uncertainty associated with the subsequent comprehension task, as 
the behavioural results indicated that accuracy was descriptively lowest for Pre-
offers. The difference in accuracy was due to lower accuracy in stimulus Set 2. 
The target utterances in Set 1 all start with I have…, which is a common way to 
begin an offer, as attested by studies of English and Finnish (Kärkkäinen & 
Keisanen, 2012). Set 2, on the other hand, is more variable and includes formats 
such as I am going… or My brother is…, which may be less common in offering 
actions and therefore categorized less accurately. If uncertainty in categorization 
drives the posterior negativity, then the effect should be more pronounced in 
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target sentences in Set 2, for which the task accuracy was lower. However, no 
differences between Sets were observed in the ERPs, speaking against an 
uncertainty account for the late ERP effect.  
 Sustained negativities to sentence-final words have been interpreted as 
reflecting difficulty in semantic analysis at the message level (see, for instance, 
Osterhout & Holcomb, 1992), but this “semantic” sentence negativity peaks 
earlier than in the present experiment (around 400 ms). Sentence-final 
negativities have also been linked to working memory operations at clause 
boundaries (clause-ending negativity; Kutas, 1997), in line with studies 
associating sustained negativities to various linguistic stimuli with increased 
demands on working memory (see, for instance, King & Kutas, 1995; Kluender & 
Kutas, 1993; Münte, Schiltz, & Kutas, 1998; Van Berkum, Brown, Hagoort, & 
Zwitserlood, 2003). Negativities associated with working memory have a frontal 
scalp distribution in most cases and therefore do not match the posterior 
distribution in the present study (for an exception, see Dwivedi et al., 2006). 
However, a working memory account for the late negativity in Pre-offers is 
consistent with the notion that they are more complex than the other two 
conditions in the study. The context turn in the Pre-offer dialogues is not 
constraining in terms of what action can follow, and as a consequence the 
speech act is less predictable. Processing at the final word may be more taxing 
on working memory in Pre-offers because it requires post-hoc retrieval of the 
prior turn to figure out what the utterance could mean in that particular context. 
On this account, a late negativity is not elicited to Declinations, because the 
prior turn (an offer) has already built up a strong expectation for either an 
acceptance or a declination, and listeners do not need to compare the utterance 
to the prior turn in working memory. Whether this working memory account is 
correct is a topic for further investigation.  
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3.4.3 Remaining questions 
Some questions relating to conceptual and methodological issues remain. The 
first concerns the task demands. Overhearing a dialogue is different from taking 
an active part in a conversation, when participants can be held accountable for 
both the content and timing of their response. Given that the crucial task in 
conversation involves recognizing the action in the incoming turn and planning 
a relevant response, we used an action categorization task to ensure that 
participants paid as much attention to the actions as in natural dialogue. To 
some degree this task mirrors the situation in everyday conversation, in which 
listeners have to make an implicit categorization of each utterance in order to 
prepare a fitted response. However, participants were given labels of the three 
speech acts in advance and may have used this top-down information to predict 
the actions based on the contexts. This raises the question whether, and if so to 
what extent, task-related processes influenced the ERP effects reported in this 
article. We are currently investigating this in an ERP study. In this follow-up 
experiment we use a true-false judgment task that probes understanding of the 
action without providing information about the speech acts in advance. 
Important for the present purposes, the main ERP effects reported in the current 
study are replicated under these different task circumstances. On the assumption 
that using a comprehension task of some kind better captures the response 
demands in conversation, the generalization of the current results to a different 
task environment supports the view that the ERP effects are not induced by the 
action categorization but rather reflect a more natural aspect of speech act 
comprehension. 
 Another issue concerns the role of prosody in speech act comprehension. 
The target utterances were recorded out of their dialogue contexts (from a list) 
and used in all three conditions to prevent the prosody from biasing any of the 
three speech acts. One could argue that this neutral prosody, which included 
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falling intonation, may be better suited for some speech acts than others. For 
instance, in a test recording during development of the materials, the native 
speakers sometimes used a fall-rise contour (Ward & Hirschberg, 1985) in the 
Pre-offers. It is therefore possible that a rising intonation is more suitable for the 
Pre-offers. To what extent the comprehension of the speech acts in the present 
study was influenced by prosody is not clear. Research on irony has not found an 
effect of prosody, suggesting that prosody does not necessarily provide crucial 
cues for utterance interpretation (Regel et al., 2011). Whether this holds for 
speech act comprehension more generally is an empirical question. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Three main conclusions can be drawn from the present ERP results. First, the 
early frontal positivities to the target utterance onset show that – at least when 
participants are asked to categorize the action – speech act recognition begins 
very early in the incoming turn, starting already from 200 milliseconds after first 
word onset when the utterance has only been partially processed. This is the 
case even though the utterance is relatively indirect and contains no 
morphosyntactic speech act clues. Second, the ERP findings for the utterance-
final word reveal that the time-course of speech act recognition is influenced by 
how the utterance connects to the larger action sequence. In highly-constraining 
(adjacency pair) contexts, when the sequence is coming to a close, no late ERP 
effect to the final word occurs. This suggests that listeners can recognize the 
speech act before the final word through predictions at the speech act level. 
Early speech act recognition may well be the key to efficient conversation, 
allowing listeners to plan their reply early and respond within the 200 ms time 
frame characteristic for turn-taking. In some cases, however, additional 
processing based on the complete utterance is required. This is reflected by a 
posterior negativity at the utterance-final word when the speech act is in a less-
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constraining context and a new action sequence is initiated. Taken together, the 
findings show that the time-course of speech act recognition is influenced by the 
type of action being performed and the sequential context. The present data 
demonstrate that the speech act dimension is an important aspect of context that 
should be taken into account in future studies on sentence comprehension in its 
natural habitat, conversation.  
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4 Generalization of the ERP correlates of speech act recognition 
across task environments 
This chapter is a modified version of:  
Gisladottir, R. S., Chwilla, D. J., & Levinson, S. C. (In preparation). The influence 
of speech act type and the sequential context on sentence comprehension: An 
ERP study. 
 
Abstract 
Verbal actions such as asking people out, requesting, and complimenting are the 
building blocks of conversation. Successful communication relies on the 
recognition of these actions for appropriate responses. In an ERP experiment, we 
investigated the time-course of speech act recognition in utterances that are 
underspecified at the action level. The aim was to determine the robustness of 
the ERP correlates of speech act recognition reported in Chapter 3 (Gisladottir, 
Chwilla, & Levinson, 2015). One limitation of the previous study is that 
participants were asked to categorize the speech acts. Do the early ERP effects –  
taken as support for an early speech act recognition account – generalize to  
more natural situations in which overt categorization is not required? In the 
present study a true/false judgment task was used, which captures the response 
demands in natural conversation and does not require explicit categorization of 
the speech acts. Further, filler dialogues were included to reduce strategic 
processing of the speech acts. Replicating earlier results, Declinations elicited an 
early frontal positivity to the first word. The frontal positivity is similar to the 
combined effects of the right fronto-temporal and left/midline frontal positivity 
in Chapter 3. Also consistent with the previous study, Pre-offers elicited a late 
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negativity at the utterance-final word. The early frontal positivity in Declinations 
and the late negativity in Pre-offers are therefore relatively stable across 
experimental tasks and designs. However, in contrast to the experiment in 
Chapter 3, no early ERP effects were found in Pre-offers. This indicates that the 
experimental environment exerts some influence on early action recognition. 
The present study supports the claim that the early frontal positivity observed to 
Declinations and the late negativity in Pre-offers are linked to speech act 
recognition. The results provide further evidence for early recognition of actions 
in highly-constraining contexts, while highlighting that in some circumstances 
recognition of action does not begin until at the utterance-final word. 
4.1 Introduction 
Conversation is an inherently interactive enterprise, characterized by rapid 
exchange of verbal actions (Schegloff, 1996). Some are routinized and easy to 
recognize, such as greetings (hi) or apologies (I’m sorry). Others are more 
complex. As previously discussed, a simple statement like I have a car could be 
used, for instance, to offer somebody help with moving, to indirectly reject an 
offer for a ride, or to answer a question. In each case listeners have to go beyond 
the literal meaning and recognize the speech act of the utterance; was it an offer, 
rejection, or an answer? Since the response to a turn is critically dependent on 
what speech act is being performed, recognition of the action is a prerequisite 
for successful communication.  
 Not only do participants in conversation need to recognize the speech act 
of every turn, they also have to plan an appropriate reply and respond in a 
timely manner to conform to the rules of turn-taking (Sacks et al., 1974). All 
these processes take place quickly and smoothly, most of the time. As reviewed 
in the Introduction to this thesis, corpus studies indicate that the gap between 
turns, i.e., the switch between speakers in conversation, is most frequently only 
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200 ms and often even shorter (De Ruiter et al., 2006; Heldner & Edlund, 2010; 
Levinson & Torreira, 2015; Stivers et al., 2009). How conversationalists manage 
to recognize the speech act of an utterance and respond within 200 ms is a real 
puzzle, given that it takes people at least between 600 to 1200 ms just to 
produce a one-word utterance (e.g., naming an object such as an apple; E. Bates 
et al., 2003; Indefrey & Levelt, 2004; Levelt, 1989; Schnur et al., 2006). Listeners 
must start planning their own turn well before the other speaker has completed 
her utterance (Levinson, 2013), which entails that the speech act must have 
been recognized at an early stage of sentence comprehension. This view was 
referrred to as the early speech act recognition account earlier in this thesis.  
 The hypothesis that speech acts can be recognized early in utterances is 
striking, given that turns rarely contain clear speech act clues or so-called 
illocutionary force indicating devices (Levinson, 1983; Searle, 1969; Searle & 
Vanderveken, 1985) to aid recognition. As the example above reveals, the form 
and content of an utterance (e.g., I have a car) can be compatible with multiple 
actions. Given that underspecification at the action level is pervasive in everyday 
conversation, how is it that listeners recognize speech acts so quickly and 
efficiently, as the extraordinarily fast transitions between turns suggest? This 
question taps into a larger issue about how proactive listeners are during 
language comprehension and whether they make predictions at the level of 
speech acts. The general aim of this study was to address this by investigating 
the time-course of speech act recognition, testing the hypothesis that verbal 
actions are recognized early in utterances based on only partial input. 
 As reviewed in the Introduction of this thesis, speech act comprehension 
broadly construed has been investigated in several domains, for instance in 
relation to reference resolution in requests and questions (e.g., Brown-Schmidt et 
al., 2008; Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004), pitch accents in question-answer 
dialogues (e.g., Magne et al., 2005), and irony (e.g., Regel et al., 2011; Spotorno 
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et al., 2013). The neural substrate of speech act comprehension has been 
investigated in fMRI and MEG experiments (Basnakova et al., 2014; Egorova, 
Pulvermüller, et al., 2013; van Ackeren et al., 2012). The time-course of speech 
act recognition – the topic of this study – has been investigated in ERP studies 
using visual, non-conversational stimuli (Coulson & Lovett, 2010; Egorova, 
Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, 2013). More relevant for research on conversation, the 
ERP study in Chapter 3 (Gisladottir et al., 2015) investigated speech act 
recognition in spoken, Dutch dialogues. Since the experiment in this chapter 
builds on this earlier study, we will first review it again here.  
 The main goal of Chapter 3 was to test the early speech act recognition 
account by investigating the time-course of spoken speech act recognition in 
utterances that are underspecified at the action level. A second aim was to 
explore how sequential context – i.e., prior turns in conversation – impacts this 
process. The dialogues used as stimuli in this experiment contained a target turn 
(e.g., I have a credit card) that performed three different speech acts depending 
on the prior context: an Answer, Declination and Pre-offer (for convenience, 
example dialogues are repeated in Table 4.1). The rationale was that recognizing 
the action would be more difficult in Pre-offers and Declinations, which are 
relatively indirect speech acts, than in Answers (the control condition)7. 
However, while Declinations and Pre-offers are both indirect, they differ in their 
relationship to prior and upcoming turns in conversation, making it possible to 
explore the influence of sequential context on speech act recognition. 
 
 
 
                                         
7 In the self-paced reading study using the same sentences (Chapter 2 and Gisladottir, Chwilla, Schriefers, & Levinson, 
2012), reading times were shortest for Answers on all measures, indicating that Answers are easiest to comprehend. 
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Table 4.1: Examples of stimuli in Dutch and English translations. 
 
 As discussed in section 3.1.2, Declinations close an adjacency pair and 
consequently the context utterance (the first turn of the pair) is highly 
constraining in terms of what type of action can follow. In contrast, Pre-offers 
initiate a new action sequence, a pre-sequence, projecting a more direct offer if 
the conversation were to continue8; thus Pre-offers differ from Declinations in 
that they invite more inferences about upcoming talk and the context utterance 
                                         
8  E.g., A: I don’t have any money. B: I have a credit card. A: You do? B: Yeah, I can pay for you. 
 Set 1 Set 2 
Condition Context Target Utterance Context 
Target 
Utterance 
Answer 
(Control) 
Hoe ga je voor 
het ticket 
betalen? 
Ik heb een 
creditcard. 
Waar koop je je 
shampoo? 
Ik ga naar de 
Kruidvat. 
How are you 
going to pay for 
the ticket? 
I have a credit-
card. 
Where do you 
buy your 
shampoo? 
I go/am going to 
the Kruidvat 
[drugstore]. 
Declination 
(Context highly-
constraining + 
target utterance 
ends the 
sequence) 
Ik kan je wat 
geld lenen voor 
het ticket. 
Ik heb een 
creditcard. 
Ik kan wel 
shampoo voor je 
meenemen? 
Ik ga naar de 
Kruidvat. 
I can lend you 
money for the 
ticket. 
I have a credit-
card. 
I can bring 
some shampoo 
for you? 
I go/am going to 
the Kruidvat 
[drugstore]. 
Pre-offer 
(Context less 
constraining + 
target utterance 
starts a new 
sequence) 
Ik heb geen geld 
om het ticket te 
betalen. 
Ik heb een 
creditcard. 
Mijn shampoo is 
op. 
Ik ga naar de 
Kruidvat. 
I don’t have any 
money to pay 
for the ticket. 
I have a credit-
card. 
My shampoo is 
finished. 
I go/am going to 
the Kruidvat 
[drugstore]. 
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is less constraining (as the dialogues do not form an adjacency pair). It was 
predicted that both Declinations and Pre-offers would elicit ERP effects relative 
to Answers in an early time-window corresponding to the first word and the 
verb, and not at the final word. Such a pattern would support the early speech 
act recognition account9. Secondly, it was hypothesized that Pre-offers might 
give rise to additional ERP effects due greater complexity (i.e., the context is less 
constraining context and the target utterance invites inferences about the 
continuation of the sequence). In line with the first prediction, both Declinations 
and Pre-offers elicited ERP effects in the early time-window. More specifically, a 
fronto-temporal positivity was found for the right hemisphere from 200 ms after 
first-word onset in Pre-offers and from 400 ms in Declinations, extending to 
anterior medial sites in Declinations only. These early effects suggest that 
listeners do not wait for the full propositional meaning but proceed with speech 
act recognition as early as 200 ms after the start of the utterance. No ERP effects 
occurred at the utterance-final word in Declinations, relative to Answers, 
providing further support for the early speech act recognition account. Pre-
offers, on the other hand, elicited a late, posterior negativity at the utterance-
final word (relative to both Declinations and Answers), indicating that additional 
processing based on the entire utterance is sometimes required. While the late 
negativity is consistent with the hypothesis that Pre-offers might give rise to 
additional ERP effects due to a more complex action sequence structure, the 
occurrence of this effect at the utterance-final word seems surprising under an 
early speech act recognition account.  
 One limitation of the ERP study in Chapter 3 relates to task demands.  
                                         
9 Note that if the action has already been recognized by the time the final word is presented, the processing of the final 
word should only add to the propositional meaning of the utterance, which for each target is the same for all three 
conditions and hence no differences should occur at the final word. 
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Before definitive conclusions can be drawn regarding the time-course and ERP 
correlates of speech act recognition, it is important to determine the robustness 
of the ERP results reported in Chapter 3 (and Gisladottir et al., 2015). 
Participants were instructed to categorize the target turns as doing Answering, 
Declining and Offering; this task was chosen to approximate the response 
demands in everyday conversation, in which listeners have to make an implicit 
categorization of each utterance in order to prepare a fitted response. However, 
the three speech act categories were known to the participants before the 
experiment began. The task therefore directed attention to the critical speech 
acts and a priori restricted possible interpretations of the utterances. It is well-
known that task demands and aspects of the experimental design can influence 
ERPs. In line with this, in the language domain both the N400 and P600 
components have been found to be modulated by the type of task (see, for 
instance, D. J Chwilla et al., 1995; Gunter & Friederici, 1999; Gina R. Kuperberg, 
2007). Moreover, early positivities are influenced by experimental factors such 
as task demands (e.g., Roehm, Bornkessel-Schlesewsky, Rösler, & Schlesewsky, 
2007). Given these findings, an important question is whether the early frontal 
positivities or the late negativity reported in Chapter 3 were induced by the 
categorization task or whether they generalize to a more natural situation in 
which such categorization is not required.  
 The aim of the current study was to further investigate the time-course of 
speech act recognition by determining the robustness of the ERP correlates 
reported in Chapter 3. Taking into account the task concern raised above, we 
investigated whether the early positivities to Declinations and Pre-offers and the 
final-word negativity in Pre-offers are also present when explicit categorization 
of the target speech act is not required. As previously mentioned at the 
beginning of the introduction to this chapter, participants in conversation have 
to juggle several tasks; they need to recognize the speech act of the unfolding 
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turn, plan an appropriate reply, and respond in a timely manner to obey the 
rules of turn-taking (Sacks et al., 1974). Thus in contrast to passive reading or 
listening to non-conversational discourse, comprehending-for-responding is a 
critical aspect of conversation. Simply instructing participants to read and listen 
for comprehension, without requiring any response, would not capture this 
important feature of conversation. To better mirror the response demands and 
attention level necessary in everyday interaction, the current study required a 
true/false judgment response to a comprehension question. Participants were 
asked to judge whether a statement about the target utterance was true or false 
(e.g., Speaker B gives A the information asked for. – True / Not true). This task 
targets understanding of the action without requiring explicit categorization of 
the speech act.  
 A second limitation of the experiment in Chapter 3 is that the 
experimental materials did not include filler dialogues. As a consequence, 
participants may have used the context turn as a superficial cue to what type of 
speech act was coming up. ForPa instance, a context utterance performing a 
proposal of some sort was always followed by a declination, but never by an 
acceptance. Coupled with the categorization task, the absence of fillers may have 
rendered the target speech acts predictable. This could have given rise to the 
early ERP effects reported in Chapter 3. To address this concern, additional filler 
dialogues were included in the present study, preventing participants from using 
the context turn as a superficial cue to the target speech act.  
 We created three types of fillers, one for each condition; these can be 
referred to as non-answers, non-pre-offers and non-declinations (i.e., 
acceptances; see Method section). The first turn of the fillers contains the same 
action as the context turn of the corresponding experimental condition (e.g., an 
offer), while the second turn delivers an action different from the target 
utterance (e.g., an acceptance instead of a declination). As a consequence, the 
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critical speech acts cannot be predicted based on the context turns, in contrast to 
the prior study. In this new design, an offer is equally likely to be followed by an 
acceptance (filler) or a declination (experimental condition). Importantly, none 
of the fillers and the experimental dialogues contain anomalies of any kind. They 
resemble natural conversations between friends or relatives and span common 
discourse topics such as working/studying, doing groceries and going out.  
 The predictions for the experiment were as follows. Under the assumption 
that the ERP effects reported in the earlier study reflect processes of speech act 
recognition and are note dependent on the categorization task, we expect to find 
a similar ERP pattern in the current experiment. More specifically, in the early 
time-window (corresponding to the first word and the verb) we predict the 
presence of frontal positivities in both Declinations and Pre-offers, relative to 
Answers. At the final word, however, we should find a late negativity in Pre-
offers, relative to Answers and Declinations, but no ERP effect in Declinations 
relative to Answers. Such an outcome would confirm the time-course of speech 
act recognition reported in the earlier study, demonstrating that the ERP 
correlates of speech act recognition are stable across experimental designs and 
tasks. An alternative outcome is that some or all of the effects reported in 
Chapter 3 are not replicated. Depending on the specific pattern of ERP results, 
this would lead to a reevaluation of the time-course of speech act recognition. 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
Forty-six native speakers of Dutch participated in the experiment (29 women, 17 
men, mean age = 21.2 years, age range 18-27). All participants were right 
handed, had normal vision and no hearing or speech problems. 
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4.2.2 Materials 
The experimental items are the same spoken dialogues as used in Chapter 3 (see 
also Gisladottir et al., 2015). The reader is referred to sections 2.3.2 and 3.2.2 
for a description of the stimuli. In addition to the experimental items, three 
types of filler dialogues were added to decrease the predictability of the target 
speech acts. The first turn of the fillers performs the same action as the context 
of one of the experimental conditions, while the second turn performs an action 
that is different from the target utterances (for instance, Non-Answer filler: What 
are you bringing to the dinner? – I don’t know yet. Non-Pre-Offer filler: I don’t have 
any money for the vending maching. – I don’t have any either. Non-Declination 
filler: I can buy a ticket for you. – That would be great). Importantly, the context 
turns cannot be used as superficial cues to the critical speech acts, as each 
context sentence can be followed by more than one type of reply (target action 
or filler action). As an example, an offer (context) can be followed by an 
acceptance (filler) or a declination (experimental condition).  
 The stimuli and fillers were pseudo-randomized and balanced across three 
lists, such that each list contained 126 experimental items and 126 fillers (with 
an equal number of trials across conditions and filler types). The recording 
session, which included a short practice list with six dialogues, lasted 
approximately an hour.  
4.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were instructed to listen carefully to the dialogues and take the 
perspective of the speakers. Each trial began with a warning beep and 750 ms 
later a fixation cross appeared in the middle of the screen. Participants were told 
to avoid movements, including blinks, during the presentation of the cross 
(which lasted throughout the entire dialogue). The context utterance was played 
500 ms after the appearance of the fixation cross. Between the context recording 
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offset and the start of the target recording there was a 200 ms silence. To 
prevent an abrupt start and ending of the sentences the recordings included a 50 
ms buffer before sentence onsets and after offsets, such that the pause between 
context and target was in total 300 ms. This pause is similar to average gap 
durations reported in corpus studies of Dutch, which range from 8 ms to 380 ms 
depending on the study (Bosch et al., 2005; Heldner & Edlund, 2010; Stivers et 
al., 2009). The fixation cross stayed on the screen for 1200 ms after the end of 
the target utterance recording, and was followed by a 1500 ms blank screen 
interval. A comprehension question then appeared on the screen, e.g., Speaker B 
gives A the information asked for or Speaker B accepts the suggestion of speaker A, to 
which participants responded True or False (in Dutch: Waar, Niet waar). To 
ensure equal probability of questions calling for a true or a false response, each 
type of experimental items and fillers was presented with two comprehension 
questions; one which called for a “true” response and another where a “false” 
response was appropriate. This resulted in six different comprehension questions 
that targeted understanding of the action. Participants responded by navigating 
the screen and clicking on the answer with a computer mouse. Upon answering 
the comprehension probe a blank screen appeared for 4000 ms and then the next 
trial began. After the EEG recording, participants filled out the Empathy 
Quotient survey (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) (see Section 8.4 in the 
Appendix).  
4.2.4 EEG recording  
The EEG was recorded with 60 active electrodes in a cap (actiCap), referenced to 
the left mastoid. The data were later re-referenced to the average of the left and 
right mastoids. Vertical and horizontal eye movements were recorded using four 
additional electrodes placed above and below the left eye and on the outer 
canthi. Bipolar EOG was computed. Electrode impedance was kept below 20 KΩ. 
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EEG and EOG data were filtered by a .02 Hz high pass and 250 Hz low pass filter 
with a 10 second time constant and sampled with a frequency of 500 Hz.  
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Behavioural analysis and results 
Accuracy in the comprehension task was analyzed with mixed-effects logistic 
regression in the statistics software R (R Core Team, 2013), using the lme4 
package (D. Bates et al., 2012, p. 4). Data from four subjects were excluded from 
the behavioural and EEG analysis due to excessive artifacts. Behavioural 
responses from 42 participants were analyzed. Accuracy in the comprehension 
task was computed as the percentage of correct responses in each experimental 
condition. Accuracy on filler items was not analyzed. Overall mean accuracy in 
the comprehension question was 93.1% (SD 6.7%). Participants correctly 
answered the question for 97.7% of Answers (SD 2.8%), 95.6% of Declinations 
(SD 5.3%) and 85.9% of Pre-offers (SD 14.9%). Table 4.2 shows mean accuracy 
for each set and condition; there seem to be differences in accuracy across sets, 
particularly in Pre-offers.  
 
Table 4.2: Mean accuracy in the comprehension task, for all items (overall) 
and each set. 
 For the mixed-effects logistic regression analysis, we used the most 
maximal random effects structure justified by the experimental design and for 
 Answer Declination Pre-offer 
Overall 
accuracy 
97.7% (2.8%) 95.6% (5.3%) 85.9% (14.9%) 
Set 1 
accuracy 
97.4% (3.5%) 94.6% (6.8%) 92.6% (12.9%) 
Set 2 
accuracy 
98.0% (3.5%) 96.6% (5.4%) 79.3% (18.6%) 
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which convergence was reached (random intercepts by participant and item, as 
well as by-participant random slopes for Action and Set and by-item random 
slopes for Action). The fixed effects were Action and Set. The full model with 
Action, Set and the Action×Set interaction (the best-fitting model, according to 
model comparison presented in the Appendix; see 8.5) indicated that the 
accuracy was lower in Pre-offers than in Answers (Estimate: -1.79, SE: 0.32, z = 
-5.67, p < .001). Accuracy was also lower in Pre-offers than in Declinations 
(Estimate: 1.40, SE: 0.32, z = 4.32, p < .001), while the comparison between 
Answers and Declinations was not significant (Estimate: -0.40, SE: 0.32, z = -
1.36, p =  0.17). As for interactions between Action and Set, accuracy was 
higher for Pre-offers in Set 1 than in Set 2 (Estimate: 1.13, SE: 0.26, z = 4.27, p 
< .001). Note that for Declinations and Answers an opposite pattern was 
observed, i.e., accuracy was slightly lower in Set 1 than in Set 2 (Answers; 
Estimate: -1.08, SE: 0.26, z = -4.03, p < .001, Declinations; Estimate: -1.22, SE: 
0.27, z = -4.45, p < .001). These behavioural results show that while overall 
accuracy in the comprehension task is high, there are subtle differences between 
actions and across sets. Additional analyses of accuracy and the EEG data with 
low accuracy items (below 93% accuracy) removed are presented in section 
4.3.4.  
4.3.2 EEG Data Analysis 
As in Chapter 3, two time-windows were used for the analyses of the EEG data: 
an early utterance time-window from 100 to 600 ms after first word onset and a 
late utterance time-window from 100 to 1000 ms after final word onset. The time-
window at the first word was shorter than the one at the final word to avoid 
overlapping time-windows. As seen in Figure 4.1, the final word of the target 
sentences occurs on average 490 ms after utterance onset. Since the first 100 ms 
after word onset are mainly sensitive to exogenous factors (e.g., modality, 
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intensity) but relatively insensitive to cognitive factors (see e.g., Kutas, Van 
Petten, & Kluender, 2005), the waveforms for the first 100 ms of the final word 
should be very similar across the experimental conditions. The endpoint of the 
early time-window was therefore set at 600 ms (roughly 490 ms + 100 ms), and 
not at 1000 ms as in the late utterance time-window. The starting point of both 
early and late time-windows was set at 100 ms after first and final word onset 
for the same reason, i.e., to exclude exogenous ERP components. These two 
time-windows allow for a separation of early speech act recognition effects at 
the beginning of the utterance up to the final word, and effects to the utterance-
final word.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Mean onset of the first word, verb and final word in target 
utterances and a rough timeline for the early and late time-windows. An 
example sentence (in red) illustrates the onset of the first word, the verb 
and the final word, but does not reflect word durations. 
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The EEG data were averaged relative to the first word onset and the sentence-
final word onset. For each time-locking point the EEG data were segmented into 
1200 ms epochs with a 150 ms pre-stimulus baseline. Artifacts were removed by 
excluding epochs with excessive EEG (±100 µV) or EOG (±75 µV) amplitude. 
In the final dataset of 42 participants, 14.7% of trials were rejected due to 
artifacts. The percentages of rejected trials did not differ across the three 
experimental conditions at the two time-locking points (Fs < 2.21, ps > .12).  
 Statistical analyses were performed on mean amplitudes in the early and 
late utterance time-windows. We first performed omnibus repeated measures 
ANOVAs in 100 ms consecutive time-windows, using all 59 electrodes with 
Action (3), Set (2) and Site (59) as factors, to further narrow down relevant 
time-windows ased on these initial analyses, follow-up analyses were performed 
for lateral and midline sites separately in 100 ms consecutive time-windows 
from 200 to 600 ms at the first word and from 500 to 700 ms and 800 to 1000 
ms at the final word. For these analyses a regional approach was used. For the 
lateral ANOVA the topographical factors were AntPost (for Anterior vs. Posterior 
sites), Hemisphere and Region, yielding 12 regions of 3 sites each (see Figure 
4.2). A similar approach with 3-site regions has been used, for instance, in 
research on ironic speech acts (Regel et al., 2011). The midline ANOVA analysis 
included 3 regions (Anterior, Medial, and Posterior) of three sites each; factors 
used were Action (3), AntPost (i.e., anteriority; 3) and Site (3). Since no 
Action×Set interactions were obtained in the initial omnibus ANOVA (see Table 
4.3 and Table 4.4), Set was removed as a factor in these regional analyses. Main 
effects of Action and relevant interactions were followed up with pairwise 
comparisons. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied to correct for 
violations of the assumption of sphericity (original degrees of freedom are 
reported for readability).  
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Figure 4.2: Regions of interest used for statistical analyses. 
 
 
 
Table 4.3: Initial omnibus ANOVA for the early utterance time-window (all 
electrodes). **p<.01. 
 
 
 
Table 4.4: Initial omnibus ANOVA for the late utterance time-window (all 
electrodes). *p < .05. 
Source DF 100-200 200-300 300-400 400-500 500-600 
Action×Site 116  3.63** 3.64** 3.92** 3.37** 
Source DF 100-200 
200-
300 
300-
400 
400-
500 
500-
600 
600-
700 
700-
800 
800-
900 
900-
1000 
Action x Site 116     1.93* 1.87*  1.89* 1.99* 
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4.3.3 ERP results 
4.3.3.1 Early utterance time-window (first word onset of target 
utterance) 
Figure 4.3 shows the grand averaged ERPs time-locked to the first word for a 
representative subset of electrodes. The overall ANOVA at lateral sites (see Table 
4.5) revealed an Action×AntPost interaction from 200 to 600 ms (Fs > 7.79, ps 
< .01) and an Action×AntPost×Region interaction from 400 to 600 ms (Fs > 
3.08, ps < .05). The midline ANOVA yielded an Action×AntPost interaction 
from 200 to 600 ms (Fs > 5.52, ps < .01) and an Action×AntPost×Site 
interaction from 200 to 300 ms and 400 to 600 ms (Fs > 2.32, ps < .05). Based 
on these interactions, follow-up comparisons between the actions were 
performed from 200 to 600 ms at both lateral and midline sites.  
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Figure 4.3: Early utterance time-window. A) Grand-averaged ERPs time-
locked to the onset of the first word (for a representative subset of 
electrodes). The relevant effects are highlighted in dashed boxes. B) Scalp 
distribution of the relevant ERP effects. All waveforms were low-pass 
filtered (10 Hz) for illustration purposes only. Negativity is plotted 
upwards. 
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Table 4.5: Regional omnibus analyses at lateral and midline sites for the 
early utterance time-window (showing only epochs with significant 
effects). *p < .05, **p<.01. AntPost = Anteriority, Reg = Region. 
Declination vs. Answer  
The lateral ANOVA (see Table 4.6) revealed that mean amplitudes were more 
positive-going in Declinations than in Answers at anterior regions in the right 
hemisphere from 200 to 300 ms (Action, F(1, 41) = 5.20, p < .05). The 
positivity to Declinations was also present from 400 to 600 ms at anterior 
bilateral regions (Action; Fs > 5.22, ps < .05) and at the anterior midline region 
(M1) (Action; Fs > 4.73, ps < .05). An effect in the opposite direction was 
observed at posterior sites: mean amplitudes were more negative-going in 
Declinations than in Answers from 200 to 300 ms at posterior bilateral sites 
(Action; F(1, 41) = 6.33, p < .05) and at the posterior midline region (M3) 
(Action; F(1,41) = 7.64, p < .01). The negativity to Declinations extended to 
two posterior regions in the left hemisphere (P2, P3) from 300 to 400 ms 
(Action, Fs > 7.50, ps < .01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 Source DF 200-300 300-400 400-500 500-600 
Lateral 
Regions 
Action×AntPost 2 8.59** 8.46** 8.84** 7.79** 
Action×AntPost×Reg 4   4.38** 3.08* 
Midline 
Regions 
Action×AntPost 4 5.52** 6.09** 8.28** 6.31** 
Action×AntPost×Site 8 2.32*  3.04* 3.11** 
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   Source DF 200-300 300-400 400-500 500-600 
An
sw
er
 vs
. D
ec
lin
at
io
n 
La
te
ra
l R
eg
io
ns
 
All 
regions 
Action×AntPost 1 17.49** 15.04** 18.76** 15.49** 
Action×Hem 1 5.33*    
Action×Reg 2 4.22*    
Action×AntPost×
Reg 2   6.30* 4.52* 
Anterior Action 2   7.56** 5.22* Action×Hem 2 7.67**    
Posterior 
Action 1 6.33*    
Action×Reg 2 8.24** 3.86* 6.63** 8.39** 
Action×Reg×Site 4    3.31* 
Ant: RH Action 1 5.20*    
Post: P2 Action 1 20.24** 7.57**   
Post:P3 Action 1 14.99** 7.50**   
Post: P4 Action 1 7.85**    
M
id
lin
e 
Re
gi
on
s All 
regions 
Action×AntPost 2 7.72** 9.19** 13.24** 9.11** 
Action×AntPost×
Site 4 3.13* 3.74* 5.14** 4.26** 
Anterior Action 1   7.77** 4.73* 
Posterior Action 1 7.64**    
De
cli
na
tio
n 
vs
 P
re
-o
ffe
r 
La
te
ra
l R
eg
io
ns
 
All 
regions 
Action×AntPost 1 7.42** 5.46* 7.21* 9.32** 
Action×AntPost×
ROI 2   6.42** 4.86* 
Anterior Action×Reg 2   4.75*  
Posterior Action×Reg 2 4.06*   5.75* 
Ant: A3 Action 1   4.26*  
Post: P2 Action 1 4.93*    
Post: P3 Action 1 6.82*   4.98* 
Post: P4 Action 1 4.45*    
M
id
lin
e 
Re
gi
on
s All 
regions 
Action×AntPost 2 8.10** 8.54** 14.12** 12.19** 
Action×AntPost×
Site 4   3.83* 4.45** 
Anterior Action 1   8.33** 4.99* 
Posterior Action 1 6.21*   5.10* 
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Table 4.6: Pairwise comparisons for the early utterance time-window. *p < 
.05, **p<.01. Ant = anterior regions, Post = posterior regions, AntPost = 
anteriority, Hem = hemisphere, Reg = Region. 
 
Pre-offer vs. Answer  
The ANOVA revealed no main effects of Action or relevant interactions at lateral 
sites (Fs < 3.28, ps > .08) nor midline sites (Fs < 2.29, ps > .09). 
 
Declination vs. Pre-offer  
The lateral analysis revealed that mean amplitude was more positive-going in 
Declinations than in Pre-offers at the anterior region closest to the midline in the 
left hemisphere (A3) from 400 to 500 ms (Action; F(1,41) = 4.26, p < .05) and  
at the anterior midline region (M1) from 400 to 600 ms (Action; Fs > 4.99, ps 
< .05). In contrast, mean amplitude was more negative-going for Declinations 
than for Pre-offers in left posterior regions (P2, P3, P4, Action; Fs > 4.45, ps < 
.05) and in the posterior midline region (M3, Action; F(1,41) = 6.21, p < .05) 
from 200 to 300 ms. The negativity to Pre-offers was also present in the 
posterior region closest to the midline in the left hemisphere (P3, Action; F(1,41) 
= 4.98, p < .05) and the posterior midline region (M3, Action; F(1,41) = 5.10, 
p < .05) from 500 to 600 ms.  
 
Summary of ERP effects in the early utterance time-window  
As predicted, Declinations showed a frontal positivity in the early utterance 
time-window relative to Answers. The frontal positivity was present at anterior 
sites in the right hemisphere from 200 to 300 ms, extending to anterior bilateral 
and midline regions from 400 to 600 ms. An additional early effect was observed 
at posterior sites: a negativity to Declinations, relative to Answers, at posterior 
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bilateral and midline regions from 200 to 300 and at lateral regions in the left 
hemisphere from 300 to 400 ms. In contrast to our predictions, no ERP effects 
were present in Pre-offers relative to Answers in the early utterance time-
window. The comparison between Pre-offers and Declinations confirmed that the 
early frontal positivity and posterior negativity observed to Declinations were 
not present in Pre-offers. Relative to Pre-offers, the frontal positivity was present 
in Declinations from 400 to 500 ms at an anterior region in the left hemisphere, 
extending to anterior midline sites from 400 to 600 ms. Similarly, the early 
negativity in Declinations was reliable relative to Pre-offers roughly at posterior 
sites in the left hemisphere and at the midline from 200 to 300 ms and 500 to 
600 ms after first word onset. 
4.3.3.2 Late utterance time-window (final word onset of target 
utterance) 
Figure 4.4 shows the grand averaged ERPs time-locked to the final word for a 
representative subset of electrodes. The omnibus analysis at lateral regions (see 
Table 4.7) yielded an Action×Hemisphere interaction from 500 to 700 ms and 
800 to 1000 ms (Fs > 5.33, ps < .01) and an Action×AntPost×Hemisphere 
interaction from 900 to 1000 ms (F(2,82) = 4.17, p < .05). The midline 
omnibus revealed no significant main effects of Action or relevant interactions 
(all Fs < 2.80, ps > .07). Thus follow-up analyses were performed comparing 
each action with the others from 500 to 700 and 800 to 1000 ms at lateral sites 
only. 
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Figure 4.4: Late utterance time-window. A) Grand-averaged ERPs time-
locked to the onset of the final word (for a representative subset of 
electrodes). The left hemisphere negativity is highlighted in dashed boxes. 
B) Scalp distribution of the left hemisphere negativity. 
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Table 4.7: Regional omnibus analyses at lateral and midline sites for the 
late utterance time-window (showing only relevant epochs). *p < .05, 
**p<.01. Hem = hemisphere, AntPost = Anteriority. 
Declination vs. Answer  
The analysis for anterior lateral sites (see Table 4.8) revealed an 
Action×Hemisphere interaction from 500 to 600 ms (F(1,41) = 4.15, p < .05) 
and an Action×Region interaction from 800 to 900 ms (F(2,82) = 5.22, p < 
.05), but further analyses did not yield any reliable differences between the 
conditions (Fs < 3.39, ps > .06).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source DF 500-600 600-700 800-900 900-1000 
Lateral 
Regions 
Action×Hem 2 7.53** 5.33** 10.52** 9.07** 
Action×AntPost×Hem 2    4.17* 
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Table 4.8: Pairwise comparisons for the late utterance time-window. *p < 
.05, **p<.01. Ant = anterior regions, Post = posterior regions, AntPost = 
anteriority, Reg = region, Hem = hemisphere. 
 
 Analysis Source DF 500-600 
600-
700 
800-
900 
900-
1000 
De
cl.
 vs
. 
An
sw
er
 All lateral 
regions 
Action×AntPost 1 4.43*    
Action×AntPost×Reg 2   4.91*  
Ant Action×Hem 1 4.15*    Action×Reg    5.22*   
Pr
e-o
ffe
r v
s. 
An
sw
er
 
All lateral 
regions 
Action 1  4.31*  5.06* 
Action×Hem 1  5.00* 15.46** 10.46** 
Action×AntPost×Site 2  4.04*  3.95* 
Action×Hem×Reg 2   3.80*  
Action×AntPost×Hem 1    4.33* 
Left Action 1  7.66** 5.73* 10.41** Action×AntPost×Site 2  5.43*   
Right Action×AntPost×Reg 2    4.02* 
Left Post Action 1  10.24**   
De
cli
na
tio
n 
vs
. P
re
-o
ffe
r  
All lateral 
regions 
Action×Hem 1 14.18** 12.62** 16.04** 14.43** 
Action×AntPost×Hem 1 6.13*   9.35** 
Action×AntPost×Reg 2    4.56* 
Action×AntPost×Hem
×ROI 2  4.14* 4.23*  
Action×Reg×Site 4   2.84*  
Left Action 1  7.28*  5.11* 
Right 
Action×Reg 2  3.91*  3.66* 
Action×AntPost×Reg 2  6.46** 5.08* 5.77* 
Action×Reg×Site 4   3.28*  
Right: Ant Action×Reg 2  6.44** 4.53* 6.22* 
Right: Post Action×Reg×Site 4 2.52* 4.39** 4.18** 3.78** 
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Pre-offer vs. Answer  
Mean amplitude was more negative-going in Pre-offers than in Answers at lateral 
regions from 600 to 700 ms and 900 to 1000 ms, reflected by a main effect of 
Action (Fs > 4.31, ps < .05). However, follow-up analyses on interactions with 
hemisphere (see Table 4.8) revealed that the negativity was more pronounced in 
the left hemisphere, being present at left posterior sites from 600 to 700 ms 
(Action; F(1,41) = 10.24, p < .01) and in the left hemisphere from 800 to 1000 
ms (Action; Fs > 5.73, ps < .05). An Action×AntPost×Region interaction was 
present in the right hemisphere from 900 to 1000 ms (F(2, 82) = 4.02, p < 
.05), but there were no reliable differences between the actions in follow-up 
analyses for the right hemisphere (Fs < 3.09, ps > .07). 
 
Declination vs. Pre-offer  
Pre-offers were more negative-going than Declinations in the left hemisphere 
from 600 to 700 ms and 900 to 1000 ms (Action; Fs > 5.11, ps < .05). Follow-
up analyses for the right hemisphere did not reveal any reliable differences 
between the actions (ps > .07).  
 
Summary of ERP effects in the late time-window 
As predicted, Pre-offers elicited a negativity relative to both Answers and 
Declinations in the late utterance time-window. Relative to Answers, the effect 
was most pronounced in the left hemisphere from 600 to 700 ms and 800 to 
1000 ms. Relative to Declinations, the negativity was present in the left 
hemisphere from 600 to 700 ms and 900 to 1000 ms. Declinations, on the other 
hand, did not elicit any ERP effects relative to Answers at the utterance-final 
word, as predicted.  
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4.3.4 Additional analyses of the utterance-final word 
ERP effects at the utterance-final word are unexpected under an early speech act 
recognition account. To corroborate the results for the late utterance time-
window – i.e., the absence of an ERP effect in Declinations and the presence of a 
late negativity in Pre-offers – additional analyses of the EEG data were 
performed for the final word.  
4.3.4.1 Word length  
The final words of the target utterances vary in the number of syllables (range: 1 
to 6 syllables; median: 3). One may therefore ask whether a difference in word 
length across items masked relevant effects at the final word, particularly an 
N400 effect or later ERP effects (e.g., P600, late negativity) in Declinations. To 
investigate this we performed supplementary analyses for a subset of the target 
utterances in which the final words were two syllables (40 items). For 
completeness, we also report the analysis for Pre-offers. Data from 10 additional 
participants were excluded because of low number of artifact-free trials per 
condition (N=32; minimum 10 trials per condition). ANOVAs were conducted 
for Declinations vs. Answers and Pre-offers vs. Answers at lateral sites (Action, 
AntPost, Hemisphere, Region, Site) and midline sites (Action, AntPost, Site). To 
check for a potential N400 effect or later ERP effects, the analyses were carried 
out in the time-windows from 250 to 500 ms and 600 to 1000 ms.  
 
N400 window (250 – 500 ms) 
Declination vs. Answer. The midline ANOVA yielded no significant main effect of 
Action or relevant interactions. The lateral ANOVA revealed that mean 
amplitude in Declinations was more negative-going than in Answers at one 
electrode in the fronto-temporal region in the right hemisphere (A5) 
(Action×Site interaction, F(2,62) = 10.83, p < .01).  
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Pre-offer vs. Answer. The midline analysis revealed no main effect of Action or 
relevant interactions. The lateral analysis yielded an 
Action×AntPost×Hemisphere×ROI interaction (F(2,62) = 4.31, p < .05), but 
follow-up analyses revealed no reliable differences.  
 
Late effects (P600, late negativity: 600 to 1000 ms) 
Declination vs. Answer. No significant effect of Action or relevant interactions 
were found in the midline ANOVA. The lateral ANOVA yielded an Action×Site 
interaction at anterior sites (F(2,62) = 9.38, p < .01), but t-tests revealed no 
reliable differences between the conditions.  
 
Pre-offer vs. Answer. The lateral analysis revealed that mean amplitude was more 
negative-going in Pre-offers than in Answers (Action; F(1,31) = 5.39, p < .05). 
The midline ANOVA revealed no reliable differences.  
 
Overall, these additional analyses converge with the results of the main ERP 
analysis, indicating that difference in word length did not mask an N400 or later 
ERP effects. In sum, Declinations do not elicit a centro-parietal N400 at the final 
word, nor do they involve later ERP effects. However, as expected a late 
negativity is present in Pre-offers relative to Answers in items with two syllables, 
as was the case in the main analysis of the full set of materials.  
4.3.4.2 Accuracy 
The behavioural results presented in section 4.3.1 indicate that accuracy is 
significantly lower in Pre-offers than in the other actions. To follow up on this 
finding, additional analyses of accuracy were carried out for each item 
(dialogue). These analyses revealed that the comprehension question was 
answered with high accuracy for the majority of dialogues; 74% of the dialogues 
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had an overall mean accuracy between 93% and 100%.  However, for Pre-offers 
the accuracy was at, or below, chance level (50%) in eight dialogues (out of 
126), whereas this was the case for only two items in Declinations. In the 
Answer condition the comprehension question was never answered below 
chance level. The problematic items in the Pre-offers were all in Set 2 and 
started with I go/am going (Dutch “ik ga”), I am moving (“ik verhuis”), I am (“ik 
ben”) and I have to (“ik moet”).  
 To clarify whether the late negativity elicited at the final word in Pre-
offers is driven by comprehension difficulty mainly in low accuracy items, we 
conducted additional analyses of the EEG data. Specifically, analyses were 
carried out for a subset of the target utterances that received very high accuracy 
in the comprehension task across speech acts (93% to 100% accuracy in each 
condition; 62 items). The presence of a negativity in the high-accuracy dialogues 
would indicate that this ERP effect does not reflect task-related comprehension 
difficulty but rather some other aspect of speech act comprehension in the Pre-
offer dialogues. The same analytical approach was used as in section 4.3.4.1 
above. For completeness we report the results for both Declinations and Pre-
offers and include the N400 time-window. Six participants were removed from 
this analysis (n=36) due to a low number of artifact-free trials per condition. 
 
N400 window (250 – 500 ms) 
Declination vs. Answer. No reliable differences were observed between the 
conditions in the lateral or midline ANOVA. 
 
Pre-offer vs. Answer. No reliable differences were found in the midline ANOVA. 
In the lateral ANOVA a marginal main effect of Action was obtained in the left 
hemisphere (F(1,35) = 4.07, p = .051), indicating that Pre-offers tended to be 
more negative than Answers in this time-window.  
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Late ERP effects (600 – 1000 ms) 
Declination vs. Answer. The midline and lateral ANOVAs yielded no relevant main 
effect of Action or interactions. 
 
Pre-offer vs. Answer. The midline ANOVA yielded a main effect of Action (F(1,35) 
= 4.34, p < .05), reflecting that mean amplitude was more negative in Pre-
offers across the midline. The lateral analysis revealed that a negativity was also 
present in the left hemisphere, reflected by a main effect of Action (F(1,35) = 
6.59, p < .05).  
 
The supplementary analyses for high accuracy items are consistent with the 
overall pattern of results at the final word, reported in section 4.3.3.2. 
Importantly, they confirm that the utterance-final negativity in Pre-offers does 
not arise from comprehension difficulty associated with low-accuracy items, as it 
is also present in items that were answered with very high accuracy.  
 
4.4 Discussion 
Conversation is characterized by tight time constraints, allowing listeners limited 
time between turns to recognize the speech act of the utterance and plan an 
appropriate response. The general goal of this article was to investigate whether 
speech acts can be recognized early in utterances, thereby enabling quick turn 
transitions. The more specific aim was to determine the robustness of the ERP 
correlates of speech act recognition reported in Chapter 3. The previous study 
used an action categorization task which a priori restricted possible 
interpretations of the target speech acts. In the current study we addressed this 
limitation, using a more natural task that does not require explicit 
categorization. Note that simply instructing participants to listen for 
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comprehension does not capture the response demands and the attention level 
necessary for conversational interaction. There is no such thing as passive 
conversation: in addition to paying attention to the speech act of the unfolding 
turn, interactants have to plan an appropriate reply and respond in a timely 
manner. The true/false judgment task used in the present study probes 
understanding of the action without providing participants with the possible 
speech act categories in advance. An additional limitation of the study in 
Chapter 3 is that the absence of filler dialogues made it possible to use the 
context utterances as superficial cues to the upcoming speech acts. In contrast, 
the current study used additional filler dialogues to decrease the predictability of 
the target speech acts.  
 The main findings of the present study were as follows. Replicating the 
results of the study resported in Chapter 3, Declinations elicited a frontal 
positivity in an early time-window roughly corresponding to the first word and 
the verb. The frontal effect had an earlier onset than in the previous study, 
starting in the right hemisphere from 200 to 300 ms and extending to anterior 
bilateral and midline ROIs from 400 to 600 ms. This effect is similar to the 
combined effects of the right fronto-temporal and left/midline frontal positivity 
in the study in Chapter 3 (see also Gisladottir et al., 2015). Also consistent with 
the prior study, no ERP effects were found in Declinations relative to Answers at 
the final word. This pattern of results provides further empirical support for an 
early speech act recognition account, indicating that comprehension at the 
action level takes place early in the utterance before the final word is heard. 
 A different pattern of results was found in Pre-offers. In contrast to the 
study reported in Chapter 3, no early ERP effects were found in Pre-offers. 
However, consistent with prior results, Pre-offers elicited a late negativity 
roughly from 600 to 700 ms and 800 to 1000 ms after final word onset. These 
results indicate that early speech act recognition is not always possible. 
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Moreover, the absence of early effects in Pre-offers shows that the experimental 
environment does exert some influence on early action recognition. Below we 
will discuss these findings and their implications in more detail. 
4.4.1 Further support for an early speech act recognition account 
Despite differences in task demands and experimental design, the pattern of 
results for Declinations is remarkably similar to that reported in Chapter 3. 
Speech act recognition in Declinations is reflected by a frontal positivity in the 
early time-window corresponding to the first word and the verb, while no ERP 
effects are observed at the final word. The additional statistical analyses for the 
final word (see section 4.3.4) further confirm the absence of an N400-like effect 
or a later ERP effect to Declinations. The absence of ERP effects at the utterance-
final word in Declinations is important as it indicates that the final word is not 
needed for recognizing the action, even though it is critical to the propositional 
meaning of the turn; the utterance-final word provides the key piece of 
information regarding why the proposal in the prior turn is being declined.  
 The early frontal positivity has an earlier onset in the present experiment, 
at 200 ms after utterance onset compared to 400 ms in the previous study. The 
early onset of the frontal positivity may reflect the influence of the changes in 
experimental task and/or design. In contrast to the study in Chapter 3, 
participants were not given labels of the relevant speech act categories in the 
present experiment, which limited top-down expectations of the target 
utterances. The predictability of the speech acts was further reduced by 
including additional filler dialogues. It has previously been reported, based on 
studies on speech act processing in the visual modality, that speech act 
comprehension effects have an earlier onset when predictability of the action is 
reduced (Egorova, Pulvermüller, et al., 2013). In particular, relevant ERP effects 
in written words performing requesting or naming speech acts had an onset up 
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to 70 ms later in an EEG study using block design (Egorova, Shtyrov, et al., 
2013) than in a single-trial MEG study with more variability in the experimental 
materials (Egorova, Pulvermüller, et al., 2013). The authors argued that in the 
MEG study showing earlier effects, the presentation of the target speech acts was 
more challenging and predictability reduced (Egorova, Pulvermüller, et al., 
2013). The interpretation that less predictability leads to earlier start of speech 
act recognition is however somewhat counterintuitive. An alternative 
explanation is that differences in the onset latency of the frontal positivity may 
be due to greater measurement sensitivity of detecting possible differences 
between conditions. The current experiment employed a 64-channel electrode 
setup instead of the 32-channel setup in the previous study, and as a 
consequence a slightly different analysis approach was used (e.g., regions with 
fewer electrodes). The setup and analysis approach used in the present study 
may be more optimal for capturing the early frontal positivity.  
 Regardless of which account better explains the early onset of the frontal 
positivity, the present finding that this effect begins from 200 ms after first word 
onset is in line with prior ERP research which has shown that spoken words are 
related to the global discourse context as early as 150 ms after word onset, “well 
before they have been fully pronounced, and possibly even before they have 
become acoustically unique” (Van Berkum, 2012, p. 591). The frontal positivity 
in the current experiment is therefore most likely triggered by the first word of 
the target utterance, and possibly subsequent words up to the final word as well.  
 What is it about Declinations that gives rise to this early start of speech 
act recognition in Declinations? As discussed previously in this thesis, rejections 
such as those in the Declinations constitute the second part of an adjacency pair. 
The first part of an adjacency pair is highly constraining in terms of what kind of 
speech act can follow. In the present experiment, listeners should expect either 
an acceptance or a declination following the proposal in the context turn (I can 
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lend you money). The first word of the response (I…) can then immediately be 
related to the speech act context, ruling out obvious acceptances of the form 
great, thank you etc. The verb (I have…) makes clear that a proto-typical 
acceptance is not in progress, strengthening the chance that a declination is 
involved. By the time the final word is reached (credit-card), the speech act has 
already been recognized. The semantic processing of the final word only adds to 
the propositional meaning, which is the same for all three speech acts, and 
hence no ERP effects are observed for Declinations at the utterance-final word. 
On this account, listeners do process the final word of the target utterance, but 
do not rely on it for recognition of the speech act.   
 The claim is not that listeners predicted the final word in Declinations, 
either at the lexical or conceptual level. If this were the case, we should find 
N400 facilitation (smaller amplitudes) in Declinations at the final word (see, for 
instance, Federmeier, 2007). The statistical analyses for the N400 window (see 
4.3.4) confirm that an N400 effect is not present. Linguistic prediction, either in 
the “weak” or “strong” sense (Kutas et al., 2011), is not at stake. The current 
findings show that listeners can get the action of an unfolding utterance in 
advance of its completion, suggesting that predictions are made at the level of 
speech acts (or action more generally). Importantly, these predictions cannot be 
due to a predictable experimental environment, as the presence of filler 
dialogues in the present study made it impossible to use the context utterances 
as superficial cues to the target speech act. Rather, we propose that early 
recognition of the speech act in Declinations reflects the natural tendency to 
anticipate upcoming talk based on prior knowledge of action sequences. 
Conversationalists have acquired a lifetime of information about speech act 
sequences and how they are used in common situations. This information can be 
stored as scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977) or schemata (Brewer & Nakamura, 
1984) in memory, providing a springboard for predictions that may be necessary 
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for smooth interactions (for the relationship between scripts and predictions, see 
Bar, 2009). Prediction at the speech act level could be the key to efficient turn-
taking; predicting unfolding or upcoming speech acts enables listeners to start 
planning their responses early, which in turn allows for short gaps between turns 
in conversation. However, further research is required to shed light on the 
mechanisms that enable listeners to recognize speech acts based on only partial 
information.   
4.4.2 Early speech act recognition is not always possible 
The results for the Declinations indicate that listeners can recognize speech acts 
early on in the utterance, based on only partial input. This does not hold for all 
actions, as exemplified by the fact that speech act recognition in Pre-offers does 
not begin until the final word. What could explain the absence of early ERP 
effects in this action type? As discussed in Chapter 3, a critical feature of a pre-
offer is that it initiates a pre-sequence rather than closing an adjacency pair. As a 
consequence, the turn immediately prior to a pre-offer (i.e., the context 
utterance in the present experiment) is much less constraining in regards to what 
action can follow. The utterance I don’t have any money could, for instance, be 
followed by responses such as condolences (That sucks), a telling of own 
experience (Me neither), or a suggestion (Why don’t you ask somebody for a loan?); 
a direct offer or a pre-offer are just additional possibilities. Since the context 
turn in the Pre-offer dialogues does not heavily constrain the next speech act, 
listeners have fewer expectations about the upcoming action and do not 
immediately proceed with speech act recognition. This is reflected by the 
absence of the early fronto-temporal positivity in Pre-offers. This account is in 
line with the finding from research on non-verbal action understanding that 
predictability is lowest at event boundaries (Zacks, Kurby, Eisenberg, & 
Haroutunian, 2011); Pre-offers initiate a new action sequence and therefore 
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constitute a boundary between two “events,” which are not in a predictable 
relationship.   
 It remains to be explained why an early fronto-temporal positivity was 
nevertheless observed in the previous study reported in Chapter 3 (and in 
Gisladottir et al., 2015). In that case participants had more top-down 
information about the three critical speech act types. First, they were given 
meta-linguistic labels of the speech acts in advance, as a consequence of using an 
explicit categorization task. Second, in contrast to the present study, the 
previous experiment did not contain filler dialogues to direct participants’ 
attention away from the critical speech acts, thereby making it easier to form 
expectations about the action of the target utterance. The availability of top-
down information about the critical utterances because of these two 
experimental factors could explain the presence of the early fronto-temporal 
positivity to Pre-offers in the first study. When such top-down information is 
limited, as in the current experiment, no strong expectations may build up prior 
to the Pre-offer being presented so listeners take a wait-and-see approach.  
 Clearly, the experimental environment exerts some influence on action 
recognition, in particular on the right hemisphere fronto-temporal positivity 
reported in Chapter 3. However, the different pattern of results in the two 
studies is likely reflective of a factor that can also be at play in everyday 
conversation. Top-down expectations are not only formed based on experimental 
design or the structure of action sequences, but also based on aspects such as the 
topic of discussion, the personality of the interlocutor, or the general course of 
the preceding conversation. It is therefore conceivable that speech act 
recognition in Pre-offers, and other actions which are not constrained by the 
prior turn, can under the right circumstances begin early in the utterance. What 
the current results show is that early recognition of the action in Pre-offers is not 
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possible based on the prior turn alone, when such top-down information is 
limited. 
 As for the results at the utterance-final word, the late negativity in Pre-
offers converges nicely with the prior study in indicating that the final word is 
required for comprehension of the action in that speech act type. Although the 
behavioral results showed lower accuracy in the comprehension task for the Pre-
offers than for the other actions, the additional analyses in section 4.3.4 indicate 
that the late negativity does not arise from general comprehension difficulty (as 
it is also present in items that were answered with very high accuracy). Rather, 
it likely reflects that Pre-offers are more complex by nature than the other 
actions, not only in terms of how constraining the prior turn is, but also in the 
relationship to upcoming actions in conversation; through their position as a 
first turn in a pre-sequence, pre-offers invite inferences about what the speaker 
might do later in the action sequence (i.e., performing a more direct offer).  
 It is difficult to disentangle whether it is just the lack of constraining 
context (backward relationship) or the projection of an action (forward 
relationship) that triggers the late negativity in Pre-offers. Late negativities are 
rarely reported in language research and occur in situations quite different from 
naturalistic dialogue. For instance, they have been linked to message-level 
analysis in sentence-final words preceded by syntactic anomalies (Osterhout & 
Holcomb, 1992) and to higher processing load in linking unrelated word pairs 
(C. M. Brown, Hagoort, & Chwilla, 2000). The left hemisphere preponderance of 
the late negativity in the current experiment may be informative with respect to 
what it reflects. While the effect was observed at posterior bilateral and medial 
sites in the study in Chapter 3, it had a clear left hemisphere distribution at both 
anterior and posterior sites in the present experiment. This is intriguing given 
that pragmatic processing, including speech act comprehension, has been 
associated with the right hemisphere (Holtgraves, 2012). The right hemisphere 
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is thought to operate in a bottom-up, post hoc fashion during language 
comprehension, while the left hemisphere has been argued to be oriented 
towards predictive language processing and the use of top-down cues 
(Federmeier, 2007). The left hemisphere’s advantage in prediction has mainly 
been studied in regards to upcoming words and not, for instance, speech acts 
(for a review, see Federmeier, 2007). At face value, the left hemisphere 
distribution of the late negativity nevertheless suggests that post-hoc analysis of 
the dialogues is not at play, and is instead more consistent with the forward 
explanation of the late negativity, namely the proposal that understanding Pre-
offers involves projecting or predicting the continuation of the sequence. 
Participants in the prior study in Chapter 3 may have had less reason to 
anticipate what could come next in the Pre-offer dialogues because the task 
simply required them to categorize the utterance into three known action types, 
leading to a more bilateral distribution of the late negativity. 
 The finding that Pre-offers are recognized only very late in the utterance 
has implications for research on the timing of turn transitions. Speech act 
recognition in Pre-offers, as reflected by the late negativity, begins around 600 
ms after final word onset. Since the duration of the final word in the target 
utterances was on average 685 ms, recognition of the action begins only shortly 
before the offset of the final word. After the action has been identified, listeners 
need to plan an appropriate reply. Response planning requires at least between 
600 to 1200 ms, as indicated by studies on word production (see, for instance, E. 
Bates et al., 2003; Indefrey & Levelt, 2004; Schnur et al., 2006). The picture that 
emerges is that the gap between the end of a Pre-offer and the beginning of its 
response should be at least between 500 and 1100 ms long, roughly estimated. 
This is much longer than the 200 ms average reported for turn transitions (De 
Ruiter et al., 2006; Heldner & Edlund, 2010; Stivers et al., 2009).  
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 So far, corpus studies have generally ignored sequence organization as a 
factor that influences the length of gaps between turns, grouping all inter-
speaker turn transitions together into one average (Bosch et al., 2005; e.g., 
Heldner & Edlund, 2010). Similarly, in conversation analysis this issue has only 
to a limited extent been taken into account (in the context of preferred vs. 
dispreferred actions; K. H. Kendrick & Torreira, 2015; Sacks et al., 1974; 
Schegloff, 2007). One testable hypothesis is that initiating actions (including 
pre-offers) take more time to recognize and are therefore followed by long gaps, 
while responsive actions (such as declinations and other second parts of 
adjacency pairs) are easy to recognize and hence followed by short gaps or even 
overlapping responses (see also K. H. Kendrick, 2012). Future experimental and 
corpus research could investigate this further to clarify accounts of turn timing 
and the time-course of speech act recognition in conversation more generally. 
4.4.3 Remaining issues 
One disadvantage of context-manipulating designs, such as the one used in the 
present experiment, is that ERP effects to words in the context can spill over into 
the target interval, leading to artificial, early ERP components (Steinhauer & 
Drury, 2011). This brings up the question whether the early effect of action in 
Declinations is caused by ERP differences arising from the context. In addition to 
the frontal positivity (which began 200 ms after target utterance onset), an early 
posterior negativity was elicited to Declinations, mainly in the left hemisphere 
(from 200 to 400 ms relative to Answers, and from 200 to 300 ms and 500 to 
600 ms relative to Pre-offers). This effect was not reported in the prior study in 
Chapter 3. Figure 4.5 shows the early frontal positivity and the early posterior 
negativity elicited to Declinations in the present study at representative 
electrodes, using a baseline interval of 150 ms and 500 ms. While the waveforms 
for the frontal positivity are nicely aligned around target utterance onset (Panel 
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A), this is not the case for the posterior negativity (Panel B); small differences 
between the conditions are already visible at 0 ms when the first word is 
presented, particularly when a 500 ms baseline is used. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Comparison of waveforms for the early frontal positivity (A) 
and posterior negativity (B) at representative electrodes at the first word, 
using a baseline of 150 and 500 ms. 
 To check whether there are reliable differences between Declinations and 
Answers during the 300-ms gap before the target utterance, we performed 
additional analyses of the EEG data between the offset of the context turn and 
the start of the target speech act, using a 150 ms pre-gap baseline. A midline 
ANOVA comparing Declinations and Answers (factors: Action, AntPost and Site) 
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did not reveal any differences during this time window (-300 to 0 ms before first 
word onset; Fs < 1.24, ps > .27). A lateral ANOVA (with Action, AntPost, 
Hemisphere, Region and Site) revealed an Action×Hemisphere interaction 
(F(1,41) = 5.05, p < .05), which was due to an Action×Region interaction in 
the left hemisphere only (F(2,82) = 3.85, p < .05). This interaction reflected 
that mean amplitude was more negative in Declinations at left posterior regions 
during the gap before target utterance onset (P2 and P3; main effect of Action, 
Fs > 4.32, ps < .05). These analyses indicate that the early left posterior 
negativity in Declinations is present already during the gap, while the frontal 
positivity is not. When the last 150 ms of the gap were analyzed, i.e., the 
interval that corresponds to the baseline period in the main EEG analysis (-150 
to 0 ms before first word onset), the differences between the conditions were no 
longer significant (Fs < 3.24, ps > .08). The analyses for the 300 ms gap 
nevertheless demonstrate the presence of the posterior negativity prior to the 
presentation of the target utterance. This effect may therefore reflect speech act 
comprehension processes that are triggered by the context turn, rather than the 
target speech act itself. For the sake of brevity, we will leave aside the functional 
significance of this effect.  
 Importantly, the additional analyses for the gap interval show that there 
are no reliable differences between Declinations and Answers at frontal sites, 
demonstrating that the early frontal positivity is not a spill-over effect from the 
baseline. This corroborates the interpretation in section 4.4.1 that this early 
frontal effect is triggered by the first word of the target utterance, and possibly 
subsequent words up to the final word as well.  
 Another issue is whether the early or late ERP effects reported in this 
study may reflect lexical priming from the context. In particular, the first word 
in the target utterance is repeated from the prior turn in some of the dialogues; a 
repetition of the first word (usually the pronoun ik, ‘I’) occurs in 54% of 
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Declinations and 85% of Pre-offers, but not in Answers. Repetition of the verb is 
less frequent, occurring in 10% of Declinations, 8% of Pre-offers and 3% of 
Answers. ERPs, in particular the N400, are known to be sensitive to word 
repetition and other types of lexical priming, such as semantic association (see, 
for instance, Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). To obtain a measure of semantic 
relatedness between the context utterance and the target speech act in each 
condition, Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) values (Landauer et al., 1998) were 
computed for the English translation of each dialogue11. LSA values have been 
found to correspond well with the pattern of results in priming studies (Dorothee 
J. Chwilla & Kolk, 2002; Landauer et al., 1998). We first computed LSA values 
for the early time-window, comparing the context turn to the target utterance up 
to the final word. The LSA values for this early part of the target utterance were 
0.07 for Answers, 0.31 for Declinations and 0.42 for Pre-offers (the higher the 
value, the more semantic similarity). An omnibus ANOVA on the LSA values 
revealed a main effect of Action (F(2,369) = 172.61, p < .01), and pairwise 
comparisons confirmed significant differences in LSA values between all actions 
(p < .01). We then computed LSA values for the late time-window, comparing 
the utterance-final word itself to the preceding words in the dialogue (i.e., the 
context turn plus the target utterance up to the final word). The LSA values for 
the final word were 0.13 for Answers, 0.12 for Declinations and 0.13 for Pre-
offers; there were no differences in LSA values across actions (F(2,369) = 0.20, 
p = .81).  
 The LSA analyses for the early time-window show that the three action 
conditions differ in the amount of semantic similarity between the context and 
the early part of the target utterance. However, we consider it unlikely that 
                                         
11 The computation was performed using document-to-document mode with “General reading up to 1st year of college” 
as the semantic space. 
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semantic priming is a driving factor in the early ERP effects for the following 
reason. Pre-offers have the highest LSA value and the highest percentage of 
repetition at the first word as described above (85%), and should therefore show 
the largest effect of semantic priming in the early time-window. The fact that no 
early ERP effects were found in Pre-offers relative to Answers (which have the 
lowest LSA value and almost no repetition) demonstrates that semantic priming 
is not at play. If the early frontal positivity in Declinations were due to semantic 
overlap, it would be most pronounced in Pre-offers. As for the late time-window, 
the LSA analyses show that there are no differences in the semantic relatedness 
between the utterance-final word and the preceding dialogue across the three 
actions. This entails that the late negativity to Pre-offers cannot be due to effects 
of semantic association or lexical repetition. Thus the results of the LSA analyses 
clearly speak against the idea that the ERP effects reported in this study can be 
accounted for by a semantic priming account.  
4.4.4 Conclusions 
This study demonstrates the robustness of two ERP correlates of speech act 
recognition reported in Chapter 3. First, again an early frontal positivity (starting 
at 200 ms after target utterance onset) was found to Declinations – when the 
action is in a highly-constraining context and the sequence is coming to a close. 
Second, as in the first study, a late negativity (from 600 ms after final word onset) 
occurred to Pre-offers – when the context is less-constraining and a new action 
sequence is being initiated. Based on differences in the timing of the two ERP 
effects (utterance onset vs. utterance-final word), polarity (positivity vs. 
negativity) and scalp distribution (anterior sites vs. poterior/left hemisphere), 
we propose that these effects reflect qualitatively distinct cognitive processes 
involved in speech act recognition.  
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 While the current experiment provides further empirical support for the 
early speech act recognition account proposed in Chapter 3, it extends prior 
findings by demonstrating that the experimental environment has some 
influence on early action recognition. In particular, in contrast to the results of 
Chapter 3 no early effects were observed to Pre-offers. The resulting picture of 
the time-course of speech act recognition is that recognition of the action is 
made very early in the utterance in highly-constraining action contexts 
(Declinations), while speech act recognition only begins at the final word when 
the prior action is less-constraining (Pre-offers). These findings call for revisiting 
the timing of turn transitions in conversation, as they imply that certain actions 
are recognized only very late in the utterance and hence should be responded to 
much later than previously assumed. Most importantly, the findings of Chapter 4 
confirm that under the “right” circumstances listeners can get the action of an 
unfolding utterance in advance of its completion, based on only limited input, 
that is before the critical final word has been heard. Early speech act recognition 
in such cases may reflect the natural tendency to anticipate upcoming talk based 
on prior knowledge of action sequences. 
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5 Neural oscillations involved in speech act recognition 
This chapter is a modified version of:  
Gisladottir, R. S., Bögels, S. & Levinson, S. C. (Under review). Oscillatory brain 
responses reflect anticipation during comprehension of speech acts in spoken 
dialogue.  
 
Abstract 
Everyday conversation requires listeners to quickly extract verbal actions, or so-
called speech acts, from the underspecified linguistic code and prepare a 
relevant response within the tight time constraints of turn-taking. The general 
aim of the present study was to determine the time-course of speech act 
recognition by investigating oscillatory activity of the electroencephalogram 
(EEG) during comprehension of spoken dialogue. The more specific aim was to 
shed light on the role of anticipatory processes in speech act recognition. 
Participants listened to short, spoken dialogues with target utterances that 
delivered three distinct speech acts (Answers, Declinations, Pre-offers). The 
targets were identical across conditions, but differed in the type of speech act 
performed and how it fit into the larger action sequence. Speech act 
comprehension was mainly associated with reduced power in the alpha/beta 
bands just prior to and during the beginning of speech acts in highly 
constraining action contexts (Declinations). The alpha/beta effect is dependent 
on the characteristics of the speech act sequences, suggesting that factors such as 
sequential constraints have an impact on the timing of speech act recognition. 
Based on the role of alpha and beta desynchronization in anticipatory attention, 
the present results are taken to indicate that anticipatory processes plays a role 
in speech act recognition. Anticipatory attention before and during the 
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beginning of speech acts could be critical for efficient turn-taking, allowing for 
early speech act recognition based on only partial input.  
5.1 Introduction 
Having a conversation requires far more than simply retrieving the meaning of 
individual words and combining them into a syntactic structure. A critical aspect 
of successful communication is the ability to grasp the function of the utterance 
in context, i.e., what speech act or verbal action is being performed; for instance, 
was it an offer, question, rejection, or a compliment? As discussed in section 1.2 
of this thesis, speech act recognition is difficult from an individual’s cognitive 
perspective for two reasons. First, it is often the case that an utterance is 
compatible with multiple speech acts, forcing listeners to rely on the 
conversational context or other factors to understand the intended action. 
Second, turn-taking in conversation is characterized by very tight time 
constraints, giving participants limited time to recognize the speech act and plan 
a response. Listeners have to quickly extract the speech act from the 
underspecified linguistic code, prepare a relevant reply and respond within 200 
ms, which is the reported average for turn transitions in conversation (De Ruiter 
et al., 2006; Heldner & Edlund, 2010; Stivers et al., 2009). A crucial question is 
how listeners are capable of speech act recognition at such an amazing speed.  
 One proposal put forth in the introduction to this thesis is that speech act 
recognition takes place early in the incoming turn, allowing listeners more time 
to plan their response. A factor that could enable such early ascription of the 
action is the sequential context, i.e., the prior action (Gisladottir et al., 2015; 
Levinson, 2013). The ERP studies presented in Chapter 3 and 4 suggest that 
when the prior utterance is highly constraining in terms of what actions can 
follow, listeners can predict the action of the unfolding turn in advance of the 
utterance’s completion. Early action recognition through anticipation of the 
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action could be critical for efficient turn-taking, enabling listeners to plan their 
reply early and respond in a timely manner. However, early speech act 
recognition is not always possible. The ERP results in Chapters 3 and 4 show 
that when the prior action is not constraining and a new sequence is being 
initiated, processing based on the complete utterance seems to be required.  
 The general aim of the present study was to further determine the time-
course of speech act recognition by investigating oscillatory EEG activity during 
comprehension of spoken dialogue. ERPs only reflect a certain part of the event-
related EEG signal, namely phase-locked responses which remain after averaging 
in the time domain (Bastiaansen et al., 2008; Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 
1999). Ocillatory activity, in contrast, is often non-phase locked; oscillations are 
ongoing, occurring even in the absence of an experimental task, and as a result 
the phase of the oscillation varies at the time of stimulus presentation 
(Bastiaansen et al., 2008). The non-phase locked response therefore cancels out 
in the averaged ERP. By investigating oscillatory dynamics we can get a more 
complete picture of the time-course of speech act recognition and better 
understand the cognitive processes underlying successful conversation.  
 The more specific aim of this study was to shed light on the role of 
anticipatory processes in speech act recognition. Suppression of EEG oscillations 
in the alpha (8 to 12 Hz) and beta (13 to 30 Hz) frequency bands have been 
associated with anticipatory processing, both in relation to motor preparation 
(see, for instance, Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 1999) and anticipatory 
attention, i.e., when attention is oriented towards an upcoming stimulus to 
facilitate its processing (Bastiaansen et al., 2001; e.g., Bastiaansen & Brunia, 
2001; Jones et al., 2010; van Ede et al., 2014). For instance, studies on attention 
in the visual or somatosensory modalities typically report modulations of alpha 
and/or beta activity in the interval between some symbolic cue and the 
anticipated target (such as a tactile event), with the beta activity sometimes 
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extending into the stimulus period (van Ede et al., 2014). Especially relevant for 
the present study, a recent study on anticipation of turn-endings (using isolated 
turns from real conversations) reported desynchronization in the low beta range 
(11 to 18.5 Hz) in turns with predictable compared to non-predictable final 
words (Magyari, Bastiaansen, De Ruiter, & Levinson, 2014). The beta 
desynchronization began as early as 1250 ms before the end of the turn and was 
taken to reflect early anticipation of turn-endings via syntactic, semantic, and 
temporal processing. Based on the results of these studies, one may predict that 
the comprehension of relatively predictable speech acts involves a decrease in 
alpha and/or beta power before and during the beginning of the utterance, 
reflecting anticipatory attention that facilitates early speech act recognition.  
 Alternatively, speech act recognition may involve modulations of gamma 
oscillations (30 to 100 Hz). An increase in gamma band power has been reported 
in studies on pragmatic phenomena such as irony (Spotorno et al., 2013) and 
world knowledge violations (Hagoort et al., 2004). More generally, it has been 
suggested that gamma plays a functional role in normal sentence 
comprehension, as gamma increase is found in correct, spoken sentences and not 
in sentences with semantic violations (Hald, Bastiaansen, & Hagoort, 2006). 
Modulations of gamma oscillations in the present study would indicate that 
processes not based on anticipatory attention are involved in speech act 
recognition.  
 
5.1.1 The present study 
To our knowledge, no prior studies have investigated oscillatory activity during 
comprehension of spoken speech acts embedded in conversational contexts. Does 
oscillatory activity corroborate the time-course of speech act recognition 
described in Chapter 4? Are anticipatory processes involved in speech act 
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recognition, reflected by modulations in the alpha or beta frequency range? To 
address these questions we investigated oscillatory brain responses during 
speech act recognition using the EEG dataset from the experiment in Chapter 4. 
In contrast to the experiment in Chapter 3, the study in Chapter 4 used a 
true/false judgment task and additional filler dialogues to reduce strategic 
processing based on the experimental environment and is therefore better suited 
to investigate anticipatory processes involved in speech act recognition. The 
materials are short, spoken dialogues with target utterances that perform three 
different speech acts – Answers, Declinations, and Pre-offers – depending on the 
prior turn. Declinations and Pre-offers – the critical conditions – have in 
common that they are more indirect than Answers, as more inferencing is 
required to understand the action. However, they differ in the type of action 
being performed and its relationship to prior and upcoming turns in 
conversation. More specifically, Declinations occur in highly-constraining 
contexts, as the context turn (containing an offer or proposal) limits the range of 
possible responses to only two speech acts – an acceptance or declination. Pre-
offers, on the other hand, occur in less-constraining action contexts and initiate a 
new action sequence, which frequently contains a more direct offer (the reader 
is referred to Chapters 3 and 4 for details). For convenience, examples of 
dialogues with the critical speech acts are presented in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1: Stimuli in Dutch and English translations 
 Prior ERP studies using the same dialogues, presented in Chapters 3 and 
4, have shown that Declinations and Pre-offers elicit different ERP patterns. In 
the case of Declinations, frontal positivities are observed as early as 200 ms after 
first word onset relative to Answers, while no ERP effects are found at the final 
word. These results show that when the prior utterance is highly constraining in 
terms of what action can follow, recognition of the action takes place early in 
the utterance, before the final word. In contrast, Pre-offers mainly elicit a late 
negativity at the utterance-final word relative to Answers, indicating that 
processing based on the complete utterance is required when the prior action is 
less constraining and a new sequence is initiated.  
 Based on these ERP studies, and the assumption that reduced alpha/beta 
power reflects anticipatory processes that may play a role in early speech act 
recognition, we made the following predictions. In the case of Declinations, the 
highly-constraining context should allow for recognition of the action early in 
the utterance (I have a credit-card). Due to the association of alpha and beta 
oscillations with anticipatory attention, we hypothesized that such early effects 
would involve less power in the alpha or beta bands (relative to Answers and 
Pre-offers) in an early utterance time-window roughly corresponding to the first 
word or the verb, or during the pre-stimulus interval just before the target 
Condition Context Target Utterance 
Answer Hoe ga je voor het ticket betalen? Ik heb een creditcard. How are you going to pay for the ticket? I have a credit-card. 
Declination Ik kan je wat geld lenen voor het ticket. Ik heb een creditcard. I can lend you money for the ticket. I have a credit-card. 
Pre-offer Ik heb geen geld om het ticket te betalen. Ik heb een creditcard. I don’t have any money to pay for the ticket. I have a credit-card. 
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utterance. At the final word, however, no effects are expected in Declinations. If 
the action has already been recognized early in the utterance, the processing of 
the final word should only add to the propositional meaning of the utterance, 
which is the same for all three conditions and hence no differences in oscillatory 
activity should occur at the final word. 
 As for Pre-offers, recognition of the action should be possible only late in 
the utterance due to increased complexity; the context is less-constraining and 
understanding Pre-offers may involve projecting the next action (i.e., that a pre-
offer leads to a more direct offer). This should mainly be reflected by oscillatory 
power differences at the utterance-final word, relative to both Answers and 
Declinations. As for what frequency band is involved, we speculated on two 
possibilities. If understanding Pre-offers involves anticipating a more direct offer, 
then recognition of the action may involve increased anticipatory attention at 
the utterance-final word, reflected by a decrease in alpha/beta power. 
Alternatively, if the complexity of Pre-offers mainly calls for increased pragmatic 
processing, and not anticipatory processes, then we may observe modulations in 
the gamma frequency range.   
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Participants, materials, procedure, EEG recording 
Chapter 4 describes the participant pool, materials, procedure and EEG 
recording for the dataset used in the current analysis; for details, the reader is 
referred to sections 4.2.1 through 4.2.4. 
5.2.2 Behavioural data analysis  
While the behavioural data used in this chapter are the same as those used in 
Chapter 4, the data were reanalyzed for the current investigation using a smaller 
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subset of participants. More participants were excluded from the time-frequency 
analysis of the EEG data than in the ERP analysis in Chapter 4 due to a different 
analysis approach. More specifically, a larger epoch was extracted from the EEG 
for the time-frequency analysis in order to include the 300 ms gap before the 
target utterance (capturing anticipatory processes) and to allow for plotting of 
raw data using pre-stimulus baselines. For consistency between the behavioural 
and EEG results, the accuracy in the true/false comprehension task was only 
analyzed for the 37 participants used in the time-frequency analysis. The 
accuracy data were analysed with mixed-effects logistic regression using the 
lme4 package (D. Bates et al., 2012) in the statistics software R (R Core Team, 
2013).  
5.2.3 Time-frequency analysis of oscillatory power 
The critical time-windows of interest were from -300 to 600 ms relative to the 
onset of the first word in the target utterance (early utterance time-window) and 
from 100 to 1000 ms after onset of the final word (late utterance time-window). 
These early and late time-windows are the same as those used in the ERP studies 
in Chapters 3 and 4, except that the early utterance time-window includes the 
300 ms interval (silence) before the target utterance to capture pre-stimulus 
anticipatory effects. If early speech act comprehension in Declinations does 
involve anticipatory processes based on the context turn, this may be reflected 
by power modulations in the alpha and/or beta bands already before target 
utterance onset in Declinations. Thus the early window spans speech act 
comprehension just before the target utterance onset up to the presentation of 
the final word (i.e., including the first word and the verb), while the late time-
window captures effects elicited to the final word. Importantly, these time-
windows do not overlap.  
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 To reduce boundary effects in the subsequent time-frequency analysis and 
for plotting of the raw data using pre-window baselines, EEG data were 
segmented into larger epochs: from -1000 ms to 1000 ms relative to first word 
onset for the early time-window analysis, and from -600 ms to 1700 ms relative 
to final word onset for the late time-window analysis. Trials containing artifacts 
exceeding ±75 µV at eye-monitoring sites and ±100 µV at other sites were 
excluded12. Data from seven participants with less than 22 trials per condition 
were removed from further analysis, in addition to data from one additional 
participant with clear heart artifacts (remaining participants N=37; nr. of trials 
left for analysis in the final dataset was 3830 or 82%). 
 Time–frequency representations (TFRs) of power were computed with a 
sliding time-window approach using the Matlab toolbox FieldTrip (Oostenveld, 
Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2011). For the low-frequency range (2 to 30 hz), 
power was calculated for each trial with a Hanning taper, using 400 ms time-
windows that were advanced in steps of 10 ms and 1 Hz. For the higher 
frequencies (30 to 90 Hz) a multitaper was used, with 400 ms sliding time-
windows, advanced in steps of 10 ms and 2.5 Hz, with frequency smoothing of 5 
Hz. Multitapers yield better frequency smoothing which is advantageous for EEG 
signals above 30 hz (“Time-frequency analysis,” 2014). The TFRs of power were 
averaged over trials for each participant and condition. Since expressing post-
stimulus EEG power relative to pre-stimulus EEG power can be problematic (see, 
for instance, Hu, Xiao, Zhang, Mouraux, & Iannetti, 2014), a baseline correction 
was not applied.  
                                         
12 The artifact rejection was based on baselined data, using a 150 ms baseline prior to the gap between the two 
utterances, but non-baselined data were used for the time-frequency analysis. 
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5.2.4 Statistical analysis of TFRs of power 
The time-frequency representations of power were submitted to nonparametric 
cluster-based permutation tests (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007) in Fieldtrip 
(Oostenveld et al., 2011). This approach has the advantage of offering a 
straightforward way to deal with the multiple comparisons problem. First, two 
experimental conditions were compared at a time with a dependent-samples t-
test for every channel-frequency-time sample in the TFR. Samples that passed a 
predetermined threshold (p < .05) were selected and clustered based on 
adjacency in time, space, or frequency. The cluster-level statistics were 
calculated as the sum of all t-values within the cluster. The Monte Carlo method 
was then used to determine the significance of the cluster. A null distribution 
which assumes no differences between conditions is created by randomly 
assigning participant averages to one of the two conditions. This procedure was 
repeated 1000 times and cluster-level statistics were computed for each 
randomization (as above). Finally the observed cluster-level test statistics are 
compared to the null distribution; the Monte Carlo estimate of the p-value is the 
proportion of random partitions resulting in a larger test statistic than the 
observed cluster. The two experimental conditions were then considered 
significantly different if the p-value was smaller than the critical alpha value, 
which was set at 0.05 and corrected for a two-tailed test, effectively 0.025. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Behavioural data 
Behavioural responses from all participants included in the time-frequency 
analysis were analyzed (N = 37). Overall mean accuracy in the comprehension 
question was 93.3% (SD 6.9%). Participants correctly answered the question for 
97.9% of Answers (SD 2.5%), 95.8% of Declinations (SD 5.3%) and 86.1% of 
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Pre-offers (SD 15.6%). The mixed-effects logistic regression model of the 
accuracy data included Action as a fixed effect. Stimulus set was not used as a 
fixed factor in the current analysis, in contrast to previous chapters, for 
consistency between the behavioural and EEG analysis; the cluster-based 
permutation test does not allow the straight-forward computation of Action×Set 
interactions (since it is designed to compare only two conditions at a time), and 
since the Set factor is not of theoretical relevance on its own, it was not included 
in the time-frequency analyses. For the random effect structure of the mixed-
effects model we included random intercepts by participant and item, as well as 
by-participant and by-item random slopes for Action. The model indicated that 
Answers were categorized more accurately than Pre-offers (Estimate: 2.30 SE: 
0.61, z = 3.76, p < .001). Responses to Declinations were also more accurate 
than to Pre-offers (Estimate: 1.63 SE: 0.50, z = 3.27, p < .001). The comparison 
between Answers and Declinations was not significant (Estimate: -0.51, SE: 0.65, 
z = -0.78, p = .43). The same pattern of results was obtained for the same EEG 
dataset (but with more participants) in Chapter 4.  
5.3.2 EEG results 
5.3.2.1 Early utterance time-window 
Statistical comparison of Declinations and Answers in the early utterance time-
window revealed one significant cluster in the theta, alpha and beta frequencies 
from 2 to 24 Hz, approximately 150 ms before onset of the target utterance until 
600 ms into the sentence (p < .01). Lower power was observed in Declinations 
relative to Answers in these frequencies (see Figure 5.1). The difference was 
largest in the following latency epochs: in the theta range (2 to 8 hz) from -50 to 
100 ms; alpha / low beta range (11 to 15 Hz) from -100 ms to 400 ms; and in 
higher beta frequencies (19 to 22 Hz) from 250 to 450 ms. The effect was 
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widespread over bilateral anterior sites in the theta and alpha/low beta 
frequencies, with a left hemisphere preponderance at anterior and posterior sites 
for the higher beta (see Figure 5.1, panel C). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Early utterance time-window: Declinations vs. Answers. A) 
Time-frequency representations of power changes at a representative 
frontal site for Declinations and Answers separately. The colors indicate 
power increase/decrease in each condition relative to a pre-stimulus 
baseline from -650 to -500 ms before target utterance onset (baseline was 
only used for plotting purposes). For location of the site, see circles in 
panel C. B) Relative power difference between Declinations and Answers at 
the representative frontal site in transparent colors, with the significant 
cluster overlaid in opaque colors. C) Topographic maps illustrating the 
distribution of the relative power differences between Declinations and 
Answers in the relevant time-windows and frequencies.  
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 The comparison between Declinations and Pre-offers in the early 
utterance time-window also yielded one significant cluster approximately -250 
ms to 250 ms relative to target sentence onset in the theta and alpha/low beta 
frequencies, from 2 to 19 Hz (p < .01). Lower power was observed in 
Declinations relative to Pre-offers in these frequencies (see Figure 5.2). The 
difference was mainly in the theta band (2 to 8 hz) from -50 to 100 ms and in 
the alpha / low beta band (8 to 17 hz) from -150 to 50 ms. The effect was most 
prominent at anterior sites in both frequency bands (see Figure 5.2, panel C).  
 
Figure 5.2: Early utterance time-window: Declinations vs. Pre-offers. A) 
Time-frequency representations of power changes at a representative 
frontal site for Declinations and Pre-offers separately. The colors indicate 
power increase/decrease in each condition relative to a pre-stimulus 
baseline from -650 to -500 ms before target utterance onset (baseline was 
only used for plotting purposes). For location of the site, see circles in 
panel C. B) Relative power difference between Declinations and Pre-offers 
at the representative frontal site in transparent colors with the significant 
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cluster overlaid in opaque colors. C) Topographic maps illustrating the 
distribution of the relative power differences between Declinations and 
Pre-offers in the relevant time-windows and frequencies.  
 The Pre-offers vs. Answers contrast did not yield any significant clusters 
in the lower frequencies (p > .23). As for the higher frequencies in the gamma 
band (>30 Hz), no significant clusters were obtained for any of the comparisons 
(p > .32). 
5.3.2.2 Late utterance time-window 
The statistical analyses did not reveal any significant clusters in the low 
frequencies (p > .06), nor in the higher frequencies (p > .25). 
5.4 Discussion 
Our results show that brain oscillations differentiate speech acts during 
comprehension of spoken dialogue. Supporting an early speech act recognition 
account, effects of action were only observed just prior to and during the 
beginning of the target utterances, while no differences were found between the 
speech acts at the final word. More specifically, less power was present in the 
alpha/beta and theta bands in Declinations in this early time-window, relative to 
both Pre-offers and Answers. Overall, the results show that the time-course of 
speech act recognition is influenced by the type of action performed and provide 
evidence that anticipatory processes play a role in the comprehension of speech 
acts. Below we discuss these findings in more detail. 
5.4.1 Alpha/beta power and anticipatory attention to upcoming speech 
acts 
We hypothesized that oscillatory activity would show an early effect of action in 
Declinations relative to Answers and Pre-offers. This prediction was based on the 
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results from the ERP studies in Chapter 3 and 4 and the assumption that the 
highly-constraining context in the Declination dialogues allows for early 
recognition of the action. We also speculated that such early effects would be 
observed in the alpha or beta bands, which have been associated with 
anticipatory attention. In line with this, we observed less power in Declinations 
relative to Answers in the alpha and beta range mainly from -100 to 450 ms 
after target utterance onset. Less power was also observed in Declinations 
relative to Pre-offers in the alpha and beta band from -150 to 50 ms. Given that 
the effects are mainly in the low beta range (also called Beta 1; 13 to 18 Hz 
(Weiss & Mueller, 2012)), we will focus on the importance of beta oscillations.  
 The relationship between beta desynchronization and anticipation has 
been well established, both in the sense of preparation for movement (see, for 
instance, Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 1999) and preparation for perception, 
that is, anticipatory attention (Jones et al., 2010; van Ede, de Lange, Jensen, & 
Maris, 2011; van Ede et al., 2014). The pre-stimulus onset of the beta effect in 
the present study (i.e., 150 ms before the presentation of the target utterance), is 
similar to findings in studies on anticipatory attention reporting beta 
desynchronization in the interval before an anticipated target, with the beta 
activity sometimes extending into the stimulus period (see, for instance, van Ede 
et al., 2014). In the language domain, a link between beta desynchronization 
and anticipation was recently established in a study using turns from real 
conversation (Magyari et al., 2014). In contrast to the present experiment, which 
focuses on the relationship between two turns, Magyari et al. (2014) 
investigated oscillatory activity in isolated turns that had either a predictable or 
a non-predictable ending (e.g., predictable: “eh I live in the same house with four 
women and with another man”, unpredictable: “uh and then, she was again eh alone 
in eh in the north”). Predictable turns were accompanied by a power decrease in 
the low beta band (11 to 18.5 Hz) as early as 1250 ms before the turn ended. As 
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in the present study, the low beta effect was observed in frontal areas, although 
it was mainly in the left hemisphere. The frontal beta power decrease was 
localized to areas involved in language as well as anticipation and attention. The 
authors related the beta power decrease to (non-motor) anticipation of the turn-
ending.  
 Given these prior findings, we take the reduced beta power in the present 
study to reflect increased anticipatory attention to Declinations. The early onset 
of the power difference in Declinations relative to Pre-offers (at 150 ms before 
the start of the target utterance) is in agreement with the assumption that the 
Declinations are more anticipatable, due to the adjacency pair structure. A 
characteristic feature of this action sequence type is that the first part of the pair 
– the context utterance in this study – is highly constraining in terms of what 
action can follow. The adjacency pair structure may act as a cue to restrict the 
possibility space for the upcoming speech act, reducing the likely outcomes 
down to two (acceptance or declination). As a result, the Declinations are 
relatively anticipatable and engage anticipatory processes just before and during 
the target utterance. Pre-offers, on the other hand, are initiating actions (i.e., 
start a new action sequence). As such, they are much less predictable based on 
the prior context and hence involve anticipatory attention to a lesser degree than 
Declinations. 
 However, sequential constraints cannot be the sole factor that determines 
the beta power effect, in particular the pre-stimulus power difference in 
Declinations relative to Answers. This is because Answers, the control condition, 
also form a second part of an adjacency pair, and thus should involve the same 
degree of constraint as Declinations do, according to the conversation analytic 
literature (see, for instance, Schegloff, 2007 for a discussion on adjacency pairs). 
This was not addressed in the ERP studies in Chapter 3 and 4 because these 
studies investigated the processing of the speech act itself, where indirectness 
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also plays a role, and not the preceding gap: the rationale was that Declinations 
and Pre-offers are more indirect than Answers and therefore should elicit ERP 
effects relative to Answers, but critically that the timing of these effects would 
differ for the actions due to their sequential characteristics. Indirectness only 
comes into play once the target utterance has started. Thus differences in 
indirectness (or other features of the utterance) and action sequencing cannot 
explain the pre-stimulus beta power effect in the Declination dialogues relative 
to Answers, during the gap between the turns.  
 One factor that differentiates the Declination and Answer dialogues is 
what implications are involved in the speech act interaction. While the context 
in the Answer dialogues (a question) simply calls for information, the first turn 
in the Declination dialogues contains an offer of assistance, which – if accepted – 
would involve some additional actions. Moreoever, while the first turn of the 
Declination dialogues has the potential to be followed by a face-threatening 
action (P. Brown & Levinson, 1988; Goffman, 1955) such as rejection, this is 
much less the case for the context turns in the Answer dialogues (a question). 
There is, therefore, “more at stake” in the Declination dialogues. The social 
significance of a turn could influence processes of speech act comprehension. 
Studies show that strongly valenced input (e.g., a face with a positive or 
negative expression) enhances attention and thereby facilitates perception of 
events (Dolan, 2002; Vuilleumier, 2005; Vuilleumier & Huang, 2009). It is 
possible that the social implications of the speech acts in the Declination 
dialogues contributed to increased anticipatory attention just before and during 
the target utterance in this condition. This could also explain why the beta 
power difference was longer lasting in Declinations relative to Answers than 
relative to Pre-offers. Speech acts are not only embedded in sequential contexts, 
but also interpersonal and social contexts that can influence their interpretation. 
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The results from the present study suggest that in addition to a high level of 
sequential constraints, other characteristics of the speech act interaction can lead 
to increased anticipatory attention, such as the social significance of the 
response. However, further research is needed to investigate how such 
characteristics of speech act sequences influence the time-course of speech act 
recognition.  
 The relationship between anticipatory attention, as reflected by the 
reduced alpha/beta power in the present study, and the early speech-act-related 
ERP effect reported for the same EEG data (in Chapter 4) remains to be 
addressed. Declinations elicited a frontal positivity with a left and midline 
distribution starting from 200 ms after target utterance onset. Research on vision 
has shown an inverse relationship between pre-stimulus alpha and stimulus-
evoked ERP components; attention reduces pre-stimulus alpha power but 
enhances ERP components such as the P1 and N1 (see, for instance, 
Rajagovindan & Ding, 2011; Sauseng et al., 2005). The pre-stimulus alpha 
reduction is thought to improve processing of the upcoming stimulus 
(Rajagovindan & Ding, 2011). However, research in the auditory domain has 
yielded conflicting results, reporting both inverse and direct relationships 
between prestimulus alpha power and auditory ERP components (for a 
discussion, see De Blasio & Barry, 2013). As for the beta band, there is limited 
research on the association between prestimulus beta and auditory ERP 
components (but see De Blasio & Barry, 2013). It is therefore not clear what the 
relationship between alpha/beta power in the present study and the speech-act-
related frontal positivity is. However, we speculate that anticipatory attention 
just before and during the beginning of the Declinations facilitates active 
processing of the speech act, reflected by the frontal positivity. In other words, 
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the alpha/beta effect does not reflect precise predictions of the target speech act, 
but rather anticipatory attention that facilitates early recognition.  
5.4.2 Theta decrease around target utterance onset 
In addition to beta band activity, differences in theta band were also observed 
for the three speech act conditions; less power was found in the theta range from 
-50 to 100 ms in Declinations relative to both Answers and Pre-offers. Active 
processing is usually associated with a power increase in the theta band. For 
instance, theta power increases with more working memory load (Jensen & 
Tesche, 2002) and top-down cognitive processing (Min & Park, 2010). In the 
language domain, increased theta power has been associated with the retrieval 
of lexical-semantic information (Bastiaansen et al., 2008) as well as larger 
demands on verbal working memory (for a review, see Bastiaansen et al., 2008), 
for instance during processing of irony (Spotorno et al., 2013). The fact that 
Declinations are associated with less power in the theta band is therefore 
surprising, given that recognizing the action should be more difficult in 
Declinations than in Answers. However, a theta power decrease has recently been 
implicated in language processing, more specifically in verb generation (when a 
noun is presented and the participant’s task is to generate a matching verb) 
(Hermes et al., 2014). Thus, two possible interpretations can be made of the 
theta power differences in Declinations relative to the other actions around 
target utterance onset: that high theta power in Pre-offers and Answers reflects 
more working memory or top-down cognitive processing in these conditions, or 
that low theta power in Declinations reflects increased demands on the language 
processing system in that condition. While the latter account better fits the 
theoretical assumptions outlined in the introduction to this chapter, more 
research is needed to understand how theta power relates to speech act 
comprehension. Moreover, it has to be noted that the effect is short-lived. A 
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good indication of the presence of genuine oscillatory activity – as opposed to 
power due to ERPs or muscle artifacts – is that it lasts at least one or two periods 
of the oscillation for low frequencies (Bastiaansen et al., 2008). Given that the 
theta activity spans only about 150 ms – less than one cycle in this frequency 
range – it is possible that the theta differences are a reflection of an ERP 
component13. Indeed, the ERP analyses of the same data, reported in Chapter 4, 
indicate that a posterior negativity was present in Declinations relative to both 
Pre-offers and Answers during the gap between the context and the target. The 
robustness and functional significance of the theta effect is therefore unclear.   
5.4.3 The time-course of speech act recognition and future questions 
Differences in oscillatory activity for the three speech act conditions were only 
observed for Declinations relative to the other actions in the early utterance 
time-window, roughly corresponding to the silence before the target utterance, 
at the first word and the verb. The absence of final-word effects for Declinations 
converges with the ERP results in Chapter 3 and 4, providing further support for 
the early speech act recognition account. When the prior turn is highly 
constraining in terms of what action can follow, listeners seem to recognize the 
action before the final word. This is the case even though the speech act is 
relatively indirect and contains no morphosyntactic speech act clues (recall that 
the target utterances were the same across all conditions and thus underspecified 
for the action).  
 In Chapter 3 and 4 I hypothesized that listeners can get the speech act in 
advance of its completion based on anticipation at the speech act level. The 
present results, namely low beta power just before and during the beginning of 
                                         
13 Note that this argument does not hold for the beta activity, as it is both longer lasting and in a higher frequency band; 
two cycles of a 15 Hz oscillation in the low beta band last for 130 ms, while the activity was present in Declinations for 
up to 200 ms relative to Pre-offers and 500 ms relative to Answers.  
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the target utterance in Declinations, provide more direct evidence for the 
involvement of anticipatory processes in the recognition of speech acts. Early 
action recognition in Declinations may reflect the natural tendency to anticipate 
upcoming talk on the basis of action sequence knowledge and other factors. This 
proposal is in line with recent models in psycholinguistics and neuroscience 
which argue that prediction based on past experience plays an important role in 
cognition (see, for instance, Bar, 2009; Martin J. Pickering & Garrod, 2013; 
Schacter et al., 2007). The precise mechanism behind such anticipation during 
speech act comprehension is however still an open question. What, for instance, 
is the role of action memory, fast and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996) or theory of mind (e.g., C. Frith & Frith, 2005) in guiding anticipation? 
Does our knowledge of speech act sequences consist of abstract sequences, or do 
we form action scripts with additional information about the situational context 
to aid prediction (e.g., restaurant scenario)? The relationship between linguistic 
processing, action knowledge and anticipation is an important topic for future 
research that aims to understand the efficiency of everyday conversation. 
 Contrary to our expectations, we did not observe oscillatory effects in Pre-
offers at the final word. In comparison to Declinations, Pre-offers are less 
predictable based on the prior turn and invite more inferences about upcoming 
talk (i.e., that a more direct offer is underway). Based on the final-word 
negativity described in Chapter 3 and 4, and oscillatory effects reported in 
studies on anticipation and linguistic pragmatics, we speculated that this 
increased complexity in Pre-offers might be reflected in modulations of 
alpha/beta or gamma oscillations at the final word. The fact that no final-word 
effects were observed in Pre-offers suggests that phase-locked event-related 
potentials are more sensitive than non-phase-locked oscillations to the aspect of 
speech act comprehension reflected by the late negativity. The neural oscillation 
results are nevertheless revealing, as they do not confirm the speculation put 
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forth in Chapter 4 that understanding Pre-offers involves anticipation of a more 
direct offer. If the late negativity does reflect the projective nature of Pre-offers, 
one could expect this to be reflected by reduced alpha/beta power at the 
utterance final word. 
 The current results for Pre-offers do, however, converge with the ERP 
results of the same EEG data (see Chapter 4) in that no effects were found in the 
early utterance time-window relative to Answers. The lack of early effects in the 
present study provides convergent evidence for the difference between the time-
course of speech act recognition in two relatively indirect speech acts. In 
Declinations the speech act is recognized early in the utterance, based on only 
partial information. In contrast, the comprehension of Pre-offers is characterized 
by a more integrative approach – that is, waiting for the final word before the 
action can be recognized. The upshot of this is that the exact same utterance 
(e.g., I have a credit-card) is processed in very different ways depending on the 
speech act it performs and how it fits into the larger action context provided by 
the prior turn. The speech act dimension is an important aspect of context that 
should not be ignored in studies of utterance meaning and language use. 
5.5 Conclusions 
How is it that listeners can recognize speech acts so efficiently, evidenced by the 
extraordinarily fast transitions between turns in conversation? The primary goal 
of this study was to address this question by investigating oscillatory activity 
during comprehension of spoken speech acts. The more specific aim was to shed 
light on the role of anticipatory processes in speech act recognition. As 
predicted, speech act comprehension was associated with reduced power in the 
alpha/beta bands just prior to and during the beginning of speech acts in highly 
constraining action contexts (Declinations). Based on the association of alpha 
and beta desynchronization with anticipatory attention, the results are taken to 
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indicate the involvement of anticipatory processes in early speech act 
recognition. The absence of the alpha/beta effect to actions in less-constraining 
contexts (Pre-offers) relative to the control condition (Answers) indicates that 
anticipatory processes are dependent on the characteristics of the speech act 
interaction, including the sequential constraints between turns in conversation.  
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6 Summary and implications for future research 
Spoken speech act recognition is a core cognitive ability that gives language its 
basic functionality. However, participants in conversation are faced with a 
challenge: they must recognize speech acts in utterances that are often radically 
underspecified for the action level of meaning (Levinson, 2013; Searle, 1975), 
and do so under tight time constraints to conform to the rules of turn-taking 
(Sacks et al., 1974). The objective of this thesis was to investigate the time-
course of spoken speech act recognition in action-underspecified utterances, 
testing the hypothesis that verbal actions are recognized early in the utterance. 
Early speech act recognition could be the key to efficient conversation, enabling 
quick transitions between speakers. A second goal of this thesis was to explore 
how the sequential organization of action influences the time-course of speech 
act recognition. All speech acts are not created equal – they differ in their 
relationships to prior and upcoming turns in conversation. Going beyond 
“direct” versus “indirect” speech acts (e.g., Basnakova et al., 2014; H. H. Clark, 
1979; Coulson & Lovett, 2010; Searle, 1975; van Ackeren et al., 2012), this 
thesis investigates how speech act recognition is modulated by the type of action 
being performed and how it fits into the larger action sequence.  
 The novelty of this thesis chiefly lies in two aspects. First, this work is 
based on an interdisciplinary approach that bridges methods from cognitive 
neuroscience and findings from studies on turn-taking. Such an interdisciplinary 
perspective raises new, important questions on speech act comprehension and 
provides methods to address them. Second, in contrast to the majority of EEG 
research on language (for overviews, see for instance Kolk & Chwilla, 2007; 
Kutas & Federmeier, 2000; Van Berkum, 2004), this study investigates speech 
act comprehension in spoken, naturalistic dialogues without any syntactic, 
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semantic or pragmatic anomalies. This research thereby achieves a better 
balance between ecological validity and experimental control, bringing us closer 
to understanding language comprehension in its natural habitat – conversation.  
 In this discussion chapter I will first summarize the main empirical 
findings of the thesis. I will then discuss their theoretical implications and 
remaining questions for future research. 
6.1 Summary  
After an overview of the thesis research questions and methods in Chapter 1, 
Chapter 2 reports behavioural findings that form a foundation for the remaining 
empirical chapters. The main aim of Chapter 2 was to investigate how reliably 
participants can categorize speech acts in utterances that are underspecified for 
the action level of meaning. A second aim of the behavioural experiment was to 
obtain a rough estimate of the time-course of speech act recognition, as reflected 
in self-paced reading times. Chapter 2 introduces an experimental paradigm 
consisting of short dialogues with target sentences (e.g., I have a credit card) that 
perform three distinct speech acts – Answers, Declinations, Pre-offers – 
depending on the prior turn. The target sentences are identical across conditions 
(and hence underspecified for action), but differ in the type of speech act being 
performed. Declinations and Pre-offers (the critical conditions) have in common 
that they are more indirect than Answers (the control condition) as they require 
more inferencing to be understood. However, they differ in their relationship to 
prior and upcoming turns in conversation. Declinations occur in highly-
constraining contexts, being second parts of adjacency pairs (Schegloff, 2007), 
and are therefore relatively anticipatable. Pre-offers, on the other hand, occur in 
less-constraining action contexts as they initiate a new action sequence (which 
frequently contains a more direct offer if the conversation were to continue 
(Schegloff, 1988, 2007)). Thus by comparing Declinations and Pre-offers it is 
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possible to investigate how speech act recognition is influenced by the type of 
action being performed and the sequential context (the paradigm is described in 
more detail in Chapter 3). 
 In the experiment discussed in Chapter 2, the context sentences were 
presented auditorily, while the target sentences were presented visually in self-
paced reading. After each dialogue participants were asked to categorize the 
action of the target sentences as doing answering, declining or offering. The 
results of the action categorization task demonstrate that participants can 
categorize the speech act in action-underspecified sentences with very high 
accuracy (95.8%), based on limited context (the prior speech act) and without 
any prosodic information in the target sentence. The reading time results 
indicate that speech act recognition is influenced by action type and sequential 
context, as reflected in different reading time patterns for Declinations and Pre-
offers; reliable differences were found at the first word for Pre-offers, relative to 
Answers, but at the verb and the final word for Declinations. The results suggest 
that speech act recognition in the visual modality begins relatively early in the 
target sentence (at the first word or the verb), but also that late processing at the 
end of the sentence may be required. The experiment in Chapter 2 validates the 
use of Answers as a control condition in future studies, as they had the shortest 
reading times on all measures (and should therefore be easiest to comprehend 
out of the three speech act types). Overall, the results of Chapter 2 demonstrate 
the feasibility of using the experimental paradigm in research on speech act 
recognition.  
 What about speech act recognition in spoken language – the prime 
modality of everyday conversation? Given the time constraints in spoken 
conversation, discussed in detail in section 1.2.2 of this thesis, the real puzzle is 
how speech act recognition proceeds in the auditory modality. Turning to the 
core of this thesis, Chapter 3 makes use of the excellent temporal resolution of 
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event-related potentials to track speech act recognition in spoken dialogues. 
How quickly can listeners recognize action-underspecified speech acts in the 
auditory modality? Keeping in mind that speech acts differ in their relationships 
to prior and upcoming turns in conversation, how does the sequential context 
influence the time-course of spoken speech act recognition? Addressing these 
questions, the experiment in Chapter 3 used spoken versions of the dialogues 
presented in Chapter 2. The same action categorization task was used to 
facilitate comparability with the behavioural results. The rationale of the study 
was that if auditory speech act recognition takes place early in the turn when 
the utterance has only been partially processed, then there should be ERP 
differences between the three speech act types early on in the target utterance (I 
have a credit-card), for instance at the first word (I) or the verb (have). Moreover, 
there should be no ERP differences at the utterance-final word, i.e., credit-card; if 
the action has already been recognized at that point, the processing of the final 
word should only add to the propositional meaning of the utterance, which for 
each target is the same in all three conditions and hence no differences should 
occur at the final word. In contrast, if speech act recognition takes place at the 
end of the utterance, based on complete analysis of the turn, there should be 
ERP differences between the conditions at the final word. Two time-windows of 
interest were therefore defined for the analysis of ERP data; an early utterance 
time-window roughly corresponding to the first word and the verb in the target 
utterances, and a late utterance time-window corresponding to the final word. 
Chapter 3 identifies both early and late speech-act-related ERP effects. A fronto-
temporal positivity in the right hemisphere was elicited to Declinations and Pre-
offers during the early time-window relative to Answers, from 200 ms after 
utterance onset in Pre-offers and from 400 ms in Declinations. Declinations also 
elicited a frontal left/midline positivity from 500 to 600 ms relative to Answers. 
Finally, Pre-offers elicited a late, posterior negativity at the utterance-final word, 
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relative to both Answers (from 900 to 1000 ms) and Declinations (from 600 to 
1000 ms). No ERP differences were observed between Declinations and Answers 
in the late utterance time-window. The early ERP effects indicate that spoken 
speech act recognition begins early in the turn, when the utterance has only 
been partially processed. The absence of ERP effects at the utterance-final word 
in Declinations provides further support for the early speech act recognition 
account, indicating that when the prior turn is highly constraining in terms of 
what action can follow (as is the case in the Declination dialogues) recognition 
of the action can be made before the final word. However, the late negativity to 
Pre-offers shows that early speech act recognition is not always possible. 
Additional processing based on the complete utterance is required in more 
complex actions such as Pre-offers, where the speech act is in a less-constraining 
context and a new action sequence is initiated. Taken together, Chapter 3 
provides partial support for the early speech act recognition account and 
demonstrates that the time-course of action recognition is influenced by the type 
of speech act being performed and how it fits into the larger action sequence. 
 Chapter 4 investigates the robustness of the speech-act-related ERP effects 
reported in Chapter 3. A disadvantage of the action categorization task used in 
Chapters 2 and 3 is that it required giving participants labels of the three speech 
act types in advance (i.e., by forcing them to categorize the utterances as doing 
answering, offering or declining). Although participants in conversation have to 
make an implicit categorization of each utterance in order to prepare a fitted 
reply, the action categorization task directed attention to the critical speech acts 
and restricted possible interpretations of them. Given that ERP components have 
been found to be modulated by task demands (see, for instance, D. J Chwilla et 
al., 1995; Gunter & Friederici, 1999; Gina R. Kuperberg, 2007; Roehm et al., 
2007), Chapter 4 investigates whether the ERP effects reported in Chapter 3 
were induced by the categorization task or whether they generalize to a more 
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natural situation in which overt categorization is not required. The crucial task 
in conversation is comprehending-for-responding. Thus simply instructing 
participants to listen for comprehension, without requiring any response, would 
not capture this important feature of conversation. To better mirror the response 
demands and attention level necessary in everyday interaction, Chapter 4 used a 
true/false judgment task, which probes understanding of the action without 
requiring explicit categorization of the speech acts. In addition, the ERP 
experiment reported in Chapter 4 included additional filler dialogues. The 
absence of fillers in Chapter 3 may have enabled participants to use the context 
turns as superficial cues to the upcoming speech acts, giving rise to the early 
ERP effects reported in Chapter 3. The filler dialogues in Chapter 4 reduce 
strategic processing of the speech acts and render them less predictable. 
 The experiment in Chapter 4 replicated two of the three ERP effects 
described in Chapter 3. As in the previous study, Declinations elicited a frontal 
positivity in the early utterance time-window. This effect was similar to the 
combined effects of the right fronto-temporal and frontal left/midline positivity 
in the previous experiment, but had an earlier onset than before (at 200 ms after 
utterance onset). Also consistent with the prior study, no ERP effects were found 
in Declinations relative to Answers at the final word. This pattern of results 
indicates that early speech act recognition in Declinations is robust, even when 
overt categorization is not required and filler dialogues limit the predictability of 
the action. As for Pre-offers no early ERP effects were observed, in contrast to 
the prior study. This indicates that the experimental environment exerts some 
influence on early speech act recognition, in particular on the right hemisphere 
fronto-temporal positivity to Pre-offers reported in Chapter 3. However, 
replicating previous results, Pre-offers elicited a late negativity from 600 ms 
after the onset of the utterance-final word, relative to Answers and Declinations 
(although the negativity had a left hemisphere preponderance, in contrast to the 
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bilateral posterior distribution in Chapter 3). The results for Pre-offers was taken 
to indicate that when participants have limited top-down information about the 
target speech acts – due to different task demands and additional fillers – 
listeners do not have strong expectations about the Pre-offers and take a wait-
and-see approach. The picture that emerges from Chapter 4 is that speech act 
recognition involves two robust ERP effects, an early frontal positivity and a late 
(posterior or left hemisphere) negativity, reflecting qualitatively distinct 
cognitive processes. In highly-constraining contexts when the action sequence is 
coming to a close – as is the case in Declinations – speech act recognition begins 
from 200 ms after utterance onset and is completed before the final, critical 
word is heard. In contrast, in less constraining contexts when a pre-sequence is 
initiated – as is the case in Pre-offers – early processing at the action level is less 
likely, and the full proposition is needed to understand the speech act. 
  Chapter 5 investigates whether the pattern of results reported in Chapter 
4 is supported by converging evidence from time-frequency analyses of the EEG 
data in the same experiment. Since neural oscillations, as revealed by time-
frequency analysis, and ERPs capture different types of brain responses (non-
phase locked vs. phase-locked), exploring the oscillatory dynamics of speech act 
recognition can yield a more complete picture of its time-course. The more 
specific aim of Chapter 4 was to shed light on the role of anticipatory processes 
in speech act recognition. Time-frequency representations of power in the EEG 
data from Chapter 4 were analyzed. Speech act recognition was mainly 
associated with reduced power in the alpha/beta bands just prior to and during 
the beginning of Declinations; from -100 to 450 ms after target utterance onset 
relative to Answers, and from -150 to 50 ms relative to Pre-offers. Given the 
association between alpha/beta suppression and anticipatory processing (e.g., 
Bastiaansen & Brunia, 2001; Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 1999; van Ede et al., 
2014), these results are taken to indicate that anticipatory attention plays a role 
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in early recognition of the action in Declinations. The absence of oscillatory 
effects at the utterance-final word in Declinations converges with the ERP results 
in Chapters 3 and 4, providing further support for early speech act recognition in 
Declinations. Finally, no power differences were observed between Pre-offers 
and Answers, indicating that ERPs (in particular, the late negativity) are more 
sensitive to speech act recognition in Pre-offers than neural oscillations. Overall, 
the results substantiate the time-course of speech act recognition as reported in 
Chapters 3 and 4 and provide evidence that early recognition of the action in 
Declinations involves anticipatory attention to the speech act already 150 ms 
before the utterance begins.   
6.2 Implications of main findings and future directions 
In this section I will discuss the theoretical implications of the main thesis 
findings and directions for future research.  
6.2.1 Speech acts can be recognized early in the utterance 
The starting point for this investigation was the observation (discussed in 
Levinson, 2013) that planning a simple response to an utterance takes at least 
600 to 1200 ms (E. Bates et al., 2003; Indefrey & Levelt, 2004; Levelt, 1989; 
Schnur et al., 2006), while the most frequent gaps between turns in conversation 
are much shorter – about 200 ms – and gaps of only 0 ms are common (De 
Ruiter et al., 2006; Heldner & Edlund, 2010; Levinson, 2013; Stivers et al., 
2009). These timing facts suggest that listeners begin planning their responses 
before the prior speaker has finished talking (Levinson, 2013), and since the 
response to a turn is critically dependent on the speech act being performed, 
recognition of the action must be made early on in the utterance when the turn 
has only been partially processed. In line with this early speech act recognition 
account, the main finding of this thesis is that under certain circumstances 
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listeners can get the action of an unfolding utterance in advance of its 
completion, before the final, critical word has been heard. More specifically, 
when the prior turn is highly constraining in terms of what action can follow (as 
in the Declination dialogues), speech act recognition begins as early as 200 ms 
after utterance onset and is completed by the time the final word is reached. 
Early speech act recognition is possible even though the utterance is 
underspecified for the action and does not contain clues from morphosyntax or 
prosody to aid recognition.  
 While the results of Chapter 3 and 4 indicate that early speech act 
recognition is not always possible – as reflected by the pattern of results for Pre-
offers – it is reasonable to believe that early recognition of actions is prevalent in 
conversation. The sequential environment that seems to engender early speech 
act recognition is the adjacency pair (Schegloff, 2007); early recognition of the 
action was reported in Declinations, which form second parts of such pairs. 
Future research is needed to clarify whether early recognition of the action in 
Declinations generalizes to other speech acts in the same sequential position. If 
that is the case, early speech act recognition should be very common, given that 
the adjacency pair is “the central organizing format for sequences” (Schegloff, 
2007, p. 4) and ties together a broad range of actions in everyday talk. Thus 
although some actions are recognized only at a later stage, early speech act 
recognition likely explains why turn transitions are on average very short 
despite long response planning times.  
 In sections 6.2.1.1 and 6.2.1.2 below I will discuss the implications of 
early speech act recognition for pragmatic theory and speculate on the cognitive 
mechanisms behind this ability.  
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6.2.1.1 Implications for pragmatic theory 
The finding that speech acts can be recognized early in the utterance challenges 
classical theories of linguistic pragmatics (e.g., Grice, 1975; Searle, 1975) which 
assume that listeners must first process the semantic content of the complete 
sentence (sentence meaning) before getting at what the speaker really means with 
her utterance (speaker meaning). These theories do not explicitly address the 
time-course of speech act recognition and hence have not received much 
attention in this thesis. However, they entail that pragmatic inferences or so-
called implicatures (Grice, 1975; see also Levinson, 2000; D. Sperber & Wilson, 
2004) – which speech act recognition can be viewed as a type of – are drawn 
only at the end of the utterance. The pattern of results in Declinations clearly 
shows that this is not necessarily the case.  
 The time-course of speech act recognition has received little consideration 
in more recent pragmatic frameworks, although it is generally assumed that 
pragmatic inferencing can take place early in the utterance. In the theory of 
presumptive meanings, Levinson (2000) argues that, based on simple heuristics, 
default implicatures can be computed “on the fly, given fragments of semantic 
representation” (Levinson, 2000, p. 168). Levinson’s account was specifically 
developed for default inferences, so-called generalized conversational implicatures 
(Grice, 1975; Levinson, 2000), while the speech act inferences in the present 
study – if one wants to call them such – are context-dependent and hence not 
default14. Nevertheless, the idea of heuristics guiding pragmatic processing can 
be extended to speech act recognition. For instance, early recognition of the 
action in Declinations could be regarded as a conversational implicature that 
arises via Levinson’s M-heuristic (similar to Grice’s Maxim of Manner), according 
                                         
14 Indeed, the speech act interpretation of the target utterances differs for each condition (Answer, Declination, Pre-
offer), depending on the prior action. 
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to which “what’s said in an abnormal way, isn’t normal” (Levinson, 2000, p. 33). 
More specifically, the Declinations are effectively merely accounts for why the 
prior proposal is being rejected and thus form an indirect, marked response. 
Given the adjacency pair context – with an offer in the preceding turn – and the 
fact that the unfolding utterance does not perform a prototypical acceptance (it 
is “abnormal”), the utterance can quickly be understood as performing a 
rejection.  However, such a theory of implicature has to be complemented with 
an account of action-sequencing, defining the sequential constraints interacting 
with the heuristics.  
 The results of this thesis pose similar problems for relevance theory (Dan 
Sperber & Wilson, 1986, 2002), another influential pragmatic framework. 
Relevance theorists view recognition of illocutionary force as a higher-level 
explicature – a mixture of linguistically decoded material and pragmatically 
inferred material which requires a higher order of metarepresentational ability 
than the recognition of the basic proposition (Carston, 2000; D. Sperber & 
Wilson, 2004). Important for the present purposes, explicatures and even 
implicatures (which contain only pragmatically inferred material) can be made 
“before the entire acoustic stimulus has been processed by the linguistic system” 
(Carston, 2000, p. 6); hearers interpret the utterance until the resulting 
interpretation meets their expectation of relevance. Under a relevance theory 
account, speech act recognition may take place early in the turn if the speech act 
is highly relevant in the context. However, this framework does not capture the 
fact that the sequential organization of actions is the critical factor defining the 
relevance of speech acts. How else can we explain that Pre-offers are recognized 
only at the end of the utterance? Moreover, since the proponents of relevance 
theory have argued that speech act classification (i.e., recognition) is only 
necessary in some limited cases (Dan Sperber & Wilson, 1986; see also Bird, 
1994), the framework is at odds with the basic assumption made in this thesis 
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that speech act recognition is critical for everyday conversation. Thus even 
though early recognition of speech acts can be worked into existing pragmatic 
theories, the results of this thesis show that they need to be complemented with 
an understanding of the constraints operating between speech acts in 
conversation.  
6.2.1.2 How so fast? 
The main goal of this thesis was to investigate the time-course of spoken speech 
act recognition, but the results inevitably raise the question how speech acts can 
be recognized early in the utterance. The finding that listeners can recognize 
speech acts in advance of their completion suggests that prediction during 
language comprehension is not restricted to the level of individual lexical items 
or their syntactic, semantic or conceptual features (e.g., Altmann & Kamide, 
1999; Federmeier, 2007; Kutas et al., 2011; Thornhill & Van Petten, 2012), but 
takes place at the speech act level as well. As discussed in previous chapters, 
early speech act recognition via prediction is in line with models of cognition 
which propose that the brain is “predictive”, “proactive”, or “prospective” and 
anticipates upcoming events based on past experience (Bar, 2009; Schacter et 
al., 2007; see also Van Berkum, 2010). However, since this thesis did not 
systematically manipulate prediction, further research is needed to elucidate the 
role of prediction in the recognition of speech acts.  
 According to one model of predictive processing, we rapidly extract basic 
features from incoming stimuli and link them via analogy to familiar 
information in memory in order to build predictions about unfolding or 
upcoming input (Bar, 2009). In Chapters 3 and 4 I proposed a similar account 
for early speech act recognition in the Declination dialogues, namely that limited 
information of the incoming utterance (for instance, the first words), coupled 
with acquired knowledge of speech act sequences in memory, enables 
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predictions at the speech act level. Events which occur in a non-random order 
and have a tight temporal relationship are an ideal breeding ground for 
prediction (Bubic, Von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010). The adjacency pair is an 
action sequence with such characteristics and is therefore a good candidate 
sequence for predictions. On this account, the main ingredients for prediction at 
the speech act level are memory of action sequences (containing frequency-
based information of how actions tend to pattern in sequences and what they 
commonly look like), linguistic processing, and the ability to link these through 
analogy. 
 An alternative or perhaps complementary view is that predictive 
processing of speech acts involves the use of heuristics – for instance of the 
pragmatic kind previously described (Levinson, 2000), or the fast and frugal 
heuristics proposed by Gigerenzer and colleagues (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; 
Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). Fast and frugal heuristics are simple mechanisms of 
inference that “a mind can actually carry out under limited time and knowledge” 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996, pp. 4–5), without a loss in inferential accuracy 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Fast and frugal heuristics consist of searching 
principles, which guide the search of relevant information, stopping principles, 
which determine when to stop the search, and finally decision-making principles 
that are called upon to make a choice based on the search (Gigerenzer & Todd, 
1999). The fast and frugal account places less emphasis on the contents of 
memory representations, giving more weight to the heuristics themselves, and 
hence may not be compatible with the idea that abstract and complex 
knowledge of speech act sequences is important for early speech act recognition. 
It is nevertheless reasonable to assume that simple heuristics of some kind may 
play a role in early speech act recognition.  
 A third possibility is that prediction at the speech act level is mediated by 
theory of mind, the role of which in speech act comprehension is far from clear 
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(as discussed in section 6.3.3 below). However, regardless of whether speech act 
predictions arise via theory of mind, heuristics, analogy to prior conversational 
experience or some other mechanism, the different pattern of results for 
Declinations and Pre-offers suggests that they must be sensitive to the sequential 
constraints operating between speech acts in conversation. Moroever, these 
proposed mechanisms are not oblivious to the linguistic input. In Chapter 3 I 
argued that the first words of the Declinations contribute to early speech act 
recognition by signalling that a prototypical acceptance is not underway. Based 
on this information and knowledge of adjacency pairs, listeners can quickly infer 
that a rejection is being performed. The behavioural results for Pre-offers in 
Chapter 3 and 4 likewise indicate that, although speech act predictions were not 
involved, the linguistic form of the utterance can matter for the action 
interpretation (see 6.3.1 below). Thus while listeners cannot rely on speech act 
markers (i.e., illocutionary force indicators) in incoming turns, the view adopted 
in this thesis is that the linguistic format of the action does play a role in speech 
act recognition by triggering or interacting with other aspects of speech act 
processing.  
 The mechanisms behind early speech act recognition, and the 
involvement of predictive processes, is a topic for future investigation. One 
avenue of research would be to explore how knowledge of action sequences 
interacts with bottom-up cues in the utterance to yield speech act predictions. 
Conversation analysts have noted that noticeably long gaps or hedges (e.g., uhm, 
well) tend to precede dispreferred actions such as declinations to offers, but not 
preferred actions such as acceptances (Schegloff, 2007; for a discussion, see K. 
H. Kendrick & Torreira, 2015). One possibility would be to investigate whether 
long gaps or hedges trigger the prediction that a certain action is coming up in 
the sequence, as reflected by modulation of the ERP correlates of speech act 
recognition. Another avenue of investigation is to focus on the nature of verbal 
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action knowledge and its recruitment during language comprehension. Some 
ideas for future research on this topic are raised in section 6.2.2 below. Research 
on predictive processing of speech acts could also focus on the role of theory of 
mind in speech act recognition, which is discussed in section 6.3.3 below. 
 Another important topic for further investigation is at what level of 
representation listeners are predicting during speech act comprehension. One 
issue to consider is the distinction between expectations made regarding 
upcoming speech acts and expectations made regarding unfolding speech acts. 
An implicit assumption in this thesis is that these two types of expectations may 
involve different levels of representation. For instance, it has been argued that 
the context turn in the Declination dialogues allows listeners to narrow down 
the speech act possibility space and form the expectation that a certain class of 
speech acts is appropriate, namely declinations or acceptances. On this account, 
precise speech act predictions are not made during the context utterance 
(although it is certainly possible to imagine situations in which such predictions 
about upcoming speech acts are made). Once the target utterance begins, 
listeners can use the linguistic input to recognize that a Declination is being 
performed even though the speech act is not yet completed, essentially 
“upgrading” their expectation and making a prediction at the speech act level. 
However, further research is required to better tease apart what levels of 
representation are involved during these stages of speech act comprehension. 
For instance, it is possible that expectations made during the context utterances 
in the Declination dialogues are more specific than this thesis has assumed. An 
important task for future studies will be to shed light on the nature of the 
representations involved during predictive processing of speech acts.  
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6.2.2 The type of action and sequential organization matters 
A key finding from this thesis is that sentence comprehension is influenced by 
the type of action performed and how it fits into the sequential context. This 
calls for going beyond investigating “direct” versus “indirect” speech act 
comprehension (e.g., Basnakova et al., 2014; Coulson & Lovett, 2010; van 
Ackeren et al., 2012) towards a more fine-grained approach that takes into 
account speech act types and their sequential organization in turn-taking.  
 The structure of action sequences and their segmentation into smaller 
units has received considerable attention in research on non-verbal (e.g., 
manual) action understanding (see, for instance, Avrahami & Kareev, 1994; 
Baldwin, Andersson, Saffran, & Meyer, 2008; Zacks et al., 2011). It has been 
argued that sequential cognition – the ability to “extract and utilize the 
sequential structure of perceptual and motor events in the world in an adaptive 
and pragmatic manner” (Dominey, Hoen, Blanc, & Lelekov-Boissard, 2003, p. 
208) – plays an important role in language processing at other levels than speech 
acts, such as syntax (Dominey et al., 2003). However, with the exception of this 
thesis, the sequential structure of verbal action has not been given much 
consideration in psycholinguistic research on language comprehension. 
 Abstract knowledge about action sequences can be conceptualized as 
scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977) or schemata (Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; 
Rumelhart, 1980) in memory. Speech act scripts could be built from the 
observation that certain actions in conversation are usually preceded by some 
other type of speech act. Knowledge of verbal action sequences might play a 
critical role in early speech act recognition, particularly in action-underspecified 
utterances, decreasing the need for higher-level mechanisms such as theory of 
mind. This proposal opens up a new avenue of research on speech act 
recognition and language comprehension more generally, as many questions are 
unanswered with regard to how sequential context and implicit knowledge of 
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speech act organization guides the interpretation of talk. How abstract are such 
action scripts – do they mainly consist of simple action sequences, such as 
adjacency pairs or pre-sequences, or do they contain additional script 
information about the situational context (e.g., restaurant scenario script)? Are 
speech act scripts stored and accessed in similar ways as non-verbal action 
knowledge? What is the time-course of such speech act script activation during 
listening to spoken dialogue? In what kind of situations is knowledge of action 
sequences not sufficient, triggering other mechanisms such as theory of mind? 
These questions could be addressed in future research using other methods 
(fMRI, MEG), new experimental paradigms and localizer tasks that tap into 
action sequence knowledge.  
6.2.3 ERP correlates provide benchmarks for future research 
The right hemisphere fronto-temporal positivity that was elicited to both 
Declinations and Pre-offers when speech act categorization was required 
(Chapter 3) did not extend to Pre-offers in an experimental environment that 
engaged participants in a true/false judgment task and included additional filler 
dialogues (Chapter 4). It is not surprising that task demands do have some 
impact on the brain signatures of speech act comprehension, since language-
relevant ERP components like the N400 and P600 have been found to be 
modulated by the task (see, for instance, D. J Chwilla et al., 1995; Gunter & 
Friederici, 1999; Gina R. Kuperberg, 2007). In Chapter 4 I suggested that the 
absence of the right hemisphere fronto-temporal positivity to Pre-offers in the 
second ERP experiment was due to limited top-down information about the 
target speech acts, as a result of additional fillers and a task that did not restrict 
participants’ interpretation of the utterances. If this is correct, the right 
hemisphere fronto-temporal positivity can nevertheless be regarded as a speech-
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act-related ERP effect, reflecting early processing of speech acts when listeners 
have some top-down information of upcoming input.  
 Most important for the present discussion, this thesis identified two 
reliable ERP correlates of speech act recognition, which show only subtle 
differences between studies in terms of latency and scalp distribution. A critical 
finding from Chapter 4 is that the frontal positivity early in the utterance in 
Declinations and the late negativity to the final word in Pre-offers are relatively 
robust across experimental tasks and designs. These EEG signatures can be 
exploited in follow-up research on speech act recognition. For instance, is speech 
act recognition – as reflected by these components – an automatic process or is it 
influenced by factors such as emotional state (see Dorothee J. Chwilla, Virgillito, 
& Vissers, 2011; Vissers et al., 2010)? Does verbal action understanding differ in 
young children or clinical populations such as people with autism? Since speech 
act comprehension likely draws on cognitive mechanisms used for other aspects 
of linguistic and social processing, the frontal positivity and late negativity are 
also informative for research in related domains, particularly on pragmatic 
language comprehension. Thus an important contribution of this thesis is that it 
provides ERP benchmarks for further studies on speech act recognition and 
sentence comprehension more generally. 
6.3 Remaining questions 
In this section I will discuss some remaining questions that are important for a 
comprehensive understanding of the time-course of speech act comprehension 
and action understanding more generally. 
6.3.1 The influence of action formation  
One finding which has not received much discussion in this thesis is that the 
linguistic form of the target speech act has a subtle influence on results in off-
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line comprehension tasks. In Chapters 2 and 3, for instance, Pre-offers of the 
form I have… (Set 1) were categorized more accurately than other formats, such 
as I go/am going… (Set 2). Similarly, in Chapter 4 the accuracy in the true-false 
comprehension task was higher for Pre-offers of the I have… format. 
Importantly, in all three experiments the behavioural results showed an 
interaction between the action condition and linguistic form (Set), indicating 
that it is not the case that there is some general feature of the utterance (e.g., 
frequency of the format within the experiment) which results in higher accuracy 
across the board, but rather that the form of the target speech act differentially 
affects the three speech act types. Although the influence of linguistic form was 
minimal in the EEG data (as reflected by the absence of Action×Set interactions 
in omnibus analyses in Chapters 3 and 4), the behavioural results are 
nevertheless a reminder that action formation, i.e., the linguistic form of the 
utterance, can matter for the action interpretation.  
 While Schegloff has argued that “sequential features of conversation … 
overshadow the contribution made by its linguistic form to what an utterance is 
doing” (Schegloff, 1984, p. 36), other conversation analysts have noted that 
participants use recurrent linguistic formats to frame actions and that action 
ascription is partially dependent on these formats (see, for instance, Couper-
Kuhlen, 2014). Through analyses of English conversation, Couper-Kuhlen has 
identified the most common formats for actions that she describes as offers, 
proposals, requests and suggestions (Couper-Kuhlen, 2014). Although each 
action type has multiple formats associated with it, and in some cases a format 
can be used in more than one action, the frequency count indicates that each 
action has a “preferred” format (e.g., I can X is frequent in proposals) (Couper-
Kuhlen, 2014). Turning again to the behavioural results for the Pre-offers, which 
show higher accuracy for Pre-offers starting with I have… (“Ik heb”; Set 1), the 
format I have X, if you want Y is a common format for concrete offers in both 
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English and Finnish (Kärkkäinen & Keisanen, 2012). It is likely that the same is 
true for Dutch and that utterances starting with I have… (“Ik heb”) frequently 
perform offering actions such as offers and pre-offers. Although the I have… 
format is not a discrete speech act marker (i.e., an illocutionary force indicator – 
see 1.2.1), listeners may learn to associate the linguistic form of the utterance 
with offering actions through repeated exposure to this format, leading to higher 
accuracy in the comprehension tasks compared to other formats.    
 Importantly, the “preferred” formats discussed by Couper-Kuhlen become 
apparent early in turns. She argues that 
...pace Schegloff (1984), grammar does tell us something about social action. It provides 
a basis on which recipients form working hypothesis about what action a co-participant is 
initiating. And it does this relatively early in the turn, thus enabling recipients (i) to 
determine an appropriate responsive action and (ii) to implement it in a timely fashion.” 
(Couper-Kuhlen, 2014, p. 645) 
 
Common action formats could feed into the fast and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer 
& Goldstein, 1996) discussed in section 6.2.1.2 above, allowing for early speech 
act recognition and response planning. While the EEG results for Pre-offers of 
the I have… format do not provide supporting evidence for this, how quickly 
speech acts are recognized when preferred action formats are involved is still an 
open question.  
 Moreover, in addition to the formats described above, some common 
speech acts in conversation involve routinized expressions, such as gesundheit in 
response to a sneeze. In these cases there is a rare one-to-one mapping between 
form and speech act function (Levinson, In press, 2013), so the speech act can 
simply be encoded as a part of the expression’s lexical meaning in semantic 
memory. Lexicalization of speech acts “facilitates speech processing since lexical 
look-up is a simpler and quicker process than figuring out what the speaker 
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means” (Aijmer, 1996, p. 196). Given that early speech act recognition is 
possible even when the utterance is underspecified for the action, as the results 
for Declinations in this thesis reveal, it is reasonable to assume that recognition 
of routinized speech acts, as well as speech acts with preferred formatting, is 
made even earlier. This could contribute further to the short turn transitions 
observed in conversation. However, the time-course of speech act recognition in 
such “non-underspecified” cases is a topic for further investigation.  
6.3.2 Revisiting the timing of turn transitions 
The finding that the time-course of speech act recognition is influenced by the 
type of action and how it fits into the larger action sequence has important 
implications for research on the timing of turn transitions. In particular, actions 
that are recognized only at the end of the utterance (such as pre-offers) should 
be followed by a gap that is considerably longer than the 200 ms reported 
average (or mode) for turn transitions (keeping in mind that response planning 
takes at least 600 ms). The sequential organization of action is rarely taken into 
account in research on turn timings. Corpus studies generally group all inter-
speaker turn transitions together into one average (Bosch et al., 2005; e.g., 
Heldner & Edlund, 2010), and in the field of conversation analysis the type of 
action has only to a limited extent been considered as a factor that influences 
the length of gaps between turns (in the context of preferred vs. dispreferred 
actions; K. H. Kendrick & Torreira, 2015; Sacks et al., 1974; Schegloff, 2007).  
 As discussed in Chapter 4, one hypothesis that emerges from the current 
results is that initiating actions (including pre-offers) take more time to 
recognize and are therefore followed by long gaps, while responsive actions 
(such as declinations and other second parts of adjacency pairs) are easy to 
recognize and hence followed by short gaps or even overlapping responses. 
Further corpus research on this issue would not only clarify accounts of turn 
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timing in conversation but also whether the time-course of speech act 
recognition as reported in this thesis is corroborated by analyses of gap length in 
natural conversation.   
6.3.3 The role of theory of mind and affective empathy 
Chapter 3 reported a correlation between scores on the Empathy Quotient (EQ; 
Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) and the early left/midline frontal positivity 
observed in Declinations, which reflected that this effect was present only in 
high empathizers. The EQ measures both affective empathy, the ability to 
respond emotionally to another person’s emotion, and cognitive empathy, which 
involves inferring the mental state of another person (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004). The latter aspect is often referred to as theory of mind, 
mentalizing or perspective-taking. The empathy correlation was not replicated in 
Chapter 4, casting doubt on the reliability of this finding. It nevertheless brings 
up the question what the role of theory of mind and affective empathy is in 
speech act recognition. Does the frontal positivity in Declinations reflect an 
affective response, due to the fact that the speech act contains a face-threatening 
rejection (P. Brown & Levinson, 1988; Goffman, 1955), or the engagement of 
theory of mind? Prior fMRI research indicates that comprehension of indirect 
speech acts activates both mentalizing and affective empathy areas (Basnakova 
et al., 2014; van Ackeren et al., 2012), as reviewed in the introduction to this 
thesis. These two accounts for the frontal positivity are therefore both plausible. 
 In regards to the possible involvement of affective empathy, some 
participants in the experiments noted that the Declinations sounded somewhat 
rude. The rudeness presumably comes about because rejecting a proposal is a 
dispreferred action. However, recognizing the speech act of the utterance – i.e., 
that a declination is involved – is a prerequisite for the affective response. Thus 
even if the frontal positivity in Declinations does reflect emotional processing, a 
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perlocutionary “by-product” of the speech act (see 1.1), it provides important 
information about the time-course of speech act recognition.  
 The second account – that the empathy correlation reflects individual 
variation in the engagement of theory of mind during speech act recognition –
suggests that the time-course of speech act recognition is influenced by theory of 
mind abilities. That listeners differ in how quickly they can extract speech acts 
from their interlocutors’ utterances is a topic that requires further investigation, 
one that could be addressed with correlation analyses and MEG experimentation 
(providing insights into both the time-course and source of brain activity during 
comprehension of speech acts). The possible association of theory of mind with 
the frontal positivity also poses the question why this ERP effect and the 
correlation with empathy were not observed in Pre-offers. Is theory of mind not 
required for the comprehension of Pre-offers? This taps into a bigger issue of 
what kind of speech act situation triggers the need for mentalizing during 
conversation. 
  The fMRI and MEG research that has reported theory of mind activation 
during speech act comprehension (see 1.3) used either indirect speech acts 
(Basnakova et al., 2014; van Ackeren et al., 2012) or visual stimuli that are quite 
removed from natural conversation (Egorova, Pulvermüller, et al., 2013). It is 
not clear to what extent mentalizing is involved in other types of speech acts and 
situations. There is considerable debate within linguistic pragmatics and other 
fields of research whether intention recognition via theory of mind is necessary 
for interaction. In contrast to Gricean-inspired pragmatic theories in which 
reasoning about the mental states of others plays a central role (e.g., Levinson, 
1983; Dan Sperber & Wilson, 2002), it has been proposed that intention 
recognition is not critical for human communication (see, for instance, Gauker, 
2001; Gregoromichelaki et al., 2011; M. J. Pickering & Garrod, 2004). A parallel 
discussion is found within research on non-verbal action understanding, in 
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which the role of theory of mind vis-à-vis the mirror neuron system in action 
recognition is debated. For instance, based on fMRI studies on manual action 
comprehension it has been argued that mentalizing regions can analyze other 
people’s actions, but only if reflecting on goals, intentions and beliefs is 
important for the task (de Lange et al., 2008; Thioux, Gazzola, & Keysers, 2008). 
Whether this is the case for speech act recognition, i.e., that theory of mind 
activation is to some degree “optional”, is an important question for further 
research. Information about familiar speech acts in semantic memory, top-down 
knowledge of action sequences, fast and frugal heuristics and general inference 
mechanisms that do not require theory of mind (see, for instance, Mason & Just, 
2011) could obviate the need for mentalizing during speech act recognition. To 
get a complete picture of the cognitive mechanisms behind fast and efficient 
speech act recognition it is important to expand the investigation to a variety of 
actions and formats and, in addition to EEG, use methods such as fMRI and MEG 
that provide information about the neural substrates involved.  
6.3.4 From overhearing to interacting 
The current investigation employed an overhearing paradigm in which 
participants listen to short, pre-designed spoken dialogues. As discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis, the use of controlled materials reduces noise from 
confounding factors. Since the dialogues were modeled on natural conversation 
(based on findings from conversation analysis), the materials nevertheless 
approximate conversational interaction. This approach therefore offers a good 
compromise between experimental control and ecological validity. However, 
overhearing a dialogue is not the same as taking an active part in one. Several 
studies have shown that understanding differs for addressees and overhearers. 
For instance, when people are asked to tell another participant how to arrange 
complex figures in a tangram matching task, those who overhear the matching 
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game are less accurate and slower in arranging the figures than addressees in an 
interactive situation (Schober & Clark, 1989; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992). This 
difference is attributed to a lack of grounding, that is, overhearers cannot initiate 
repair in the conversation or use other collaborative means to reach mutual 
belief (Schober & Clark, 1989; see also Herbert H. Clark & Brennan, 1991). Eye-
tracking studies have shown that in interactive dialogue an addressee’s initial 
interpretation of another’s utterance is sensitive to the addressees’s experience 
with the speaker, while such partner-specific effects are not found in non-
interactive settings (Brown-Schmidt, 2009). Thus listeners may be less likely to 
engage in sophisticated understanding of speech acts when overhearing 
dialogue. Although this thesis used comprehension tasks to counter the possible 
lack of perspective-taking and engagement, participants may have processed the 
dialogues more superficially or with less speed than in real life, leading to 
attenuation or delay in ERP components.  
 Another related issue is how first-hand knowledge and intentions 
influence speech act recognition. If the experimental dialogues were interactive, 
the addressees of the target utterances would be the speakers of the context 
turns. In the case of the Declination dialogues, this entails that the person 
performing the proposal in the context is already expecting an acceptance or 
rejection, and does not have to infer this from the adjacency pair structure (i.e., 
based on her own proposal). More importantly, in the Pre-offer dialogues the 
speaker of the context turn, which contains an expression of some problem, may 
already have the intention to elicit an offer of assistance; in this situation the 
Pre-offer should be readily apparent and possibly recognizable early in the 
utterance (especially in turns starting with I have, given the association of this 
phrase with offering; see 6.3.1). Thus for both Declinations and Pre-offers it is 
reasonable to assume that the recognition of the speech act would take place 
earlier in interactive settings than in non-interactive settings such as the 
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experiments for this thesis. In light of this, the early speech act recognition effect 
to Declinations, starting from 200 ms after utterance onset, is striking. Moreover, 
the lack of interactivity could contribute to late recognition of Pre-offers.  
 Is there a way to investigate the time-course of speech act recognition in a 
more interactive setting? One possibility for further research is to have the 
participant interact with a confederate in a situation that is easy to manipulate, 
for instance in some type of a communication task or a quiz paradigm (Bögels, 
Magyari, & Levinson, 2014; Van Berkum, 2012). This involves using well 
controlled, scripted and preferably pre-recorded utterances, which inevitably 
limits the interaction and is challenging in terms of experimental design (for 
problems with using confederates in experimental research on dialogue, see 
Kuhlen & Brennan, 2013). Future studies should aim to address these issues, 
pushing the limits in research on speech act recognition. However, important 
strides can be made using an overhearing paradigm, for instance by 
investigating the automaticity of speech act recognition and exploring individual 
differences in this ability in healthy people, as well as in children or clinical 
populations (as discussed in 6.2.3 above). 
6.3.5 Relationship to non-verbal action understanding 
The previous discussion on the role of theory of mind, prediction and knowledge 
of action sequences in speech act recognition resonates with similar themes in 
research on non-verbal action understanding. An important question for future 
investigation concerns the relationship between the neural substrates of verbal 
and non-verbal action recognition. Ultimately it may be the case that action 
recognition in both modalities involves the same systems. Verbal and non-verbal 
actions are tighly integrated in conversation, often occurring in tandem – as in 
the case of co-speech gestures (Dick, Goldin-Meadow, Hasson, Skipper, & Small, 
2009; Willems, Özyürek, & Hagoort, 2007) – or in exchange for each other. 
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Requesting something can be done with a manual gesture, for example reaching 
for a glass, or a verbal request. Similarly, raising an eyebrow or leaning forward 
can function in the same way as “huh” or “what did you say” in the initiation of 
repair in conversation (see, for instance, Enfield et al., 2013). There is no reason 
to believe that the machinery that makes speech act recognition possible is much 
different from the mechanisms used in the visual modality. Further research on 
the neural substrate of speech act recognition would provide a more unified 
understanding of efficient action recognition in both modalities and shed new 
light on the interaction engine (Levinson, 2006) behind human communication.  
6.4 Conclusions 
This thesis illustrates how an interdisciplinary approach, combining EEG 
methodology with findings from conversation analysis and corpus studies, can 
provide novel insights into the basic cognitive ability underlying conversational 
interaction – the recognition of speech acts. The findings demonstrate that the 
time-course of speech act recognition is dependent on the type of action being 
performed and how it fits into the larger action sequence. Given that the prior 
turn is highly constraining in terms of what action can follow, speech act 
recognition begins very early in the incoming utterance and is completed by the 
time the final word is reached. This finding implies that predictions are made at 
the level of speech acts, opening up a new arena of research on predictive 
language comprehension. At a more general level, the results of this thesis show 
that sentence comprehension is influenced by the give-and-take of the speech act 
interaction, calling for a more nuanced approach in investigating language 
comprehension in conversational contexts. Future studies have to take into 
account the temporal demands and rich structure of action that characterize 
turn-taking.  
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8 Appendix 
8.1 Model comparison for accuracy analysis in Chapter 2  
We started by comparing the fit of the full model with Action, Set and the 
Action×Set interaction (AIC 1570.2, logLIK -763.1) to a model without the 
interaction (AIC 1585.3, logLik -772.7); including the interaction significantly 
improved the fit of the model (loglikelihood difference = 9.56; χ2(2) = 19.11, 
p <  0.001). We then compared a model with Action and Set as fixed effects 
(AIC 1585.3, logLik -772.7) to a model without Action (AIC 1582.7, logLik -
773.33); this comparison was not significant (loglikelihood difference = 0.67; 
χ2(2) = 1.34, p = 0.51), indicating that including Action does not improve the 
model. A comparison of a model with Action and Set as fixed factors (AIC 
1585.3, logLik -772.7) to a model with only Action (AIC 1584.1, logLik -773.0) 
revealed that adding a fixed effect of Set did not significantly improve the model 
(loglikelihood difference = 0.38; χ2(1) = 0.77, p = 0.38). The best fitting 
model therefore includes only an Action×Set interaction, but the more 
conservative, full model with Action and Set was used for the analysis in Section 
2.4.1. 
8.2 Empathy Quotient correlation analysis for Chapter 3  
Prior fMRI and MEG studies have implicated theory of mind (or mentalizing) 
and affective empathy in indirect speech act comprehension. For instance, a 
recent fMRI study found that indirect replies in spoken dialogues (e.g., Did you 
like my presentation? – It's hard to give a good presentation) activate not only 
typical language regions but also areas for mentalizing and affective empathy 
(Basnakova et al., 2014). Similarly, an fMRI study on indirect requests (e.g., It is 
very hot here presented with a picture of a closed window) reported activations 
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in theory of mind regions, in addition to activations in areas associated with 
action planning and motor control (van Ackeren et al., 2012). Theory of mind 
activations were also reported in an MEG study on speech act processing, in 
which written words performed either a requesting or a naming speech act 
depending on a prior video-taped context sentence (e.g., What are these 
called?/What can I get you? – PLANT) (Egorova, Pulvermüller, et al., 2013). 
Based on this research, we hypothesized that there might be individual 
differences in the timing or nature of speech act recognition due to possible 
variation in perspective-taking and social cognition more generally. Such 
variation can be assessed with the Empathy Quotient (EQ) (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004; Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004). The 
EQ measures both theory of mind (cognitive empathy; the ability to infer the 
mental state of another person) and affective empathy (the ability to respond 
emotionally to another person’s emotion) (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). 
Theory of mind and affective empathy, as measured with the EQ, have 
previously been found to influence pragmatic language comprehension in ERP 
research (van den Brink et al., 2012).  
 To investigate whether theory of mind or affective empathy plays a role 
in speech act recognition we planned to compute correlations between scores on 
the Empathy Quotient and the ERP data. More specifically, the goal of the 
correlation analysis was twofold: to examine whether the observed ERP effects 
are modulated by empathy, and to check whether individual differences mask 
other ERP effects that might be present (such as an N400). 
 
8.2.1 Empathy Quotient scores and correlation analysis  
All participants filled out the Empathy Quotient questionnaire (EQ) after the 
EEG recording. EQ scores ranged from 20 to 62 (M=40.79, SD=8.46) (highest 
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possible score 80, higher scores indicate more empathy skills). The correlation 
analysis was performed on mean amplitudes in the early utterance time-window 
from 100 to 600 ms after first word onset, and in the late utterance time-window 
from 100 to 600 ms and 600 to 1000 ms after final word onset. The analysis for 
the early window included the right anterior region and the anterior medial 
region (to capture modulation of frontal ERP effects), as well as the posterior 
medial region (to check for effects at posterior sites). The analysis for the final 
word included the same frontal regions and a posterior region in the left 
hemisphere (to capture the late negativity). We first averaged the mean 
amplitude over all sites in each region for each condition. ERP difference scores 
were then computed for Declinations and Pre-offers by subtracting the mean 
amplitude for Answers (Declinations - Answers and Pre-offers - Answers, 
respectively). Two-tailed Pearson’s correlations were performed using 
Bonferroni-adjusted alpha levels, p = .017 for the early utterance time-window 
and p = .008 for the two time-windows at the final word. 
 EQ scores were positively correlated with the Declination difference score 
at the anterior medial region in the early utterance time-window, i.e., from 100 
to 600 ms after first word onset (r(40) = .43, p = .005); the more empathy 
participants have, the bigger the amplitude difference between Answers and 
Declinations. A scatter plot showing the correlation is provided in Figure 8.1. 
Participants were split into two groups based on EQ scores, resulting in a Low 
EQ group (20 participants, EQ 20 to 40) and a High EQ group (22 participants, 
EQ 41 to 62). Visual inspection of both groups’ mean waveforms for Answers 
and Declinations at the first word (see Figure 8.1) suggests that Declinations 
separate earlier from Answers in participants with high empathy than in low 
empathizers. Separate analyses (ANOVAs) for each group in the early utterance 
time-window revealed that the frontal positivity at the medial region is present 
from 400 to 600 ms in the High EQ group, indicated by a main effect of Action 
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at the frontal medial region (Fs ≥ 7.06, ps < .05), while no differences were 
observed in the Low EQ group.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Empathy Correlation. A) Scatter plot showing correlation 
between EQ and Declinations difference score in the early utterance time-
window at the frontal medial region. B) ERPs at Fz time-locked to the onset 
of the first word; for all participants, high empathy participants, and low 
empathy participants. 
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The ERP difference scores in Pre-offers were not significantly correlated with EQ 
at the first word (ps > .10). At the final word there were no significant 
correlations between EQ and ERP difference scores using the corrected alpha 
level (ps > .016; the corrected alpha level was .008 in the late time-windows).  
8.2.2 Discussion 
A positive correlation was observed between EQ and the Declination difference 
score at the frontal medial region from 100 to 600 ms after first word onset, 
indicating that the more empathy participants have, the larger the mean 
amplitude difference between Answers and Declinations. The follow-up analyses 
indicated that the frontal medial positivity (referred to as frontal left/midline 
positivity in Chapter 3) is present from 400 to 600 ms after first word onset in 
high empathizers only. The correlation suggests that the frontal medial positivity 
is related to theory of mind and/or affective empathy. Unfortunately it is 
difficult to disentangle the cognitive and emotional components of empathy as 
they tend to co-occur (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Prior fMRI research 
indicates that comprehension of indirect speech acts activates both mentalizing 
and affective empathy areas (Basnakova et al., 2014; van Ackeren et al., 2012), 
as previously discussed. 
 In Chapter 3 we speculate that the correlation with the Empathy Quotient 
in Declinations reflects individual differences in theory of mind processing. 
Declinations may be more taxing on theory of mind than Pre-offers and Answers 
due to a combination of predictability and indirectness. In contrast to Pre-offers, 
the context turn in the Declination dialogues builds up strict expectations about 
the upcoming action (an acceptance or declining of an offer). In contrast to 
Answers, the Declination target utterances are relatively indirect (providing just 
a reason for not needing the offer) and therefore more difficult. These factors 
may trigger theory of mind processing in Declinations, reflected by the frontal 
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medial positivity; listeners quickly “tune in” to the early signals of the action 
(expecting either declination or acceptance) and yet have to engage in additional 
processing because of the indirect response. On this account the time-course of 
speech act recognition is influenced by theory of mind abilities. However, 
further research is clearly required to investigate the influence of cognitive and 
emotional empathy on the time-course of speech act recognition.  
8.3 Model comparison for accuracy analysis in Chapter 3 
We first compared the fit of the full model with Action, Set and the Action x Set 
interaction (AIC 1394.5, logLIK -675.26) to a model without the interaction (AIC 
1397.2, logLik -678.58); including the interaction significantly improved the fit 
of the model (loglikelihood difference = 3.32; χ2(2) = 6.64, p <  0.05). A 
comparison of a model with Action and Set as fixed effects (AIC 1397.2, logLik -
678.58) to a model without Action (AIC 1405.9, logLik -684.97) was significant 
(loglikelihood difference = 6.39; χ2(2) = 12.76, p < 0.01), suggesting that the 
best fitting model includes Action as a fixed effect. A comparison of a model 
with Action and Set as fixed factors (AIC 1397.2, logLik -678.58) to a model 
with only Action (AIC 1396.5, logLik -679.27) revealed that adding a fixed effect 
of Set did not significantly improve the model (loglikelihood difference = 0.69; 
χ2(1) = 1.38, p = 0.24). The best model therefore includes Action and the 
Action× Set interaction, but the more conservative, full model with Action, Set 
and the Action× Set interaction was used for the analysis in section 3.3.1. 
8.4 Empathy Quotient correlation analysis for Chapter 4 
Chapter 3 (see 8.2 in Appendix) reported a positive correlation between scores 
on the Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) and the early 
frontal positivity in Declinations; more specifically, the frontal positivity was 
present in high empathizers from 400 to 600 ms after first word onset while it 
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was absent in low empathizers. The Empathy Quotient measures both cognitive 
empathy, i.e., theory of mind, as well as affective empathy (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004). Both components of empathy have been implicated in the 
comprehension of indirect speech acts, as investigated by fMRI studies on 
indirect requests and replies (Basnakova et al., 2013; van Ackeren et al., 2012). 
To investigate whether individual differences in empathy modulate the ERP 
correlates of speech act recognition in the current experiment, we carried out 
correlation analyses on empathy scores from all participants who were included 
in the main EEG analysis. Empathy scores ranged from 26 to 63 (M=44.93, 
SD=8.80; higher scores indicate more empathy skills). The correlation analysis 
was performed on averaged mean amplitude in three regions of interest to 
capture the regions used in the prior study. A Mid-Anterior region included 
anterior regions at and around the midline (A3, M1 and A4; to capture 
modulation of the frontal positivity around the midline). A Right-Anterior region 
included two anterior regions in the right hemisphere (A5, A6; to capture the 
right hemisphere frontal positivity). Finally, a Posterior region included two left 
posterior regions (P2 and P3; to check for effects at posterior sites such as the 
late negativity or an N400). We first averaged the mean amplitude over all sites 
in each condition for each region. ERP difference scores were then computed for 
Declinations and Pre-offers by subtracting the mean amplitude for Answers (that 
is, Declinations - Answers and Pre-offers - Answers). The correlation analysis was 
performed on mean amplitudes in the early utterance time-window from 100 to 
600 ms and in the late utterance time-window from 100 to 600 ms and 600 to 
1000 ms. Two-tailed Pearson’s correlations were performed using Bonferroni-
adjusted alpha levels, p = .017 for the first time-window and p = .008 for the 
final word.  
 There were no correlations between the EQ and the difference score in 
Declinations and Pre-offers in any of the three time-windows (early time-window 
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ps > .16; first late time-window (100 to 600 ms) ps > .014; second late time-
window (600 to 1000 ms) ps > .32).  
8.4.1 Discussion 
The present experiment did not replicate the correlation between Empathy 
Quotient scores and the frontal positivity in Declinations, reported in Chapter 3. 
It seems that high empathizers have an advantage when comprehending 
Declinations in a categorization task (as in Chapter 3), but this advantage 
disappears under the experimental conditions of the present experiment, as 
reflected by the finding that the empathy correlation was not replicated. It is 
likely that these two different outcomes have more to do with the amount of 
top-down information participants had about the stimuli than the task itself. As 
discussed in section 4.4.2, participants in the present experiment had less 
information about the target speech acts before the session started. Moreover, 
additional fillers directed their attention further away from the critical 
utterances, limiting top-down expectations. Whether and how empathy interacts 
with the use of top-down information during speech act recognition is a topic for 
further investigation.  
8.5 Model comparison for accuracy analysis in Chapter 4 
We first compared the fit of the full model with Action, Set and the Action×Set 
interaction (AIC 2009.91, logLIK -982.96) to a model without the interaction 
(AIC 2029.90, logLik -994.95). Including the interaction improved the fit of the 
model (loglikelihood difference = 11.99; χ2(2) = 6.175e-06, p <  0.001). A 
comparison of a model with Action and Set as fixed effects (AIC 2029.90, logLik 
-994.95) to a model with Set only (AIC 2046.59, logLik -1005.29) was 
significant (loglikelihood difference = 10.34; χ2(2) = 3.227e-05, p < 0.001), 
indicating that Action improves the fit of the model. A final comparison of a 
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model with Action and Set (AIC 2029.90, logLik -994.95) to a model with Action 
only (AIC 2032.45, logLik -997.23) revealed that adding a fixed effect of Set 
significantly improved the model (loglikelihood difference = 2.28; χ2(1) = 
0.03, p < .05). Thus the best fitting model of the accuracy includes Action, Set 
and the Action×Set interaction. 
8.6 Stimuli 
Below are the stimuli used for Chapter 3, 4 and 5.  
1 Answer Hoe weet je zoveel over parketvloeren? Mijn vader is timmerman. 
1 Declination Ik kan je helpen het parket te vervangen.  Mijn vader is timmerman. 
1 Pre-offer Ik zoek iemand die het parket kan vervangen.  Mijn vader is timmerman. 
2 Answer Hoe ben je van de spinnen in je huis 
afgekomen?  
Ik heb insectenspray.  
2 Declination Wil je dat ik met je mee naar huis ga en de 
spin dood maak? 
Ik heb insectenspray.  
2 Pre-offer Er zitten zo veel spinnen in mijn huis.  Ik heb insectenspray.  
3 Answer Hoe ga je de doucheafvoer maken? Ik heb ontstopper.  
3 Declination Zal ik de doucheafvoer voor je maken? Ik heb ontstopper.  
3 Pre-offer Ik moet de doucheafvoer maken. Ik heb ontstopper.  
4 Answer Hoe blijf je eigenlijk zo fit? Ik ben hardloper.  
4 Declination Zal ik je helpen met de training voor de 
wedstrijd? 
Ik ben hardloper.  
4 Pre-offer Ik weet niet hoe ik moet trainen voor de 
wedstrijd.  
Ik ben hardloper.  
5 Answer Hoe weet je zoveel over Denemarken? Ik heb een boek over 
Scandinavië. 
5 Declination Wil je mijn reisgids van Denemarken lenen? Ik heb een boek over 
Scandinavië. 
5 Pre-offer Ik ben op zoek naar een reisgids van 
Denemarken.   
Ik heb een boek over 
Scandinavië. 
6 Answer Wat voor een soort feest ben je aan het 
plannen? 
Ik ga trouwen. 
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6 Declination Wil je een keer met me uitgaan? Ik ga trouwen. 
6 Pre-offer Ik wil ervaring opdoen met het maken van 
huwelijksreportages. 
Ik ga trouwen. 
7 Answer Hoe weet je zoveel over bomen? Mijn vader is tuinman.  
7 Declination Ik kan je helpen met het planten van de 
bomen. 
Mijn vader is tuinman.  
7 Pre-offer Ik wil bomen planten maar ik weet niet hoe 
dat moet.  
Mijn vader is tuinman.  
8 Answer Wat doe je met het avondeten? Ik ga iets lekkers koken. 
8 Declination Ik kan een afhaalmaaltijd voor je meebrengen. Ik ga iets lekkers koken. 
8 Pre-offer Ik wou dat ik een privékok had. Ik ga iets lekkers koken. 
9 Answer Hoe is het je gelukt om de computer te 
repareren? 
Mijn beste vriend is een 
computernerd. 
9 Declination Ik kan je een nummer geven van iemand die je 
computer kan repareren. 
Mijn beste vriend is een 
computernerd. 
9 Pre-offer Ik moet iemand vinden die mijn computer kan 
repareren. 
Mijn beste vriend is een 
computernerd. 
10 Answer Hoe ga je het slot vinden in het donker?  Ik heb een zaklampje. 
10 Declination Zal ik het licht aandoen zodat je het slot kunt 
zien? 
Ik heb een zaklampje. 
10 Pre-offer Ik kan het slot niet zien in het donker. Ik heb een zaklampje. 
11 Answer Wat ga je toch met al die bloem doen? Ik bak vanavond 
oliebollen.  
11 Declination Wil je met ons mee komen naar het feest? Ik bak vanavond 
oliebollen.  
11 Pre-offer Ik zal mijn moeders eten op oudejaarsdag wel 
missen. 
Ik bak vanavond 
oliebollen.  
12 Answer Waar ga je heen? Ik moet naar de 
boekhandel. 
12 Declination Wil je samen met mij lunchen? Ik moet naar de 
boekhandel. 
12 Pre-offer Ik heb een nieuwe agenda nodig. Ik moet naar de 
boekhandel. 
13 Answer Wat zijn je plannen voor morgen?  Ik ga naar de uni. 
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13 Declination Ik kan het boek voor je halen uit de UB. Ik ga naar de uni. 
13 Pre-offer Ik ben vergeten een boek uit de UB te halen. Ik ga naar de uni. 
14 Answer Hoe weet je zoveel over klassieke muziek?  Mijn vader is pianist.  
14 Declination Ik kan je aan iemand voorstellen die muziek 
kan spelen op je receptie. 
Mijn vader is pianist.  
14 Pre-offer We zoeken iemand die muziek kan spelen op 
de receptie. 
Mijn vader is pianist.  
15 Answer Waarom ken jij Stockholm zo goed? Mijn vriendin is Zweeds. 
15 Declination Ik ken Stockholm goed, dus ik kan je wel wat 
tips geven. 
Mijn vriendin is Zweeds. 
15 Pre-offer Ik moet iemand zien te vinden die Stockholm 
goed kent. 
Mijn vriendin is Zweeds. 
16 Answer Waarom weet je zoveel over juridische zaken? Mijn man is jurist. 
16 Declination Ik kan je juridisch advies geven over het 
contract. 
Mijn man is jurist. 
16 Pre-offer Ik heb juridisch advies nodig over mijn 
contract. 
Mijn man is jurist. 
17 Answer Wat voor zaden heb je voor je tuin? Ik heb allerlei 
groentezaden. 
17 Declination Ik kan je zaden van sla geven voor in de tuin. Ik heb allerlei 
groentezaden. 
17 Pre-offer Ik zou graag zaden van sla willen voor in de 
tuin.  
Ik heb allerlei 
groentezaden. 
18 Answer Hoe fiets je met je dochtertje? Ik heb een fietsstoeltje.  
18 Declination Je kunt onze fietskar lenen voor je dochter. Ik heb een fietsstoeltje.  
18 Pre-offer Ik moet een fietskar of iets dergelijks lenen. Ik heb een fietsstoeltje.  
19 Answer Hoe ben je droog gebleven in deze regen? Ik heb een grote paraplu.  
19 Declination Je mag mijn regenjas wel lenen. Ik heb een grote paraplu.  
19 Pre-offer Ik had echt mijn regenjas mee moeten nemen 
vandaag. 
Ik heb een grote paraplu.  
20 Answer Waar ga je al deze pizza's laten? Ik heb een grote vriezer.   
20 Declination Ik kan de pizza's in mijn koelkast leggen voor 
je. 
Ik heb een grote vriezer. 
20 Pre-offer Ik heb geen ruimte in mijn koelkast voor alle 
pizza's. 
Ik heb een grote vriezer. 
21 Answer Waar ga je de slaapbank neerzetten?  Ik heb een grote 
woonkamer. 
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21 Declination We kunnen het feest bij mij houden als je 
appartement te klein is. 
Ik heb een grote 
woonkamer. 
21 Pre-offer Ik wil een feestje geven, maar mijn 
appartement is te klein. 
Ik heb een grote 
woonkamer. 
22 Answer Hoe kun je zien wat voor vogels het zijn? Ik heb een verrekijker. 
22 Declination Ik kan wel wat dichterbij rijden zodat we de 
vogels beter kunnen zien. 
Ik heb een verrekijker. 
22 Pre-offer Ik zou willen dat we de vogels beter konden 
zien. 
Ik heb een verrekijker. 
23 Answer Hoe ga je voor het ticket betalen? Ik heb een creditcard. 
23 Declination Ik kan je wat geld lenen voor het ticket. Ik heb een creditcard. 
23 Pre-offer Ik heb geen geld om het ticket te betalen. Ik heb een creditcard. 
24 Answer Hoe ga je kamperen in de zomer? Ik heb een tent. 
24 Declination Je mag onze caravan lenen als je wilt. Ik heb een tent. 
24 Pre-offer Ik moet kampeerspullen kopen. Ik heb een tent. 
25 Answer Wat gebruik je om het schilderij mee op te 
hangen? 
Ik heb een boormachine. 
25 Declination Zal ik iets brengen om het schilderij mee op te 
hangen?  
Ik heb een boormachine. 
25 Pre-offer Ik moet iets vinden om het schilderij mee op 
te hangen. 
Ik heb een boormachine. 
26 Answer Hoe heb je deze krachtoefeningen geleerd? Mijn zus is fitnesstrainer. 
26 Declination Ik kan je wat krachtoefeningen laten zien. Mijn zus is fitnesstrainer. 
26 Pre-offer Ik moet wat goede krachtoefeningen leren. Mijn zus is fitnesstrainer. 
27 Answer Hoe zorg je dat alles droog blijft op je 
tuinfeest?  
Ik heb een partytent. 
27 Declination Ik kan je wel een waterdichte parasol lenen 
voor je tuinfeest.  
Ik heb een partytent. 
27 Pre-offer Ik wil een tuinfeest geven maar het gaat 
misschien regenen. 
Ik heb een partytent. 
28 Answer Waar ga je het vuur mee aansteken? Ik heb lucifers.  
28 Declination Zal ik een grote aansteker meebrengen voor de 
barbecue? 
Ik heb lucifers.  
28 Pre-offer Ik heb mijn aansteker thuis laten liggen. Ik heb lucifers.  
29 Answer Hoe ben je van je allergie afgekomen? Ik heb goede 
hooikoortstabletten. 
29 Declination We kunnen wel binnen eten als je allergisch 
bent? 
Ik heb goede 
hooikoortstabletten. 
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29 Pre-offer Ik denk dat ik allergisch voor iets ben. Ik heb goede 
hooikoortstabletten. 
30 Answer Hoe ben je van plan je spullen te gaan 
verhuizen? 
Ik heb een auto.  
30 Declination Ik kan je wel helpen verhuizen met mijn 
bakfiets. 
Ik heb een auto.  
30 Pre-offer Ik moet uitzoeken hoe ik mijn spullen kan 
verhuizen. 
Ik heb een auto.  
31 Answer Wat doe je allemaal naast je studie?  Ik werk momenteel als 
barman. 
31 Declination Heb je zin om mee te gaan naar het theater 
vanavond?  
Ik werk momenteel als 
barman. 
31 Pre-offer Mijn moeder zoekt mensen die kunnen 
bedienen op haar feest. 
Ik werk momenteel als 
barman. 
32 Answer Wat voor een fiets gebruik je voor de 
fietstocht? 
Ik heb een mountainbike.  
32 Declination Wil je mijn fiets lenen voor de fietstocht? Ik heb een mountainbike.  
32 Pre-offer Ik zoek een sportieve fiets voor de fietstocht. Ik heb een mountainbike.  
33 Answer Wat doe je in je thee?  Ik heb honing.  
33 Declination Ik zal wat suiker voor je thee halen. Ik heb honing.  
33 Pre-offer Deze kop thee is te bitter. Ik heb honing.  
34 Answer Wat is je bestemming in de Verenigde Staten? Ik ga naar New York. 
34 Declination Je kan me in mei komen bezoeken in Berlijn. Ik ga naar New York. 
34 Pre-offer De camera die ik wil hebben is veel goedkoper 
in de Verenigde Staten. 
Ik ga naar New York. 
35 Answer Waarom ben je eigenlijk zo geïnteresseerd in 
auto's? 
Mijn broer is automonteur.  
35 Declination Misschien kan ik je auto repareren? Mijn broer is automonteur.  
35 Pre-offer Ik moet mijn auto laten repareren. Mijn broer is automonteur.  
36 Answer Waar wil je zometeen lunchen? Ik ga naar de kantine. 
36 Declination Zal ik wat te eten voor je kopen?  Ik ga naar de kantine. 
36 Pre-offer Ik ben vergeten om drinken te kopen. Ik ga naar de kantine. 
37 Answer Hoeveel contant geld is er nog over? Ik heb honderd euro. 
37 Declination Ik kan je geld lenen als je dat nodig hebt. Ik heb honderd euro. 
37 Pre-offer Ik ben vergeten geld te pinnen. Ik heb honderd euro. 
38 Answer Wat wil je doen vanmiddag? Ik ga basketballen. 
38 Declination Wil je mee naar de bioscoop vanavond? Ik ga basketballen. 
38 Pre-offer Ik moet echt sporten vandaag. Ik ga basketballen. 
39 Answer Wat wil je vanavond doen? Ik ga naar de bioscoop. 
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39 Declination Heb je zin om met ons naar het feest te gaan?  Ik ga naar de bioscoop. 
39 Pre-offer Ik wil vanavond een film kijken of zoiets. Ik ga naar de bioscoop. 
40 Answer Hoe ben je op internet gekomen?  Ik heb een smartphone.   
40 Declination Ik kan het adres voor je vinden op internet. Ik heb een smartphone.   
40 Pre-offer Ik moet ergens internettoegang vinden. Ik heb een smartphone.   
41 Answer Wat voor drank is er vanavond?  Ik heb een krat bier.  
41 Declination Ik kan wel wat drinken halen voor vanavond?  Ik heb een krat bier.  
41 Pre-offer Ik ben helemaal vergeten drank te halen.  Ik heb een krat bier.  
42 Answer Wat zijn je plannen voor het komende 
weekend? 
Ik ga naar een popfestival. 
42 Declination Ik kan een kaartje voor je regelen voor het 
concert van komend weekend. 
Ik ga naar een popfestival. 
42 Pre-offer Ik heb zin om volgend weekend naar een 
concert te gaan.  
Ik ga naar een popfestival. 
43 Answer Wat heb je besloten over de nieuwe woning? Ik verhuis naar Lent. 
43 Declination We kunnen het appartement in het centrum 
van Nijmegen wel delen. 
Ik verhuis naar Lent. 
43 Pre-offer Ik werk in Nijmegen, maar ik ken niemand in 
de buurt.  
Ik verhuis naar Lent. 
44 Answer Wat ben je van plan in juli?  Ik ga dan op vakantie. 
44 Declination Kom je op mijn feest  in juli?  Ik ga dan op vakantie. 
44 Pre-offer Ik zoek een kamer voor een paar weken in juli. Ik ga dan op vakantie. 
45 Answer Waarom heb je nog een Labrador genomen? Ik hou van honden. 
45 Declination Zal ik de Labrador in zijn hok stoppen zodat 
hij je niet irriteert? 
Ik hou van honden. 
45 Pre-offer Ik moet iemand vinden die voor mijn Labrador 
kan zorgen. 
Ik hou van honden. 
46 Answer Waar wil je nu naar toe? Ik ga naar de Coop. 
46 Declination Wil je mee naar het park? Ik ga naar de Coop. 
46 Pre-offer Ik heb zin in cola. Ik ga naar de Coop. 
47 Answer Hoeveel golfclubs heb je nu?   Ik heb een complete 
golfset.  
47 Declination Je kunt een golfclub van mij lenen. Ik heb een complete 
golfset.  
47 Pre-offer Ik zal wat golfclubs moeten lenen op de baan. Ik heb een complete 
golfset.  
48 Answer Hoe ga je de website maken? Ik kan programmeren. 
48 Declination Ik kan de website voor je maken.   Ik kan programmeren. 
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48 Pre-offer Ik moet iemand vinden om de website te 
maken. 
Ik kan programmeren. 
49 Answer Hoe ga je van je slechte adem afkomen?  Ik heb kauwgom. 
49 Declination Probeer deze pepermuntjes eens.  Ik heb kauwgom. 
49 Pre-offer Ik stink echt uit mijn mond.  Ik heb kauwgom. 
50 Answer Hoe ben jij zo goed geworden in het 
analyseren van data? 
Ik heb een goed 
statistiekboek.  
50 Declination Heb je mischien hulp nodig met je data-
analyse?  
Ik heb een goed 
statistiekboek.  
50 Pre-offer Ik ben helaas niet goed in data-analyse. Ik heb een goed 
statistiekboek.  
51 Answer Wat doe je tegen de pijn in je schouders? Ik heb sterke pijnstillers.  
51 Declination Ik kan je wel een massage geven als je 
schouders zo zeer doen? 
Ik heb sterke pijnstillers.  
51 Pre-offer Mijn schouders doen erg zeer, ik kan wel een 
massage of zoiets gebruiken. 
Ik heb sterke pijnstillers.  
52 Answer Hoe is het je gelukt om zoveel vis te vangen? Ik heb een goede hengel. 
52 Declination Als je graag wil vissen kan ik je visspullen 
lenen. 
Ik heb een goede hengel. 
52 Pre-offer Ik wil graag vissen maar ik heb geen 
visspullen. 
Ik heb een goede hengel. 
53 Answer Waarop slaapt je broer vanavond? Ik heb een oude slaapbank. 
53 Declination Je mag mijn logeerbed wel lenen. Ik heb een oude slaapbank. 
53 Pre-offer Ik zoek een goedkoop bed. Ik heb een oude slaapbank. 
54 Answer Welke vreemde taal spreek je naast Engels? Ik kan een beetje Duits.  
54 Declination Ik kan de brief uit München voor je lezen. Ik kan een beetje Duits.  
54 Pre-offer Ik begrijp niks van deze brief uit München. Ik kan een beetje Duits.  
55 Answer Wat ga je dit weekend doen? Ik heb zaterdag een feestje.   
55 Declination Wil je dit weekend met ons uitgaan?  Ik heb zaterdag een feestje.   
55 Pre-offer Ik wil graag uitgaan maar de clubs hier zijn zo 
saai.  
Ik heb zaterdag een feestje.   
56 Answer Hoe is het je gelukt om de Duitse vertaling te 
maken? 
Mijn vriendin is Duits. 
56 Declination Ik kan een Duitser voor je vinden die de 
vertaling kan maken. 
Mijn vriendin is Duits. 
56 Pre-offer Ik moet een Duitser zien te vinden die de 
vertaling voor me kan maken. 
Mijn vriendin is Duits. 
57 Answer Hoe ga je de tijden van de wedstrijd 
bijhouden? 
Ik heb een stopwatch. 
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57 Declination Ik kan de tijden van de wedstrijd bijhouden. Ik heb een stopwatch. 
57 Pre-offer Ik moet de tijden van de wedstrijd bijhouden. Ik heb een stopwatch. 
58 Answer Hoe weet je hoeveel houtskool je moet 
gebruiken? 
Ik heb al vaak 
gebarbecued. 
58 Declination Ik kan je helpen met het aansteken van de 
houtskool. 
Ik heb al vaak 
gebarbecued. 
58 Pre-offer Ik moet uitvinden hoeveel houtskool ik moet 
gebruiken. 
Ik heb al vaak 
gebarbecued. 
59 Answer Hoe ga je je muziek laten horen op het feest?  Ik heb goede boxen. 
59 Declination Je mag mijn koptelefoon wel lenen, die klinkt 
geweldig. 
Ik heb goede boxen. 
59 Pre-offer Ik kan de muziek alleen op mijn computer 
afspelen.  
Ik heb goede boxen. 
60 Answer Welke teamsport voer je uit?  Ik zit in een voetbalteam. 
60 Declination Je kunt meedoen in ons basketballteam?  Ik zit in een voetbalteam. 
60 Pre-offer Ik wil graag meedoen met een teamsport. Ik zit in een voetbalteam. 
61 Answer Hoe ga je voor het diner betalen? Ik heb contant geld. 
61 Declination Ik kan het diner voor je betalen. Ik heb contant geld. 
61 Pre-offer Ik ben mijn portemonnee vergeten. Ik heb contant geld. 
62 Answer Hoe is je rijexamen gegaan? Ik ben geslaagd. 
62 Declination Ik kan je wel helpen met de voorbreiding op je 
rijexamen. 
Ik ben geslaagd. 
62 Pre-offer Ik zoek iemand die zijn rijexamen heeft 
gehaald.   
Ik ben geslaagd. 
63 Answer Hoe kan het dat je zoveel weet over Japan? Ik heb een vriend uit 
Tokyo.  
63 Declination Ik kan je voorstellen aan iemand die Japans 
met je kan oefenen. 
Ik heb een vriend uit 
Tokyo.  
63 Pre-offer Ik moet een Japanner interviewen. Ik heb een vriend uit 
Tokyo.  
64 Answer Hoe ben je op het idee gekomen om in een 
kapsalon te werken? 
Mijn moeder is haarstylist. 
64 Declination Ik kan korting voor je regelen bij mijn 
kapsalon. 
Mijn moeder is haarstylist. 
64 Pre-offer Ik moet een goede kapsalon vinden. Mijn moeder is haarstylist. 
65 Answer Wat eet je vanavond? Ik maak pizza.  
65 Declination Heb je zin om vanavond friet te eten?  Ik maak pizza.  
65 Pre-offer Ik wil vanavond iets lekkers eten. Ik maak pizza.  
66 Answer Waar koop je je shampoo? Ik ga naar de Kruidvat.  
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66 Declination Ik kan wel shampoo voor je meenemen? Ik ga naar de Kruidvat.  
66 Pre-offer Mijn shampoo is op. Ik ga naar de Kruidvat.  
67 Answer Hoe houd jij de boekhouding toch zo goed op 
orde? 
Mijn broer is accountant.  
67 Declination Ik kan je helpen met de boekhouding.  Mijn broer is accountant.  
67 Pre-offer Ik heb wat hulp nodig met mijn boekhouding. Mijn broer is accountant.  
68 Answer Waarom ben je je nu aan het omkleden? Ik ga vanavond naar een 
concert. 
68 Declination Wil je bij me komen eten? Ik ga vanavond naar een 
concert. 
68 Pre-offer Ik wil vandaag iets leuks gaan doen. Ik ga vanavond naar een 
concert. 
69 Answer Hoe oefen je met zingen? Ik zit in een gezellig koor. 
69 Declination Je kunt meezingen met onze sanggroep.  Ik zit in een gezellig koor. 
69 Pre-offer Ik wil weer met anderen gaan zingen. Ik zit in een gezellig koor. 
70 Answer Wat heb je besloten over de Vierdaagse? Ik ben al ingeschreven.  
70 Declination Ik kan je de informatie over de Vierdaagse 
toesturen. 
Ik ben al ingeschreven.  
70 Pre-offer Ik hoop dat iemand met me mee wil lopen in 
de Vierdaagse. 
Ik ben al ingeschreven.  
71 Answer Wat doe jij vandaag met deze prachtige zon?  Ik ga naar het strand.  
71 Declination Wil je met ons mee gaan zonnen in het park? Ik ga naar het strand.  
71 Pre-offer Ik wil zonnen nu het zo’n prachtig weer is. Ik ga naar het strand.  
72 Answer Wat wil je drinken?  Ik neem een grote Spa 
Blauw. 
72 Declination Je mag mijn glas water hebben. Ik neem een grote Spa 
Blauw. 
72 Pre-offer Ik ben vergeten om water te vragen. Ik neem een grote Spa 
Blauw. 
73 Answer Waarom heb je zoveel gehakt gekocht? Ik maak vanavond lasagne. 
73 Declination Zal ik een pizza bestellen en langsbrengen? Ik maak vanavond lasagne. 
73 Pre-offer Ik heb zin in echt goed Italiaans eten. Ik maak vanavond lasagne. 
74 Answer Waar wil je naar toe in België? Ik ga naar Brussel. 
74 Declination Ik kan wat goede chocola voor je meenemen 
uit België. 
Ik ga naar Brussel. 
74 Pre-offer Ik zou graag wat echte Belgische chocola 
willen kopen.  
Ik ga naar Brussel. 
75 Answer Hoe kreeg je die Hollandaisesaus zo perfect? Ik heb een goed recept. 
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75 Declination Zal ik je helpen om een perfecte Hollandaise 
saus te maken? 
Ik heb een goed recept. 
75 Pre-offer Ik weet niet hoe ik perfecte Hollandaisesaus 
moet maken. 
Ik heb een goed recept. 
76 Answer Wat voor melk heb je om in de koffie te doen? Ik heb sojamelk. 
76 Declination Hier is wat melk voor in je koffie. Ik heb sojamelk. 
76 Pre-offer Ik kan geen gewone melk drinken in mijn 
koffie. 
Ik heb sojamelk. 
77 Answer Waar ga je de lasagne in doen? Ik heb een grote 
ovenschaal. 
77 Declination Ik kan je een bak lenen voor de lasagne.  Ik heb een grote 
ovenschaal. 
77 Pre-offer We hebben geen bak voor de lasagne. Ik heb een grote 
ovenschaal. 
78 Answer Waar ga je al je spullen in stoppen? Ik heb een grote koffer. 
78 Declination Als je spullen niet in je koffer passen, dan kan 
ik je er een lenen.  
Ik heb een grote koffer. 
78 Pre-offer Ik weet niet of alle spullen in mijn koffer 
passen. 
Ik heb een grote koffer. 
79 Answer Hoe ken je al deze fitnessoefeningen?  Ik heb een fitness DVD. 
79 Declination Je mag mijn boek met fitnessoefeningen wel 
lenen. 
Ik heb een fitness DVD. 
79 Pre-offer Ik moet eens wat nieuwe fitnessoefeningen 
uitproberen. 
Ik heb een fitness DVD. 
80 Answer Wat ben je vandaag van plan te doen? Ik ga nu shoppen.  
80 Declination Wil je langskomen om een film te kijken? Ik ga nu shoppen.  
80 Pre-offer Ik wil echt graag de nieuwe kledingwinkel 
zien. 
Ik ga nu shoppen.  
81 Answer Hoe ga je alles naar huis dragen? Ik heb een grote fietstas. 
81 Declination Laat mij wat voor je naar huis dragen. Ik heb een grote fietstas. 
81 Pre-offer Ik kan niet alles naar huis dragen. Ik heb een grote fietstas. 
82 Answer Hoe kunnen jouw nagels toch altijd zo mooi 
zijn?   
Mijn zus heeft een 
nagelstudio. 
82 Declination Ik kan je wel een nagelbehandeling geven. Mijn zus heeft een 
nagelstudio. 
82 Pre-offer Ik wil echt een nagelbehandeling. Mijn zus heeft een 
nagelstudio. 
83 Answer Wat voor toetje eten we vanavond? Ik heb aardbeienvla. 
83 Declination Zal ik een toetje meenemen voor vanavond?   Ik heb aardbeienvla. 
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83 Pre-offer Ik ben vergeten een toetje te kopen voor 
vanavond.  
Ik heb aardbeienvla. 
84 Answer Waar doe je de boodschappen voor het 
avondeten? 
Ik ga naar de markt. 
84 Declination Zal ik zoete aardappelen voor je meenemen?  Ik ga naar de markt. 
84 Pre-offer Ik heb geen zoete aardappelen gevonden in de 
winkels.  
Ik ga naar de markt. 
85 Answer Hoe weet je wat er in de mode is? Ik werk in een 
kledingwinkel. 
85 Declination Ik kan je wat tips geven over wat er in de 
mode is.  
Ik werk in een 
kledingwinkel. 
85 Pre-offer Ik wil iets nieuws kopen, maar ik weet niet 
wat er in de mode is. 
Ik werk in een 
kledingwinkel. 
86 Answer Hoe ben je toch zo veel afgevallen? Ik ben begonnen aan een 
nieuw dieet. 
86 Declination Ik zal je morgen de cake laten proeven. Ik ben begonnen aan een 
nieuw dieet. 
86 Pre-offer Ik zoek een methode om af te vallen die echt 
werkt. 
Ik ben begonnen aan een 
nieuw dieet. 
87 Answer Hoe komt het dat jij zo goed met kinderen om 
kunt gaan? 
Ik heb een klein broertje.  
87 Declination Heb je hulp nodig bij het oppassen op je 
nichtje?  
Ik heb een klein broertje.  
87 Pre-offer Ik moet op mijn nichtje passen, maar ik weet 
totaal niet wat ik moet doen. 
Ik heb een klein broertje.  
88 Answer Waarom heb je het gegrilde vlees niet 
geprobeerd?  
Ik ben vegetariër. 
88 Declination Zal ik wat vlees meenemen om te grillen? Ik ben vegetariër. 
88 Pre-offer Ik wil meer recepten met groenten leren.  Ik ben vegetariër. 
89 Answer Wat ga je aandoen als het koud wordt? Ik heb een sjaal.  
89 Declination Als je het koud hebt mag je mijn trui wel 
lenen. 
Ik heb een sjaal.  
89 Pre-offer Ik had mijn trui moeten meebrengen. Ik heb een sjaal.  
90 Answer Wat doe je in de salade?  Ik heb wat sladressing. 
90 Declination Ik kan olijfolie halen voor de salade. Ik heb wat sladressing. 
90 Pre-offer Er zit niet zoveel smaak aan mijn salade. Ik heb wat sladressing. 
91 Answer Wat voor snacks ben je aan het eten? Ik heb nootjes.  
91 Declination Zal ik wat chips voor je kopen onderweg? Ik heb nootjes.  
91 Pre-offer Ik wou dat ik wat snacks had meegenomen. Ik heb nootjes.  
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92 Answer Welke Japanse gerechten kun je bereiden? Ik maak zelf sushi. 
92 Declination Zal ik eten afhalen bij het Japanse restaurant? Ik maak zelf sushi. 
92 Pre-offer Helaas is er hier geen Japans restaurant. Ik maak zelf sushi. 
93 Answer Waarom wil je geen wijn of bier?  Ik ben zwanger. 
93 Declination Wil je een glas wijn of een biertje? Ik ben zwanger. 
93 Pre-offer Ik wil me gaan bezighouden met babyfoto's. Ik ben zwanger. 
94 Answer Wat gebruik je om de soep te pureren? Ik heb een staafmixer.  
94 Declination Ik kan je mijn blender wel lenen om de soep te 
pureren.  
Ik heb een staafmixer.  
94 Pre-offer Ik moet een apparaat vinden om de soep te 
pureren.  
Ik heb een staafmixer.  
95 Answer Wat doe je deze zomer in je vakantie? Ik ga naar Rome. 
95 Declination Ik kan wat goede kaas voor je meenemen uit 
Italië. 
Ik ga naar Rome. 
95 Pre-offer Ik zoek Italiaanse kaas maar het is lastig te 
krijgen.  
Ik ga naar Rome. 
96 Answer Hoe ga je in Wenen het hotel vinden? Ik heb een 
navigatiesysteem. 
96 Declination Ik kan je een kaart van Wenen geven. Ik heb een 
navigatiesysteem. 
96 Pre-offer Ik ben bang om in Wenen te verdwalen. Ik heb een 
navigatiesysteem. 
97 Answer Hoe ben je van plan op het feestje te komen in 
deze regen?  
Ik ga met de auto. 
97 Declination Ik kan je wel even met de fiets naar het feestje 
brengen. 
Ik ga met de auto. 
97 Pre-offer Ik heb geen zin om in de regen naar het feestje 
te fietsen.  
Ik ga met de auto. 
98 Answer Hoe ga je voor iedereen een zitplaats regelen?  Ik heb meerdere 
klapstoelen. 
98 Declination Wil je dat ik een paar grote zitkussens 
meebreng?  
Ik heb meerdere 
klapstoelen. 
98 Pre-offer Ik denk niet dat er voldoende zitplaatsen zijn. Ik heb meerdere 
klapstoelen. 
99 Answer Waarom ben je niet met de fiets?  Ik woon vlakbij. 
99 Declination Zal ik je een lift naar huis geven? Ik woon vlakbij. 
99 Pre-offer Ik ben te moe om naar huis te fietsen. Ik woon vlakbij. 
100 Answer Wat ben je van plan aankomende zaterdag te 
doen? 
Ik ga naar de IKEA. 
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100 Declination Wil je mee met de fietstocht zaterdag? Ik ga naar de IKEA. 
100 Pre-offer Ik moet een paar dingen voor mijn huis kopen. Ik ga naar de IKEA. 
101 Answer Wat is je volgende bestemming in Amerika? Ik ga deze maand naar 
Boston. 
101 Declination Ik zal wat Amerikaans snoep voor je 
meebrengen. 
Ik ga deze maand naar 
Boston. 
101 Pre-offer Ik mis echt het Amerikaanse snoep. Ik ga deze maand naar 
Boston. 
102 Answer Wat voor lekkers is er voor het feestje?   Ik heb nog wat chocola. 
102 Declination Je mag wel een stuk van mijn cake hebben. Ik heb nog wat chocola. 
102 Pre-offer Ik wou dat we iets zoets hadden gekocht. Ik heb nog wat chocola. 
103 Answer Wat ben je aan het drinken? Ik heb nog wat wijn. 
103 Declination Ik zal wat bier voor je halen. Ik heb nog wat wijn. 
103 Pre-offer Ik heb zin in iets te drinken. Ik heb nog wat wijn. 
104 Answer Waar wil je een hamburger kopen?  Ik ga naar McDonald's. 
104 Declination Ik kan wel een hamburger voor je maken. Ik ga naar McDonald's. 
104 Pre-offer Ik heb echt zin in een hamburger. Ik ga naar McDonald's. 
105 Answer Wat voor frisdrank is er?  Ik heb cola.  
105 Declination Zal ik frisdrank voor je kopen?  Ik heb cola.  
105 Pre-offer Ik had frisdrank moeten halen. Ik heb cola.  
106 Answer Wat zit er in je tas?   Ik heb zonnebrandcrème. 
106 Declination Zal ik de parasol voor je opzetten? Ik heb zonnebrandcrème. 
106 Pre-offer Ik voel dat mijn rug begint te verbranden. Ik heb zonnebrandcrème. 
107 Answer Waar doe jij je boodschapppen?  Ik ga naar de Albert Heijn.  
107 Declination Wil je de film samen met ons kijken? Ik ga naar de Albert Heijn.  
107 Pre-offer Ik heb een paar dingen voor het avondeten 
nodig. 
Ik ga naar de Albert Heijn.  
108 Answer Wat voor eten is er in huis? Ik heb nog koekjes. 
108 Declination Ik kan speculaas meebrengen. Ik heb nog koekjes. 
108 Pre-offer Ik heb zin in iets zoets. Ik heb nog koekjes. 
109 Answer Hoe ga je je band plakken? Ik heb een reparatiesetje. 
109 Declination Ik kan iets brengen om je band te plakken.  Ik heb een reparatiesetje. 
109 Pre-offer Ik moet mijn band plakken. Ik heb een reparatiesetje. 
110 Answer Welk beleg is er voor op de broodjes? Ik heb salami. 
110 Declination Ik kan rauwe ham gaan halen voor op je 
broodje.  
Ik heb salami. 
110 Pre-offer Er is geen beleg voor op mijn broodje. Ik heb salami. 
111 Answer Hoe wil je thuiskomen zonder je fiets? Ik ga met de taxi.  
111 Declination Je mag mijn fiets lenen als je wilt. Ik ga met de taxi.  
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111 Pre-offer Ik wil echt niet naar huis fietsen. Ik ga met de taxi.  
112 Answer Hoe ga je vannacht slapen zonder 
verwarming? 
Ik heb een extra dekbed. 
112 Declination Je kunt mijn slaapzak morgen lenen voor je 
vriend. 
Ik heb een extra dekbed. 
112 Pre-offer Ik had het koud vannacht want de verwarming 
was kapot. 
Ik heb een extra dekbed. 
113 Answer Hoe komt het dat het hier zo lekker fris ruikt? Ik heb mijn kamer gisteren 
schoongemaakt. 
113 Declination Ik kan morgen met wat reinigingsmiddelen 
langskomen. 
Ik heb mijn kamer gisteren 
schoongemaakt. 
113 Pre-offer Mijn huis is zo'n puinhoop, daar kunnen we 
niet heen. 
Ik heb mijn kamer gisteren 
schoongemaakt. 
114 Answer Wat voor sla is er voor in de salade? Ik heb rucola. 
114 Declination Zal ik wat sla voor de salade meebrengen? Ik heb rucola. 
114 Pre-offer Ik ben vergeten sla mee te brengen voor mijn 
salade. 
Ik heb rucola. 
115 Answer Wat is er te drinken?  Ik heb koffie. 
115 Declination Zal ik een kop thee voor je maken? Ik heb koffie. 
115 Pre-offer Ik kan nu wel wat warms gebruiken.  Ik heb koffie. 
116 Answer Wat is er te eten bij je barbecue?  Ik heb een hoop vlees.  
116 Declination Zal ik wat worstjes meenemen naar je 
barbecue? 
Ik heb een hoop vlees.  
116 Pre-offer Ik ben vergeten iets voor de barbecue te 
kopen. 
Ik heb een hoop vlees.  
117 Answer Waar ga je de barbecue neerzetten?  Ik heb een grote tuin. 
117 Declination Als je niet genoeg ruimte hebt kunnen we bij 
mij barbecueën. 
Ik heb een grote tuin. 
117 Pre-offer We hebben geen balkon, dus ik kan niet 
barbecueën. 
Ik heb een grote tuin. 
118 Answer Hoe ben je zo snel hersteld van je blessure? Mijn vrouw is 
fysiotherapeute. 
118 Declination Ik kan je enkele goede oefeningen laten zien 
voor je blessure. 
Mijn vrouw is 
fysiotherapeute. 
118 Pre-offer I moet behandeld worden voor mijn blessure. Mijn vrouw is 
fysiotherapeute. 
119 Answer Wat doet je partner voor de kost?  Mijn vriendin is zangeres.  
119 Declination Ik zou wel in je band kunnen zingen op het 
concert.  
Mijn vriendin is zangeres.  
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119 Pre-offer We hebben iemand nodig die op het concert 
kan zingen. 
Mijn vriendin is zangeres.  
120 Answer Hoe ga je de bladzijden bij elkaar houden? Ik heb wat paperclips. 
120 Declination Ik zal mijn nietmachine voor je halen. Ik heb wat paperclips. 
120 Pre-offer De nietmachine werkt niet erg goed. Ik heb wat paperclips. 
121 Answer Wanneer neem je vrij deze zomer?  Ik heb volgende week 
vakantie.  
121 Declination Heb je zin om op kantoor te lunchen na dit 
weekend?  
Ik heb volgende week 
vakantie.  
121 Pre-offer Ik wil snel een dagtrip naar Amsterdam 
maken. 
Ik heb volgende week 
vakantie.  
122 Answer Waarom kun je niet naar het feest? Ik ga vanavond studeren. 
122 Declination Heb je zin om een film te kijken?  Ik ga vanavond studeren. 
122 Pre-offer Ik wil met iemand oefenen voor het examen.  Ik ga vanavond studeren. 
123 Answer Wat is je plan voor vandaag? Ik ga wandelen. 
123 Declination Wil je met ons mee naar het strand? Ik ga wandelen. 
123 Pre-offer Ik moet wat meer bewegen. Ik ga wandelen. 
124 Answer Waar gaat je suz logeren deze winter?  Ik heb een lege kamer. 
124 Declination Je zus kan wel in mijn huis logeren. Ik heb een lege kamer. 
124 Pre-offer Ik moet een logeeradres vinden voor de 
winter. 
Ik heb een lege kamer. 
125 Answer Waar ben je van plan de fietslampjes te 
kopen? 
Ik ga vanmiddag naar de 
HEMA. 
125 Declination Zal ik nieuwe fietslampjes voor je kopen? Ik ga vanmiddag naar de 
HEMA. 
125 Pre-offer Ik moet echt nieuwe fietslampjes kopen. Ik ga vanmiddag naar de 
HEMA. 
126 Answer Wat ga je gebruiken om het handvat te 
maken?  
Ik heb superlijm. 
126 Declination Ik kan iets meebrengen om het handvat te 
maken. 
Ik heb superlijm. 
126 Pre-offer Ik moet iets kopen om het handvat te maken. Ik heb superlijm. 
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9 Samenvatting 
Taalhandelingen (speech acts) zijn verbale acties zoals verzoeken, plagerijen en 
complimenten (Schegloff, 1996; Searle, 1975). Deelnemers aan een gesprek 
moeten deze acties kunnen herkennen om communicatie succesvol te laten 
verlopen. Het herkennen van taalhandelingen is verre van eenvoudig, aangezien 
verbale uitingen vaak niet aangeven welke actie er wordt uitgevoerd (Levinson, 
2013; Searle, 1975). De uitdaging voor luisteraars wordt nog verder vergroot 
door de buitengewoon snelle beurtwisselingen in een gesprek (De Ruiter, 
Mitterer, & Enfield, 2006; Stivers et al., 2009), waardoor er maar beperkte tijd 
overblijft om de actie te herkennen en een relevante respons te plannen 
(Levinson, 2013). 
 De doelstelling van dit proefschrift was het onderzoeken van het 
tijdsverloop van de herkenning van taalhandelingen in gesproken, natuurlijke 
dialogen binnen een nieuw kader dat bruggen legt tussen methoden van 
cognitieve neurowetenschappen en onderzoek naar conversationele interactie. 
Het hoofddoel was het testen van de hypothese dat taalhandelingen vroegtijdig 
in verbale uitingen worden herkend, wat snelle en efficiënte beurtwisseling 
faciliteert. Een tweede doel was het onderzoeken hoe de herkenning van 
taalhandelingen wordt gemoduleerd door de soort actie die wordt uitgevoerd en 
hoe dit past in de grotere actiesequentie.  
 Er is een experimenteel paradigma ontwikkeld dat zich richt op deze 
problemen. Het omvat gesproken mini-dialogen met doeluitingen (bijv. Ik heb 
een creditcard) die afhankelijk van de voorgaande beurt drie afzonderlijke 
taalhandelingen uitvoeren – Antwoorden, Afwijzingen, Pre-verzoeken (pre-
offer). De doeluitingen zijn identiek in alle condities (en specificeren dus geen 
actie), maar de contexten verschillen wel in de soort taalhandeling die wordt 
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uitgevoerd. De Antwoordconditie bevat een vraag-antwoord sequentie (Hoe ga je 
voor het ticket betalen? – IK HEB EEN CREDITCARD). De Afwijzingconditie 
bestaat uit een aanbod, gevolgd door een afwijzing (Ik kan je wat geld lenen voor 
het ticket. – IK HEB EEN CREDITCARD). De Pre-verzoekconditie bevat een 
aankondiging van een probleem, gevolgd door een aanzet tot een aanbod; dit 
wordt in conversatie-analyse een pre-verzoek (pre-offer) genoemd (Schegloff, 
1988, 2007) (Ik heb geen geld om het ticket te betalen. – IK HEB EEN 
CREDITCARD). Afwijzingen en Pre-verzoeken (de cruciale condities) hebben met 
elkaar gemeen dat ze indirecter zijn dan Antwoorden (de controleconditie) 
aangezien ze meer inferenties vereisen om begrepen te worden, maar ze 
verschillen in hun relatie tot de voorgaande en komende beurten in een gesprek. 
Afwijzingen komen voor in zeer specifieke contexten, waarbij ze een tweede 
paardeel (second pair part) zijn van een aangrenzend paar (adjacency pair) 
(Schegloff, 2007), en zijn daarom relatief anticipeerbaar. Pre-verzoeken, echter, 
komen voor in minder specifieke contexten aangezien ze een nieuwe 
actiesequentie initiëren, en daarom minder voorspelbaar zijn. 
 Na de introductie van het onderzoeksveld en de beschrijving van de 
methodologie in Hoofdstuk 1, beschrijft Hoofdstuk 2 gedragsbevindingen van 
een 'self-paced' leestaak en een begripstaak. Het doel van het gedragsexperiment 
was tweevoudig. Het onderzoeken hoe betrouwbaar deelnemers de 
taalhandeling kunnen categoriseren van zinnen die geen actie specificeren 
(begripstaak), en het verkrijgen van een grove schatting van het tijdsverloop van 
de herkenning van taalhandelingen zoals gereflecteerd wordt in self-paced 
leestijden. De contextuitingen van de hierboven beschreven mini-dialogen 
werden auditief gepresenteerd, gevolgd door geschreven versies van de 
doeluitingen. Deze werden gepresenteerd via een self-paced leestaak. Dat wil 
zeggen dat proefpersonen de uitingen woord-voor-woord op het scherm kregen 
en zelf met een drukknop konden bepalen wanneer het volgende woord op het 
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scherm kwam. De resultaten van een actiecategorisatietaak laten zien dat 
deelnemers acties zeer nauwkeurig kunnen categoriseren (95,8%), gebaseerd op 
alleen de voorgaande actie. De leestijden suggereren dat de herkenning van 
taalhandelingen in de visuele modaliteit relatief vroeg in de doeluiting begint, 
namelijk bij het eerste woord of het werkwoord, maar ook dat late verwerking 
aan het eind van de zin wellicht vereist is. 
 Hoofdstuk 3 maakt gebruik van de excellente temporele resolutie van 
event-related brain potentials (ERPs) om het tijdsverloop van de herkenning van 
taalhandelingen in gesproken dialogen te volgen. Hoe snel kunnen luisteraars 
taalhandelingen die geen actie specificeren herkennen in de auditieve 
modaliteit? Hoe beïnvloedt de sequentiële context dit proces? Het ERP 
experiment dat wordt gepresenteerd in Hoofdstuk 3 gebruikt de gesproken 
versies van de dialogen in Hoofdstuk 2 en dezelfde actiecategorisatietaak. 
Hoofdstuk 3 identificeert drie ERP effecten gerelateerd aan taalhandelingen: een 
vroege fronto-temporale positiviteit in de rechterhersenhelft vanaf 200 
milliseconden na de aanvang van de verbale uiting bij Pre-verzoeken en vanaf 
400 millieseconden bij Afwijzingen (relatief tot Antwoorden); een iets latere 
frontale links/middenlijn positiviteit bij Afwijzingen (relatief tot Antwoorden); 
en een late, posterieure negativiteit bij het laatste woord van de verbale uiting 
bij Pre-verzoeken (relatief tot Antwoorden en Afwijzingen). De vroege 
positiviteiten geven aan dat gesproken herkenning van taalhandelingen vroeg in 
de gespreksbeurt begint, wanneer de verbale uiting pas deels is verwerkt. Het 
argument voor vroege herkenning van taalhandelingen wordt versterkt doordat 
er geen ERP verschillen werden waargenomen tussen Afwijzingen en 
Antwoorden bij het laatste woord van de verbale uiting; herkenning van de actie 
lijkt plaats te vinden voor het laatste woord wanneer de voorgaande beurt zeer 
beperkend is in termen van welke actie er mogelijk kan volgen. Echter, de late 
negativiteit bij Pre-verzoeken laat zien dat aanvullende verwerking die 
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gebaseerd is op de complete verbale uiting vereist is bij complexere acties zoals 
Pre-verzoeken. Daarbij bevindt de taalhandeling zich in een minder beperkende 
context en wordt er een nieuwe actiesequentie geïnitieerd. Kort samengevat, 
levert Hoofdstuk 3 gedeeltelijke steun voor het argument dat taalhandelingen 
vroeg worden herkend. Bovendien laten de resultaten zien dat het tijdsverloop 
van de herkenning wordt beïnvloed door het soort taalhandeling dat wordt 
uitgevoerd en hoe deze in de grotere actiesequentie past. 
 Hoofdstuk 4 toetst de robuustheid van de ERP effecten gerelateerd aan 
taalhandelingen die werden waargenomen in Hoofdstuk 3. Een nadeel van de 
actiecategorisatietaak die werd gebruikt in Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 is dat het de 
aandacht op de cruciale taalhandelingen richtte en de mogelijke interpretatie 
hiervan beperkte. Gegeven dat ERP-componenten gemoduleerd kunnen worden 
door taakeisen (zie bijvoorbeeld: Chwilla, Brown, & Hagoort, 1995; Gunter & 
Friederici, 1999; Kuperberg, 2007; Roehm, Bornkessel-Schlesewsky, Rösler, & 
Schlesewsky, 2007), onderzoekt Hoofdstuk 4 of de ERP effecten die beschreven 
werden in Hoofdstuk 3 geïnduceerd werden door de categorisatietaak of dat ze 
generaliseren naar situaties waarin expliciete categorisatie niet vereist is. Het 
experiment in Hoofdstuk 4 gebruikte een waar/onwaar beoordelingstaak die 
begrip op het actie niveau meet zonder deelnemers van tevoren de mogelijke 
categorieën van taalhandelingen te verstrekken. Aanvullende fillerdialogen 
werden ook toegevoegd om strategische verwerking van de doeltaalhandelingen 
te verminderen. Hoofdstuk 4 repliceert twee van de drie ERP effecten die 
beschreven werden in Hoofdstuk 3, wat de robuustheid van deze effecten 
ondersteunt. Afwijzingen brachten een vroege frontale positiviteit teweeg vanaf 
200 ms na het begin van de verbale uiting, vergelijkbaar met de gecombineerde 
effecten van de twee frontale positiviteiten in het vorige experiment. Weer 
werden er geen ERP effecten gevonden bij het laatste woord in Afwijzingen 
relatief tot Antwoorden, wat aangeeft dat vroege herkenning van 
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taalhandelingen in Afwijzingen robuust is. De late negativiteit bij het laatste 
woord van de verbale uiting in Preverzoeken werd ook gerepliceerd. Echter, er 
werden geen vroege ERP effecten waargenomen bij Preverzoeken, in 
tegenstelling tot de vorige studie. Dit geeft aan dat de experimentele omgeving 
enigszins invloed uitoefent op de vroege herkenning van taalhandelingen, met 
name op de fronto-temporale positiviteit in de rechterhersenhelft bij 
Preverzoeken die werd gerapporteerd in Hoofdstuk 3. Het beeld dat ontstaat, 
gebaseerd op Hoofdstuk 4, is dat in zeer beperkende contexten, wanneer de 
actiesequentie aan een einde begint te komen – wat het geval is bij Afwijzingen - 
de herkenning van taalhandelingen 200 ms na het begin van de verbale uiting 
begint en wordt afgerond voordat het laatste, cruciale woord wordt gehoord. 
Echter, in minder beperkende contexten, wanneer een pre-sequentie wordt 
geïnitieerd – wat het geval is in Pre-verzoeken – is vroege verwerking van acties 
minder waarschijnlijk, en is de volledige propositie nodig om de taalhandeling te 
begrijpen. 
 Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt of het patroon van resultaten dat werd 
beschreven in Hoofdstuk 4 wordt ondersteund door tijdsfrequentie analyses van 
de EEG data in hetzelfde experiment. ERPs alleen reflecteren een bepaald deel 
van het EEG signaal dat gereleteerd is aan een gebeurtenis, namelijk  activiteit 
met dezelfde fase, welke achterblijft na het middelen in het tijdsdomein 
(Bastiaansen, Mazaheri, & Jensen, 2008; Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 1999). 
Door het analyseren van oscillerende activiteit met verschillende fasen, beoogt 
Hoofdstuk 5 een completer beeld van het tijdsverloop van de herkenning van 
taalhandelingen te geven. Het specifieke doel is om licht te werpen op de rol van 
anticipatieprocessen in de herkenning van taalhandelingen. De 
tijdsfrequentierepresentaties in de EEG data van Hoofdstuk 4 werden 
geanalyseerd. De herkenning van taalhandelingen was hoofdzakelijk gerelateerd 
aan een verminderde  sterkte van de alpha/beta golven net voor en tijdens het 
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begin van Afwijzingen; van -150 tot 50 ms na het begin van de doeluiting 
relatief tot Pre-verzoeken en van -100 tot 450 ms relatief tot Antwoorden. 
Gegeven de relatie tussen alpha/beta onderdrukking en anticipeerbare 
verwerking (bijv., Bastiaansen & Brunia, 2001; Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 
1999; van Ede, Szebényi, & Maris, 2014), blijkt uit deze resultaten dat 
anticipatieaandacht een rol speelt in de vroege herkenning van taalhandelingen 
in Afwijzingen. Het gebrek aan oscillerende effecten bij het laatste woord van de 
verbale uiting bij Afwijzingen sluit aan bij de ERP resultaten in Hoofdstuk 3 en 
4, wat verdere steun levert voor de vroege herkenning van taalhandelingen in 
Afwijzingen. Ten slotte werden er geen sterkteverschillen waargenomen tussen 
Pre-verzoeken en Antwoorden, wat aangeeft dat ERPs (met name late 
negativiteit) gevoeliger zijn voor de herkenning van taalhandelingen in Pre-
verzoeken dan hersengolven. Over het algemeen onderbouwen de resultaten het 
tijdsverloop van de herkenning van gesproken taalhandelingen zoals beschreven 
in Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 en leveren bewijs dat vroege herkenning van de actie in 
Afwijzingen samengaat met anticipeerbare aandacht voor de taalhandeling al 
150 ms voordat de verbale uiting begint. 
 Hoofdstuk 6 geeft een samenvatting van de belangrijkste empirische 
bevindingen, bespreekt hun theoretische implicaties en geeft richting voor 
toekomstig onderzoek. De belangrijkste bevinding van dit proefschrift is dat 
onder sommige omstandigheden luisteraars de taalhandeling van een lopende 
verbale uiting kunnen oppikken nog voor deze is afgerond – voordat het laatste, 
cruciale woord is gehoord. Deze bevinding betwist de klassieke pragmatische 
theorie (bijv., Grice, 1975; Searle, 1975) die aanneemt dat luisteraars eerst de 
semantische inhoud van een complete zin moeten verwerken voor ze kunnen 
begrijpen wat de spreker werkelijk bedoelt met zijn of haar verbale uiting. De 
resultaten geven ook problemen voor de meer recente pragmatische kaders 
(bijv., Levinson, 2000; Sperber & Wilson, 1986, 2002), aangezien deze geen 
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rekening houden met de sequentiële beperkingen die werkzaam zijn tussen 
taalhandelingen in een gesprek. De bevinding dat luisteraars taalhandelingen 
nog voor hun afronding kunnen herkennen suggereert dat predictie tijdens 
taalcomprehensie niet beperkt is tot het niveau van individuele lexicale 
elementen of hun syntactische, semantische of conceptuele kenmerken (bijv., 
Altmann & Kamide, 1999; Federmeier, 2007; Kutas, Delong, & Smith, 2011; 
Thornhill & Van Petten, 2012), maar ook plaatsvindt op het niveau van 
taalhandelingen. Hoofdstuk 6 speculeert kort over de mechanismen die zulke 
predictie van taalhandelingen mogelijk maken. 
 Een andere belangrijke bevinding van dit proefschrift is dat het begrip 
van een uiting wordt beïnvloedt door het soort taalhandeling dat de uiting 
uitvoert en hoe deze past in de sequentiële context. Dit vraagt om een bredere 
kijk op de kwestie dan het onderzoek naar begrip van “directe” versus 
“indirecte” taalhandelingen (bijv., Basnakova, Weber, Petersson, Van Berkum, & 
Hagoort, 2014; Coulson & Lovett, 2010; van Ackeren, Casasanto, Bekkering, 
Hagoort, & Rüschemeyer, 2012). Een meer verfijnde aanpak die rekening houdt 
met het soort taalhandeling en hun sequentiële organisatie in beurtwisseling is 
gewenst. Hoofdstuk 6 stelt dat abstracte kennis van sequenties van 
taalhandelingen, geconceptualiseerd als scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977) of 
schema’s (Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Rumelhart, 1980) in het geheugen, een 
cruciale rol zouden kunnen spelen in de vroege herkenning van taalhandelingen. 
 Een derde belangrijke bevinding is dat de frontale positiviteit vroeg in de 
verbale uiting bij Afwijzingen en de late negativiteit bij het laatste woord bij 
Pre-verzoeken relatief robuust zijn in verschillende experimentele taken en 
designs. Dus deze ERP-effecten leveren een maatstaf voor toekomstig onderzoek 
naar de herkenning van taalhandelingen en pragmatisch taalbegrip in het 
algemeen, aangezien het begrijpen van taalhandelingen waarschijnlijk 
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voortkomt uit cognitieve mechanismen die ook gebruikt worden voor andere 
aspecten van linguïstische en sociale verwerking. 
 Het proefschrift eindigt met een bespreking van overige vragen die 
gerelateerd zijn aan het begrijpen van taalhandelingen in een bredere context, 
zoals de invloed van de linguïstische vorm van de verbale uiting op de 
herkenning van taalhandelingen; implicaties van de bevindingen van het 
proefschrift voor onderzoek naar de timing van beurtwisselingen; de rol van 
theory of mind en affectieve empathie in de herkenning van taalhandelingen; het 
verschil tussen passief belsuiteren van een gesprek en interactie; en de relatie 
tussen het verbaal en non-verbaal begrip van acties. 
 Samenvattend illustreert dit proefschrift hoe een interdisciplinaire 
aanpak, die EEG methodologie combineert met bevindingen van conversatie-
analyse en corpus onderzoek, nieuwe inzichten kan leveren in de herkenning 
van taalhandelingen – een belangrijke cognitieve capaciteit die ten grondslag ligt 
aan succesvolle conversationele interactie. 
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